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Stochasticity in Games: Theory and Experiment
Evan Friedman
A large literature has documented a pattern of stochastic, or random, choice in individual decision
making. In games, in which payoffs depend on beliefs over opponents’ behavior, another
potentially important source of stochasticity is in the beliefs themselves. Hence, there may be both
“noisy actions” and “noisy beliefs”. This dissertation explores the equilibrium implications of both
types of noise in normal form games. Theory is developed to understand the effects of noisy beliefs,
and the model is compared to the canonical model of noisy actions. Predictions—and
assumptions—are tested using existing and novel experimental data.
Chapter 1 introduces noisy belief equilibrium (NBE) for normal form games, a model that
injects “noisy beliefs” into an otherwise standard equilibrium framework. Axioms restrict the belief
distributions to be unbiased with respect to and responsive to changes in the opponents’ behavior.
We compare NBE to an axiomatic form of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) in which players
have correct beliefs over their opponents’ behavior, but take “noisy actions”. We show that NBE
generates similar predictions as QRE such as the “own-payoff effect”, and yet is more consistent
with the empirically documented effects of changes in payoff magnitude. Unlike QRE, NBE is a
refinement of rationalizability and invariant to affine transformations of payoffs.
Chapter 2, joint with Jeremy Ward, studies an equilibrium model in which there is both
“noisy actions” and “noisy beliefs”. The model primitives are an action-map, which determines a
distribution of actions given beliefs, and a belief-map, which determines a distribution of beliefs
given opponents’ behavior. These are restricted to satisfy the axioms of QRE and NBE,
respectively, which are simply stochastic generalizations of “best response” and “correct beliefs”.
In our laboratory experiment, we collect actions data and elicit beliefs for each game within a
family of asymmetric 2-player games. These games have systematically varied payoffs, allowing us
to “trace out” both the action- and belief-maps. We find that, while both sources of noise are
important in explaining observed behaviors, there are systematic violations of the axioms. In
particular, although all subjects observe and play the same games, subjects in different roles have
qualitatively different belief biases. To explain this, we argue that the player role itself induces a
higher degree of strategic sophistication in the player who faces more asymmetric payoffs. This is
confirmed by structural estimates.
Chapter 3 considers logit QRE (LQRE), the common parametric form of QRE; and we
endogenize its precision parameter _, which controls the degree of “noisy actions”. In the first stage
of an endogenous quantal response equilibrium (EQRE), each player chooses her precision
optimally subject to costs, taking as given other players’ (second-stage) behavior. In the second
stage, the distribution of players’ actions is a heterogenous LQRE given the profile of first-stage
precision choices. EQRE satisfies a modified version of the regularity axioms, nests LQRE as a
limiting case for a sequence of cost functions, and admits analogues of classic results for LQRE
such as those for equilibrium selection. We show how EQRE differs from LQRE using the family
of generalized matching pennies games.
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Chapter 1: Stochastic Equilibria: Noise in Actions or Beliefs?
1.1 Introduction
Game theory rests on Nash equilibrium (NE) as its central concept, but despite its appeal and
influence, it fails to capture the richness of experimental data. Systematic deviations from NE
predictions have been documented, even in some of the simplest games.
NE rests on two assumptions. First, players form accurate beliefs over their opponents’ actions.
Second, players best respond to these beliefs. Efforts to reconcile theory with data typically amount
to weakenings of these strict assumptions.
One leading example is quantal response equilibrium (QRE) ([1]), which is very much like
NE, but relaxes the assumption of best response. That is, each player forms correct beliefs over the
distribution of opponents’ actions, and though he tends to take better actions (by expected utility),
he fails to do so with probability one. Simply put, QRE is an equilibrium model with “noise in
actions”.
In many contexts, however, the assumption of correct beliefs is unrealistic. Therefore, it is
natural to consider equilibrium models which relax the other condition of NE by allowing for
“noise in beliefs” while maintaining best response. In this paper, we introduce such a model and by
comparing it to QRE, we ask: which of action- or belief-noise is more consistent with experimental
data?
Since we do not want our conclusions to depend on specific functional forms, we begin by
introducing a general class of equilibrium models with noisy beliefs. In a noisy belief equilibrium
(NBE), players best respond to their beliefs, but their beliefs are drawn from distributions that
depend on the opponents’ equilibrium behavior. The belief distributions are restricted to satisfy
several axioms. The important behavioral axioms are belief-responsiveness and unbiasedness, which
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ensure that the belief distributions (1) tend to track changes in opponents’ behavior and (2) are
appropriately centered around the distribution of opponents’ actions in equilibrium.
We study the testable restrictions of NBE, which we compare to those of regular QRE ([2]) in
which axioms embed a sensitivity to payoff differences into the primitive quantal response function.1
This is essentially the most flexible form of QRE which imposes testable restrictions on the data,
and so we avoid altogether any concerns that QRE can “explain anything” (see, for example, [3]).2
Thus, we compare two families of stochastic equilibrium models, which inject noise into actions
and beliefs, respectively.
While the idea of injecting noise into beliefs is not new (see Related Literature below), an
approach that does not rely on parametric structure brings new insights. For example, some
existing parametric models approximately satisfy our axioms and hence give predictions that can be
approximated by NBE; and so our results have implications for understanding these models and
their relationship to QRE.
In Section 2, we introduce NBE for normal form games and discuss the relationship of NBE to
other concepts that relax the assumption of perfect beliefs. In particular, we show that NBE is a
refinement of rationalizability ([4] and [5]) in the sense that only rationalizable actions are played
with positive probability in equilibrium. This distinguishes NBE from QRE, and yet we show that
the models make similar predictions in certain types of fully mixed games.
In Section 3, we study the two empirical regularities explained by QRE that lie at the heart of its
success. Specifically, in fully mixed games, QRE predicts (1) the commonly observed deviations
from NE within a game, and (2) the well-known “own payoff effect” across games.3 The best
1For each player, the quantal response function maps his vector of expected utilities (i.e. each element representing
the expected payoff to some action) to a distribution over actions. The axioms impose that actions with higher payoffs
are played more often (monotonicity), and that an increase in the payoff to some action increases the probability it is
played (responsiveness).
2[3] study structural QRE in which quantal response is induced by taking the action that maximizes the sum of
expected utility and a random error. They show that the data from any one game can be rationalized as a structural QRE
as long as the errors are not i.i.d. across players’ actions. On the other hand, the class of regular QRE does impose
restrictions and is more general than the class of structural QRE with i.i.d. errors ([2]).
3Whereas NE predicts that a change in a player’s own payoffs does not affect his behavior since the other players
have to be kept indifferent, subjects’ behavior is systematically affected by non-affine transformations of their payoffs.
See, for example, [6] and [7].
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evidence for these regularities comes from generalized matching pennies games, so we specialize
results for this context. We begin by showing an equivalence result: NBE imposes the same testable
restrictions as QRE within any one of these games. We then show that NBE also predicts the own
payoff effect across games. In other words, by adding noise to beliefs, it is as if players are sensitive
to expected payoff differences–the mechanism behind QRE.
In Section 4, we revisit a sticking point for QRE, that it over-predicts sensitivity to changes in
payoff magnitude. The problem is well-known for the parametric logit model: for fixed _ (rationality
parameter), equilibrium predictions are sensitive to scaling one or more players’ payoffs by positive
constants. Such predictions have been tested experimentally by [8], who find that subjects’ behavior
within a game is qualitatively consistent with logit, but the scaling predictions across games find
little support as subjects’ behavior is unaffected by scale. We provide novel results to establish
that this “scaling issue” is general to all regular QRE in the sense that, if QRE is to explain the
empirical regularities discussed in the previous paragraph, it must be non-trivially sensitive to
affine transformations of payoffs. In other words, QRE can be made nearly invariant to affine
transformations of games, but only by being nearly insensitive to payoff differences within a game.
By contrast, NBE explains the empirical regularities while being invariant to affine transformations,
which is more consistent with experimental findings.
In Sections 5 and 6, we consider several datasets to test model predictions. Revisiting the [8]
study on scale effects, and using only the structure provided by the models’ axioms, we show
that NBE is a better qualitative description than QRE of the whole dataset. Both models capture
deviations from NE within a game, but only NBE can explain the absence of scale effects and
other patterns in behavior across games. After developing a parametric NBE model based on the
logit transform, we compare its performance to that of logit QRE in data from several existing
studies on 2 × 2 and 3 × 3 games. We find that the models perform similarly when fit to individual
games in-sample, which is unsurprising due to our equivalence result. However, we show that NBE
outperforms QRE in making out-of-sample predictions across games of varying scale and in fitting
sets of games pooled together.
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The paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of this section, we discuss related literature.
Section 1.2 reviews QRE and introduces NBE, Section 1.3 compares the models’ within-game
restrictions and studies the own payoff effect, Section 1.4 establishes payoff magnitude predictions,
Section 1.5 introduces the parametric logit transform NBE, Section 1.6 tests model predictions in
data, and Section 2.10 concludes.
Related Literature. Early QRE theory was developed in a series of papers ([1], [9], [10], and
others) and is surveyed in a recent textbook ([11]). The logit specification was introduced in the
original paper and has since found wide application in experimental studies where it is used to
reconcile data with theoretical predictions.
Our task in this paper is to study and compare equilibrium models with noise in actions to those
with noise in beliefs. For each type of noise, we select a representative family of models.
For noisy actions, we seek a family of QRE models that is both flexible and falsifiable, and so
we choose regular QRE ([2]) in which axioms restrict the quantal response functions directly. The
other alternative would have been the family of structural QRE (see, for example, [3]) in which
quantal response is induced by players who choose actions that maximize the sum of expected
utility and a random error. However, [3] show that structural QRE can rationalize the data from any
one game as long as the errors are not restricted to be i.i.d. across players’ actions. By contrast,
regular QRE imposes testable restrictions and is strictly more general than the family of structural
QRE with i.i.d. errors.
For noisy beliefs, we develop a new model which we call noisy belief equilibrium (NBE). It is
analogous to regular QRE in that its primitive, the mapping from opponents’ actions to distributions
over beliefs, is restricted to satisfy several axioms. Like regular QRE, flexibility in its primitive
typically leads to set predictions; and by excluding a measure of possible outcomes, is falsifiable.
For injecting noise into equilibrium beliefs, NBE adapts the basic framework of random belief
equilibrium (RBE) of [12] (no relation to the author of this paper). In their model, players best
respond to beliefs that depend stochastically on the opponents’ behavior, but as they study the case
in which belief-noise “goes to zero” to develop a theory of equilibrium selection, their conditions
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on belief distributions do not impose any testable restrictions beyond ruling out weakly dominated
actions. On the other hand, our paper is concerned with characterizing equilibria when belief-noise
is bounded away from zero, so we introduce a new model and provide non-overlapping results.
After introducing NBE, we give a more detailed discussion in Section 1.2.4.
Another model similar to NBE is sampling equilibrium of [13], which was applied to experimen-
tal data in [14]. Sampling equilibrium is a parametric model of noisy beliefs, which approximately
satisfies the NBE axioms and thus (up to technical conditions) is a special case of NBE (see Section
1.2.4 for details). Our results therefore suggest that it will behave similarly to QRE in certain
datasets. Less related to NBE, but similar in spirit, [15] and [16] introduce equilibrium models with
biased but deterministic beliefs.
We emphasize that NBE, as well as a number of other beliefs-based models, is invariant to affine
transformations of payoffs. This is of interest because logit QRE is well-known to over-predict
sensitivity to changes in scale ([8]); and to address this “scaling issue”, several parametric QRE
models have been proposed.4 However, we show that all regular QRE must be non-trivially sensitive
to scaling and/or translating payoffs if they are to explain the two empirical regularities for which
QRE is renowned. Hence, we argue that the scaling issue cannot be adequately addressed within the
QRE framework. On the other hand, we show that beliefs-based models can explain the empirical
regularities while being invariant to both scale and translation.
Our approach to mistaken beliefs can be contrasted with those that drop the equilibrium as-
sumption altogether. Rationalizability ([4] and [5]) is an early concept that allows for any belief
not excluded by rationality and common knowledge of rationality.5 Level : ([20] and [21]) and its
successors ([22], [23], and others) assume that subjects’ beliefs are determined by their “depths
of reasoning” or how many iterations of best response they can calculate. [24] models beliefs as
random draws from a Bayesian posterior.
4Approaches include augmenting logit QRE with risk aversion ([7]) or heterogenous _s ([8]); or endogenizing _ as
a strategic decision ([17] and [18]).
5[19] introduce noisy rationalizability in which “noise is injected into iterated conjectures about others’ decisions
and beliefs” that is better suited for application to experimental data.
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1.2 Stochastic Equilibria
We provide the notation for normal form games, review QRE, introduce NBE, and discuss the
relationship of NBE to other concepts.
1.2.1 Normal Form Games
A finite, normal form game Γ = {#, , D}, is defined by a set of players # = {1, ..., =}, action
space  = 1 × ... × = with 8 = {081, ..., 08 (8)} such that each player 8 has  (8) possible pure
actions ( =
∑
8  (8) actions total), and a vector of payoff functions D = (D1, ..., D=) with D8 : → R.
Let Δ 8 be the set of probability measures on 8. Elements of Δ 8 are of the form f8 : 8 → R
where
∑ (8)
9=1 f8 (08 9 ) = 1 and f8 (08 9 ) ≥ 0. For simplicity, set f8 9 ≡ f8 (08 9 ). Define Δ = Δ1 × ...×Δ=
and Δ−8 = ×:≠8Δ : with typical elements f ∈ Δ and f−8 ∈ Δ−8. As is standard, extend payoff
functions D = (D1, ..., D=) to be defined over Δ via D8 (f) =
∑
0∈ f(0)D8 (0). For convenience, we
will call any element of Δ an “action”, regardless of whether it is pure or mixed, and we use these
terms only when the distinction is important.
1.2.2 Quantal Response Equilibrium
As is standard in the literature on quantal response equilibrium (QRE), we use additional
notation for expected utilities. Given f−8 ∈ Δ−8, player 8’s vector of expected utilities is given by
D̄8 (f−8) = (D̄81(f−8), ..., D̄8 (8) (f−8)) ∈ R (8) where D̄8 9 (f−8) = D8 (08 9 , f−8) is the expected utility to
action 08 9 given behavior of the opponents. We use E8 = (E81, ..., E8 (8)) ∈ R (8) as shorthand for an
arbitrary vector of expected utilities. That is, E8 is understood to satisfy E8 = D̄8 (f
′
−8) for some f
′
−8.
Player 8’s behavior is modeled via the quantal response function &8 = (&81, ..., &8 (8)) : R (8) →
Δ 8, which maps his vector of expected utilities to a distribution over actions. For any E8 ∈ R (8) ,
component &8 9 (E8) gives the probability assigned to action 9 . Intuitively, &8 allows for arbitrary
probabilistic mistakes in taking actions given the payoffs to each action, resulting perhaps from
unmodeled costs of information processing.
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To impose testable restrictions on data, we follow [2] by imposing the regularity axioms on the
quantal response functions. Regularity defines a very important class of QRE models in that (1)
regularity imposes testable restrictions on the data, and (2) all structural QRE6 with i.i.d. errors
(such as logit) are regular. In other words, the class of regular QRE is flexible enough to include the
large majority of applications while still maintaining empirical content (i.e. the [3] critique simply
does not apply); so we impose the axioms throughout:
1. Quantal response function & satisfies (A1)-(A4):
(A1) Interiority: &8 9 (E8) ∈ (0, 1) for all 9 ∈ 1, ...,  (8) and for all E8 ∈ R (8) .
(A2) Continuity: &8 9 (E8) is a continuous and differentiable function for all E8 ∈ R (8) .
(A3) Responsiveness: m&8 9 (E8)
mE8 9
> 0 for all 9 ∈ 1, ...,  (8) and for all E8 ∈ R (8) .
(A4) Monotonicity: E8 9 > E8: =⇒ &8 9 (E8) > &8: (E8) for all 9 , : ∈ 1, ...,  (8).
Responsiveness and monotonicity are the important behavioral axioms, and can be summarized
as “sensitivity to payoff differences”. These require that an all-else-equal increase in the payoff to
some action increases the probability it is played, and that actions with higher payoffs are played
with greater probability. The other axioms are technical in nature, ensuring existence and that all
actions are played with positive probability.
A QRE is obtained when the distribution over all players’ actions is consistent with their quantal
response functions. Letting & = (&1, ..., &=) and D̄ = (D̄1, ..., D̄=), QRE is any fixed point of the
composite function & ◦ D̄ : Δ → Δ .
1. Fix {Γ, &}. A QRE is any f ∈ Δ such that for all 8 ∈ 1, ..., = and all 9 ∈ 1, ...,  (8), f8 9 =
&8 9 (D̄8 (f−8)).
6In a structural QRE, player 8 chooses the action that maximizes the sum of expected utility and a random error, and
thus &8 9 (E8) = P(E8 9 + Y8 9 ≥ E8: + Y8: ∀:).
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1.2.3 Noisy Belief Equilibrium
In a noisy belief equilibrium (NBE), players draw beliefs about their opponents’ actions prob-
abilistically to which they best respond. This induces, for each player, an expected action. In
equilibrium, the belief distributions are centered in some sense around the opponents’ expected
actions, which are similarly induced by best responding to realized beliefs.
Randomness in beliefs can be interpreted in several ways. It could result from mistakes in
“solving” for an equilibrium or from noisy signals about opponents’ behavior. It could also be
that each player represents a population of subjects who form beliefs deterministically, and the
distribution of beliefs simply reflects heterogeneity in the population. To justify our axioms, however,
we argue that they capture the key restrictions imposed on beliefs by models of sampling (e.g. [13]),
but allow for very general sampling processes.
An example
Before defining NBE for normal form games in the next section, we introduce it using our
leading example: the family of generalized matching pennies games. Consisting of all 2 × 2 games
with unique fully mixed NE, this family has been the subject of numerous experimental studies.
The NBE of these games take a simple form, allowing us to introduce key ideas concisely.
Generalized matching pennies is defined by the payoff matrix in Figure 3.3.7 We use the notation
Γ< for an arbitrary game in this family. The parameters 0! , 0', 1* , and 1 give the base payoffs.
The parameters 2! , 2', 3* , and 3 are the payoff differences, which we assume are strictly positive
to maintain the relevant features.8 Since each player has only two actions in Γ<, we identify Δ 8
with [0, 1] and Δ with [0, 1]2. We also write f* and f! for the probabilities of playing* and !,
respectively. As has been our convention, we refer to f* and f! as “actions” even though they








depends only on the payoff differences.
7This notation is borrowed from [14] with slight modification.
8Games in which the payoff differences are all strictly negative are equivalent up to the labelling of actions.
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Figure 1.1: Generalized matching pennies
L R
U
1* 1* + 3* U: up D: down
L: left R: right
player 1’s payoff in lower-left corner
0! + 2! 0' player 2’s payoff in upper-right corner
D
1 + 3 1
0! , 0', 1* , 1 ∈ R
2! , 2', 3* , 3 > 0
0! 0' + 2'
More generally, for any game in which player : has two pure actions (i.e.  (:) = 2), we use
A ∈ [0, 1] to refer to player :’s action. This is simply to avoid using subscripts. In Γ<, for example,
A should be understood as one of f* or f! depending on the context.
In Γ<, or any game in which  (:) = 2, player :’s action is A ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that player
8’s belief over :’s action is drawn from a distribution that depends on A. In other words, player 8’s
belief is a random variable that we denote A∗(A), which is supported on [0, 1]. We call this family
of random variables the belief-map (following [12]), and it is defined by a family of CDFs: for
any potential belief Ā ∈ [0, 1], 8
:
(Ā |A) is the probability of realizing a belief less than or equal to Ā
given that player : is playing A .
After realizing belief A
′
, player 8 takes an action. This is summarized by a strategy B8 = (B81, B82)
in which component B8 9 : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a measurable function mapping realized beliefs to the
probability of taking action 08 9 (B8 must satisfy B81(A
′) + B82(A
′) = 1 for all A ′ ∈ [0, 1]). Without
loss, action 08 9 is a best response to any belief in [0, Ā8] and action 08; is a best response to any
belief in [Ā8, 1], where {Ā1, Ā2} = {f#! , f
#
*
} are the indifferent beliefs that correspond to the Nash
equilibrium of Γ<. We say that B8 is rational if it indicates a best response to any realized belief:
B8 9 (A
′) = 1 for A ′ < Ā8 and B8 9 (A
′) = 0 for A ′ > Ā8. Since any B8 9 (Ā8) ∈ [0, 1] is a best response,
there are many rational strategies (all of which agree on A
′
≠ Ā8). We define player 8’s expected
best response correspondence or reaction correspondence as the set of expected actions that can
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be induced by best response (i.e. integrating over any rational strategy) as a function of player :’s
action A:





′ |A) : B8 is rational}. (1.1)
Before defining equilibrium, we restrict the belief-map to satisfy several axioms that will both
simplify the form of the reaction (1.1) and impose testable restrictions. We introduce the axioms
here for the binary-action case and will generalize them to allow for arbitrary numbers of actions
in the next section. The axioms capture, in reduced form, the key restrictions imposed on beliefs
by models of sampling (e.g. [13]), but allow for very general sampling processes. We discuss this
further when comparing NBE to other concepts in Section 1.2.4.
2. If  (:) = 2, the belief-map A∗ satisfies (B1′)-(B4′):
(B1
′
) Interior full support: For any A ∈ (0, 1), 8
:
(Ā |A) is strictly increasing and continuous in
Ā ∈ [0, 1]; A∗(0) = 0 and A∗(1) = 1 with probability 1.9
(B2
′
) Continuity: For any Ā ∈ (0, 1), 8
:
(Ā |A) is continuous in A ∈ [0, 1].
(B3
′
) Belief-responsiveness: For all A < A ′ ∈ [0, 1], 8
:
(Ā |A ′) < 8
:










) are technical in nature and will be shown to ensure existence of equilibria
and that the other axioms are well-defined. (B3
′
) restricts belief distributions to be responsive to
changes in the opponent’s behavior, (B4
′
) restricts belief distributions to be unbiased with respect to
the opponent’s action, and both axioms are required to meaningfully restrict the set of equilibrium
outcomes. We explain each axiom in turn.
Interior full support (B1
′
) requires that belief distributions are atomless and have full support
when the opponent’s action is interior, i.e. for A ∈ (0, 1).10 It further imposes that beliefs are correct
with probability one (and therefore described by a single atom) when the opponent’s action is on
9This is equivalent to having CDFs that satisfy 8
:
(Ā |0) = 1 and 8
:
(Ā |1) = 1{Ā=1} for Ā ∈ [0, 1].
10Even though beliefs have full support in this case, the probability that beliefs realize in any open subset of [0, 1]
can still be made arbitrarily small; in this sense the axiom is very weak.
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the boundary, i.e. for A ∈ {0, 1}. Otherwise, beliefs would necessarily be biased.11 (B1′) and the
structure of Γ< make the form of the reaction (1.1) particularly simple. Since the indifferent belief
Ā8 is interior, it realizes with probability zero for all A ∈ [0, 1]. Since all rational strategies agree
on A
′
≠ Ā8, the reactions are single-valued functions indicating the probabilities with which* (for
player 1) and ! (for player 2) are best responses to realized beliefs:
Ψ* (f!) ≡1 − 12 (f
#
! |f!)





) implies that Ψ = (Ψ* ,Ψ!) : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2 is continuous in (f* , f!),




) together imply that
Ψ is jointly continuous in (f* , f!) and the payoff parameters, which will ensure that equilibria do
not jump for small changes in the game. Importantly, despite that the reactions are continuous, we
make the following remark:
1. There are discontinuities in beliefs: there exists a (Borel) subset of [0, 1] for which the probability
that player 8’s beliefs realize in that set is discontinuous in :’s action A.
For instance, by (B1
′
), the probability that belief A
′
= 0 realizes jumps from 0 to 1 as the opponent’s
action approaches 0, i.e. as A → 0+. More generally, there are other belief-discontinuities associated




), it is easy to characterize all
belief-discontinuities.12 Intuitively, since beliefs have full support and are atomless for all interior
A, but are correct with probability one when A is on the boundary, all discontinuities are related to
sets of realized beliefs nearby one of the boundaries and A approaching that same boundary. In Γ<,
11If beliefs are not correct with probability one when A ∈ {0, 1}, beliefs would be biased on mean, and if they are
correct with probability less than one half, than they would be biased on median.
12Characterizing belief-discontinuities ( (:) = 2). We discuss the case that A is nearby 0, with the case of A nearby
1 being symmetric. Let `8
:
(·|A) be the probability measure on [0, 1] derived from 8
:
(·|A). From (B1′) and (B2′), it
is easy to check that `8
:
(·|·) satisfies (1) `8
:
({0}|A) = 0 for A > 0, (2) `8
:
({0}|0) = 1, (3) `8
:
( [0, n) |A) is continuous
in A ∈ [0, 1], and (4) `8
:




((0, n) |A) as
A → 0+, which jump from 0 to 1 and 1 to 0, respectively. More generally, letting , : ⊂ [0, 1] be Borel subsets, there
is a discontinuity in `8
:
(: |A) as A → 0+ if and only if : = {0} ∪  or : = (0, n) ∪  where  is well-separated
from 0 (i.e. 2; () ∩ {0} = ∅).
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the reactions are continuous despite the existence of belief-discontinuities because the probability
that beliefs realize in any of the “relevant” sets–the largest which induce unique best responses–are
continuous in A. This issue of belief-discontinuities will require special care when generalizing
NBE to arbitrary games, but we will still find that the reactions are continuous in generic games.
Belief-responsiveness (B3
′
) ensures that belief distributions shift in the same direction as changes
in the opponent’s action. To capture this idea, we use the notion of first-order stochastic dominance
(FOSD). Importantly, (B3
′
) implies that Ψ* (f!) and Ψ! (f*) are strictly increasing and strictly
decreasing respectively, which will imply a unique equilibrium in Γ<.
Unbiasedness (B4
′
) imposes that beliefs are correct on median. An implication of (B4
′
) in Γ< is
that if player : is playing the indifferent action that equalizes the (objective) expected utility to both
of player 8’s actions, the probability of taking either action is exactly one half. On the other hand,
replacing (B4
′
) with mean-unbiasedness would place no restriction on player 8’s reaction when :
plays the indifferent action. Nonetheless, it may still be of interest to impose mean-unbiasedness in
some applications, so we note that it is consistent with (B4
′
) (and the other axioms) and therefore
could be imposed in addition. In Section 1.2.4, we discuss how both (B4
′
) and its mean-based
counterpart can be microfounded via sampling.
2. Fix {Γ<, f∗}. An NBE is any (f* , f!) ∈ [0, 1]2 such that Ψ* (f!) = f* and Ψ! (f*) = f! .
1. Fix {Γ<, f∗}. An NBE exists and is unique and interior.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.2. 
Normal Form Games
We generalize NBE to normal form games. To this end, we adapt the framework of random
belief equilibrium (RBE) ([12]), but restrict the belief distributions to satisfy axioms in order to
impose testable restrictions on the data. The general axioms nest their binary-action counterparts
from the previous section.
Given player :’s action f: ∈ Δ : , player 8’s beliefs over :’s action are given by random vector
f8∗
:
(f: ) = (f8∗:1(f: ), ..., f
8∗
: (:) (f: )) that is supported on Δ : . We call this family of random vectors
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player 8’s belief-map over player :’s action. For convenience, refer to all players’ belief-maps
by f∗ ≡ (f8∗
:
)8,:≠8, and for all f−8 ∈ Δ−8, define belief-maps over 8’s opponents’ actions by
f∗−8 (f−8) ≡ (f8∗: (f: )):≠8.
For each f: ∈ Δ : , f8∗: (f: ) is defined by probability measure `
8
:
(·|f: ) on B(Δ : ), the Borel
f-algebra on Δ : , which gives the probability that beliefs are realized in any : ∈ B(Δ : ). Assume
that all of :’s opponents draw their beliefs about : independently conditional on f: , and player 8’s
beliefs about any two of his opponents are drawn independently conditional on their actions. Thus,
for all f−8 ∈ Δ−8, f∗−8 (f−8) is associated with the product measure: `−8 ( |f−8) ≡ Π:≠8`8: (: |f: )
for any  = ×:≠8: ∈ ⊗:≠8B(Δ : ) ≡ B(Δ−8).
Define the 8 9-response set '8 9 ⊆ Δ−8 by
'8 9 = {f
′
−8 : D̄8 9 (f
′
−8) ≥ D̄8: (f
′
−8) ∀: = 1, ...,  (8)}. (1.2)
This defines the set of beliefs about 8’s opponents for which action 08 9 is a best response.13 A





−8) ≥ 0 and
∑ (8)
9=1 B8 9 (f
′
−8) = 1. As before, this maps any realized belief to an action. Strategy
B8 is rational if it only puts positive probability on best responses: B8 9 (f
′
−8) = 0 if f
′
−8 ∉ '8 9 .
Given any f−8 ∈ Δ−8, player 8’s belief-map f∗−8 induces a distribution over his realized beliefs
and thus also over his actions through his strategy B8. Integrating 8’s strategy over his realized beliefs
via the measure `−8 (·|f−8) gives an expected action. Restricting attention to rational strategies
in which player 8 best responds to realized beliefs, we define player 8’s expected best response
correspondence or reaction correspondence as







−8 |f−8) : B8 is rational}. (1.3)
This maps the opponents’ action profile f−8 to the set of 8’s expected actions that can be induced by
best responding to realized beliefs.
13Note that '8 9 ∈ B(Δ−8), i.e. that the response sets are measurable.
13
Correspondence (1.3) generalizes the best response correspondence of NE, and analogous to
NE, NBE will be defined as a fixed point of (Ψ;f∗) = ((Ψ1;f∗−1), ..., (Ψ=;f
∗
−=)) : Δ ⇒ Δ . Note
that while the belief distributions depend on the opponents’ expected actions, the dependence is
arbitrary without additional restrictions on f∗.




) from the previous section to allow for arbitrary numbers
of actions. Our general technical axioms interior full support and continuity require that belief
distributions (1) are supported on the lower dimensional simplex over opponents’ pure actions that
are played with positive probability and (2) vary with the opponents’ actions as continuously as
possible, given the previous point. As in the binary-action case, these conditions are necessary to
accommodate our behavioral axioms but imply that the belief distributions involve discontinuities
associated with opponents’ actions nearby the boundary. However, as in the matching pennies
example, the reactions of which NBE is a fixed point will be continuous in generic games (and
upper hemicontinuous for all games).
To state the axioms, we require additional notation. For any action f: ∈ Δ : , define Δ (f: ) ≡
{f ′
:
∈ Δ : : BD??(f
′
:
) = BD??(f: )} as the subset of Δ : in which each element is a probability
vector that has the same support as f: (i.e. has 0s in precisely the same components as f:). For
example, if f: = (0, 12 ,
1
2 ), then Δ (f: ) = {(0, ?, 1 − ?) : ? ∈ (0, 1)}. Let 〈Δ : ,B(Δ : ),L:〉 be
the Lebesgue probability space on Δ : where L: is the Lebesgue measure. For each f: , we also
define the Lebesgue probability space 〈Δ (f: ),B(Δ (f: )),LΔ (f: ): 〉, where B(Δ (f: )) is the Borel
f-algebra on Δ (f: ) and LΔ (f: ): is the Lebesgue measure on Δ (f: ).
14 Note that if f: has 0 in some
component and  ∈ B(Δ (f: )), then L: () = 0. For example, if f: = (0, 12 ,
1
2 ), L: (Δ (f: )) = 0
even though LΔ (f: )
:
(Δ (f: )) = 1. We now state our technical axioms:
(B1) Interior full support: `8
:
(: |f: ) > 0 if and only if LΔ (f: ): (: ∩ Δ (f: )) > 0.
(B2) Continuity: Let {fC
:
} ⊂ Δ : be a sequence with fC: → f
∞
:




(: |fC: ) =
`8
:
(: |f∞: ) if, for sufficiently large C, either (i) {f
C
:
} ⊂ Δ (f∞
:







∈ Δ (f: ), then Δ (f
′
:
) = Δ (f: ), so this defines only finite probability spaces.
14










Notes: This figure plots the simplex that defines player :’s action when he has 3 pure actions. Consider the sets , ,
and .  is entirely in the interior of the simplex, but 2; () ∩  = , where  is a subset of {(?, 1− ?, 0) : ? ∈ (0, 1)},
and  = {(1, 0, 0)}. Now consider the sequence {fC
:
}C drawn as the black arrow, which starts from the interior and
limits to f∞
:


































) > 0. However, by (B2), there is not a discontinuity in `8
:
( ∪  |fC
:
) as C →∞ because  and  overlap
in the sense of (B2)-(ii).
Interior full support says that (1) the support of belief distributions is the subset of the simplex
(over the opponent’s pure actions) whose elements put positive probability on the opponent’s pure
actions that are played with positive probability, and (2) the belief measure is absolutely continuous
with respect to the relevant Lebesgue measure. Suppose the opponent’s action is f: . Then, Δ (f: )
is the set of beliefs over :’s action that put positive probability precisely on the pure actions that
: plays with positive probability. The axiom says that the probability beliefs realize in : will be
positive if and only if there is a nontrivial intersection of : with Δ (f: ). The “only if” part implies
15That is, set equality may only hold as {2; (: ∩ Δ (fC: )) ∩ Δ (f
∞
:
)} ∪ 21 = {: ∩ Δ (f∞: )} ∪ 22 for some












that there are no atoms, unless the opponent is taking a pure action with probability one in which
case beliefs are correct with probability one.
Continuity is best understood by contrast with a more standard notion. It is similar to requiring








(: |fC: ) = `
8
:
(: |f∞: ), which is








) in the total variation distance of probability
measures. This is the technical condition assumed in [12]. However, this is incompatible with
interior full support, which we require for the behavioral axioms. Hence, we weaken this condition
by allowing for discontinuities associated with some {{fC
:
},:}-pairs. In the one-dimensional
case, interior full support only implies discontinuities when the opponent’s action approaches the
boundary (see discussion following Remark 1). With higher dimensions, the analogue is when the
opponent’s action “gains zeros” in the limit, i.e. puts positive probability on fewer pure actions. If
{fC
:
} ⊂ Δ (f∞
:
) for sufficiently large C, then fC
:
does not gain zeros in the limit and so there will not
be discontinuities for any : ((B2)-(i)). If fC: does gain zeros in the limit, then there necessarily will
be discontinuities for some : since the probability that beliefs realize in Δ (f∞: ) goes from 0 to 1
by interior full support. However, we require continuity if 2; (: ∩Δ (fC: )) ∩Δ (f
∞
:
) = : ∩Δ (f∞: ),








By construction, belief-discontinuities can only arise when the overlapping condition (B2)-
(ii) fails.16 In the one-dimensional, binary-action case, failures of the overlapping condition are
equivalent to belief-discontinuities (see footnote 12), and it is easy to rewrite (B2) for this special
case.17 To give more intuition for (B1) and (B2) in higher dimensions, we provide some examples
16(B2)-(i) is actually redundant since it implies (B2)-(ii), but we include it separately as a natural sufficient condition
17Continuity (B2) in the binary-action case. Consider a sequence with A → 0+. For : ∈ {{0}, (0, n)}, the
overlapping condition fails: for : = {0}, 2; ({0} ∩ (0, 1)) ∩ {0} = ∅ and {0} ∩ {0} = {0}, and for : = (0, n),
2; ((0, n) ∩ (0, 1)) ∩ {0} = {0} and (0, n) ∩ {0} = ∅. For : = [0, n), the overlapping condition is satisfied:
2; ( [0, n) ∩ (0, 1)) ∩ {0} = {0} and [0, n) ∩ {0} = {0}. Given these results, it is easy to show that (B2) becomes: (1)
`8
:



















(: |A) = `8: (: |1) if : ∩ (1 − n, 1] = ∅ for some n > 0.
16
for the case of three pure actions in Figure 1.2.
To state our general behavioral axioms, we introduce the marginal belief distribution (CDF)
defined by 8
: 9
(f̄:0 |f: ) ≡ `8: ({f
′
:
∈ Δ : : f
′
: 9
∈ [0, f̄:0]}|f: ) for all 8, :, and 9 . This gives the
probability that player 8 believes player : plays action 0: 9 with probability less than or equal to
f̄:0 ∈ [0, 1] as a function of f: ∈ Δ : . Belief-responsiveness requires that the 9 th marginal belief
distribution increases in the sense of FOSD as the probability the opponent plays the corresponding
action increases. Unbiasedness requires that the marginal belief distributions are correct on median:
(B3) Belief-responsiveness: If, for some 9 , f: and f
′
:
satisfy f: 9 < f
′
: 9











(f̄:0 |f: ) for f̄:0 ∈ (0, 1).
(B4) Unbiasedness: 8
: 9
(f: 9 |f: ) = 12 for f: with f: 9 ∈ (0, 1).
The general axioms nest their binary-action counterparts. When  (:) = 2, it is immediate that






), respectively. That (B2) collapses to (B2
′
) is
less obvious, but becomes clear once (B2) is rewritten for the binary-action case (see Footnote 17).
2. If  (:) = 2, (B1)-(B4) are equivalent to (B1′)-(B4′).
Several other axioms come to mind as natural, and in fact will be satisfied by our parametric
model.18 However, we only impose (B1)-(B4) as they are sufficient to impose testable restrictions,
and the resulting NBE will have a similar degree of flexibility as QRE:
3. The belief-map f∗ satisfies (B1)-(B4).
3. Fix {Γ, f∗}. An NBE is any f ∈ Δ such that for all 8 ∈ 1, ..., =, f8 ∈ Ψ8 (f−8;f∗−8).
From continuity and the fact that that the '8 9 sets are closed in Δ , it is easy to show that
Ψ : Δ ⇒ Δ is upper hemicontinuous (as well as non-empty and convex-valued). Existence of NBE
then follows from standard arguments.
18One is belief-monotonicity in which the distribution of f8∗
: 9
(f: ) first-order stochastically dominates the distribution
of f8∗
:;
(f: ) if f: 9 > f:; . Another is label independence in which f8∗:; (f: ) and f
8∗
: 9
(f: ) have the same distribution if
f: 9 = f:;; and if f: and f
′
:
are the same up to permutation of components, then f8∗
: 9
(f: ) has the same distribution as
f8∗
: ] ( 9) (f
′
:
) where ] : {1, ...,  (:)} → {1, ...,  (:)} is the permutation mapping.
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2. Fix {Γ, f∗}. An NBE exists.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.2. 
In general, Ψ may not be single-valued, which is the case if and only if a player can be
indifferent between two best responses with positive probability, i.e. if `−8 ('8 9 ∩ '8; |f−8) > 0 for
some f−8 ∈ Δ−8. Since interior full support requires that beliefs are correct with probability one
when the opponents take pure actions, this occurs when 08 9 and 08; are best responses to some pure
action profile 0−8. In games without such actions, however, interior full support implies that Ψ is
single-valued.
1. Fix {Γ, f∗}. If D8 (08 9 , 0−8) ≠ D8 (08; , 0−8) for all 8, 08 9 , 08; , and 0−8, then Ψ is single-valued.19
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.2. 
Since Ψ is upper hemicontinuous, the lemma implies that Ψ is a continuous function for generic
games.
1.2.4 Relationship to other concepts
A refinement of rationalizability. The theory of rationalizability ([4] and [5]) finds strategy
profiles that cannot be ruled out on the basis of rationality and common knowledge of rationality
alone, recognizing that these are not enough to form correct beliefs as required in an NE. One view
is that NE predictions are too precise whereas rationalizability may be too permissive.20 NBE is
a compromise between NE and rationalizability in that it acknowledges the difficulty in forming
correct beliefs and yet pins down distributions over beliefs and actions. What’s more, NBE respects
rationalizability in the following sense.
2. If f ∈ Δ is an NBE, then 08 9 ∈ BD??(f8) is rationalizable for all 8 and 9 .
19[12] have a similar result, and in fact, we invoke theirs as the final step in our proof.
20In generalized matching pennies, for example, NE makes a unique prediction that is sensitive to every non-affine
transformation of the payoff matrix, whereas every action is rationalizable independent of payoffs (as long as the game
retains the matching pennies structure).
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Proof. 08 9 ∈ BD??(f8) is 1-rationalizable (a best response to some beliefs) by the assumption
of rationality embedded in Ψ. Suppose every 08 9 ∈ BD??(f8) is :-rationalizable. It must be the
case that 08 9 ∈ BD??(f8) is (: + 1)-rationalizable. In particular, it is a best response to some





−8) = BD??(f−8) with probability one by (B1). This completes
the induction. 
On the other hand, QRE does not respect rationalizability as interiority (A1) requires all pure actions
are played with positive probability.21
Random belief equilibrium. NBE adopts the basic structures of RBE ([12])–belief distributions
that depend on the opponent’s expected actions in equilibrium. The difference between the models
lies in the restrictions imposed on the belief distributions, which are tailored for different purposes.
Whereas we introduce NBE as a tool for understanding the testable restrictions of equilibria with
belief-noise that is “bounded away from zero”, [12] use RBE for equilibrium selection and hence
study the limiting case as belief-noise “goes to zero”. Specifically, they consider belief measures
that converge weakly to the opponents’ expected action profile. Along the sequence, the restrictions
they impose on belief distributions are (1) full support on the simplex and absolute continuity with
respect to Lebesgue measure (`8
:
(: |f: ) > 0 if and only if L: (: ) > 0) and (2) the natural notion
of continuity (`8
:
(: |f: ) is continuous in f: ∈ Δ :).22 The only restrictions imposed by these
conditions are that weakly dominated actions are played with zero probability and undominated
actions are played with positive probability. In particular, RBE does not respect rationalizability as
players must expect (incorrectly) that their opponents play never-best-responses. NBE’s technical
axioms (B1) and (B2) neither nest or are nested in the RBE conditions. In particular, the RBE
conditions imply that the belief-map cannot be unbiased.23 However, NBE can be approximated
21In the prisoner’s dilemma for example, NBE will always predict the unique NE, whereas QRE allows for any
distribution of play in which both players play the dominant strategy with probability greater than 12 .
22Though unimportant for this discussion, [12] also allow for belief distributions to have finite atoms, so these
restrictions only apply to the absolutely continuous part of the belief measures. That the belief distributions converge
weakly implies that all atoms must vanish in the limit, except possibly for an atom on the opponents’ expected action
profile.
23From RBE’s full support condition, a belief distribution cannot be unbiased on median or mean unless the
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arbitrarily well by RBE in generic games,24 so NBE can be considered as a refinement of RBE in
this sense.
A model of sampling. [13] introduce sampling equilibrium in which players are frequentists
who best respond to an <-length samples of their opponents’ pure actions.25 As in NBE, this
sampling procedure induces a mapping from each opponent’s mixed action to a distribution over
beliefs. Since no sample involves actions that are not played with positive probability, and the
variance of the sampling distribution goes to zero as the opponents put increasing probability on
a pure action profile, NBE’s technical axioms capture belief formation that has a sampling flavor.
Moreover, even though the sampling belief distributions are discrete, it is easy to show that they
respect belief-responsiveness, and, in large samples, are approximately unbiased on both median
and mean.26 It is also the case that, if a player represents a population of subjects, each of whom
samples different <, the aggregate belief distribution will still satisfy these properties. Hence, one
can regard NBE as a generalized and “smoothed” sampling model that captures some of the key
properties of sampling in reduced form. Our results therefore have implications for the empirical
content of sampling models and their relationship to QRE.
Multiplicity. By interior full support, beliefs are correct with probability one when opponents
play a pure action. Thus, any pure strategy NE is also an NBE. It is obvious therefore that for some
games, there are multiple NBE for any belief-map f∗ satisfying the axioms. QRE, on the other
hand, always predicts a unique equilibrium for some quantal response function. This is well-known
as logit QRE predicts a unique equilibrium for sufficiently small _ ([1]). In this sense, NBE is more
like NE, and could be paired with standard refinements. For instance, a pure strategy NE in weakly
dominated strategies is an NBE, but would not survive a trembling hand.
opponent’s action is interior. In particular, belief distributions will necessarily be biased in equilibrium when the
opponent has a dominated action.
24Not all games: a pure strategy NE in weakly dominated strategies is an NBE (see Multiplicity discussion below),
but no RBE can put positive probability on weakly dominated actions.
25If the opponent’s action is f: ∈ Δ : , the sampling distribution follows a multinomial distribution with parameters
f: = (f:1, ..., f: (:) ) and player 8’s realized belief is the count data divided by sample size <.
26The 9 th marginal of the sampling distribution is a binomial with parameter f: 9 ; dividing the count data by < gives
the distribution of realized beliefs (see footnote 25). From results on the binomial distribution ([25]): (1) If <f: 9 is an
integer, then the unique (strong) median belief is " = f: 9 . (2) If <f: 9 is not an integer, then any (weak) median belief
" satisfies b<f: 9c
<
≤ " ≤ d<f: 9e
<
due to discreteness; the bounds contain f: 9 and get arbitrarily tight as < →∞.
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1.3 Within-game restrictions and the Own Payoff Effect
Contrary to the predictions of Nash equilibrium (NE) in fully mixed games, experimental studies
report two regularities. First, whereas NE predicts that each player’s choice probabilities keep their
opponents indifferent, there are systematic deviations within a game: the empirical frequency of
actions typically leads to a ranking of actions for each player by expected utility to which they
noisily best respond. Second, subjects exhibit the “own payoff effect” across games: whereas NE
predicts that a change in a player’s own payoffs does not affect his equilibrium choice probabilities
since the other players have to be kept indifferent, subjects’ behavior is systematically affected by
non-affine transformations of their payoffs.
The best evidence for these regularities comes from generalized matching pennies (see for
example [6], [8], and [26]), and QRE is well-known for capturing both effects in this context ([2]).
In this section, we show that NBE also captures both effects, and thus these empirical patterns can
be explained equally well by adding noise to actions or adding noise to beliefs without relying on
any specific functional form.
We first show that NBE imposes the same testable restrictions as QRE for any individual
matching pennies game, and hence captures deviations from NE equally well.
3. Fix Γ<. The set of attainable NBE is equal to the set of attainable QRE.
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.2. 
The theorem states that, for any individual matching pennies game, (1) any NBE is a QRE for
some quantal response function, and (2) any QRE is an NBE for some belief-map. Remember that




), respectively, so the result requires careful
construction. The intuition, however, is simple.
When player : takes the indifferent action A = Ā8 that equates the expected utilities to player 8’s
actions, player 8 will take each action with one half probability under both models. This follows
from monotonicity (A4) in a QRE and unbiasedness (B4
′
) in an NBE (beliefs are equally likely to




one of player 8’s actions increases in expected utility (while decreasing for the other). This action
will now be played with probability greater than one half in a QRE by responsiveness (A3) as well
as in a NBE by belief-responsiveness (B3
′
) (as the belief distribution shifts up, the probability that
this action is subjectively better increases).
In Appendix 1.8.2, we derive the set of attainable NBE for any given matching pennies game,
which corresponds to the set of QRE by Theorem 3. The following example, which illustrates such
a set, was derived in [2] for QRE; we re-derive the set using NBE.
Figure 1.3: Matching Pennies -
L R
U -, 0 0, 1
D 0, 1 1, 0
1. Let - > 0. In the game of Figure 1.3, {f* , f!} is an NBE (QRE) if and only if

f* ≤ 12 if f! ≤
1
1+-





f! ≥ 12 if f* ≤
1
2
f! ≤ 12 if f* ≥
1
2 .
Proof. Suppose {f* , f!} is an NBE. By (B4
′
), the probability player 1 plays * when player 2
is playing f! = 11+- (the action that makes player 1 indifferent) is exactly f* =
1





1+- , the probability player 1 plays* is strictly less than
1
2 . The other inequalities are similar.
Conversely, any {f* , f!} satisfying the inequalities can be attained as an NBE, which we explain
below. 
For any - > 0, the set of attainable NBE (QRE) is given by the inequalities in Example 1.
The left panel of Figure 1.4 plots this set when - = 4 as a gray rectangle, in which case only
15% of all possible outcomes are consistent with the model. A representative NBE is plotted
as the intersection of reaction functions. Player 1’s reaction must be strictly increasing in f!
(belief-responsiveness) and pass through the point {f* , f!} = { 12 ,
1
1+- } (unbiasedness) as well as
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the corners of the square.27 Similarly, player 2’s reaction must be strictly decreasing in f* and pass
through the point {f* , f!} = { 12 ,
1
2 }. These are the only restrictions on the reaction functions,
28
and hence any {f* , f!} satisfying the inequalities can be attained in an NBE.







Notes: The left panel plots the set of attainable NBE (QRE) in the game of Figure 1.3 (- = 4) as a gray region. The NE
is given as the intersection of the best response correspondences (dotted lines), and a representative NBE is given as the
intersection of reaction functions (black curves). The right panel plots the set of attainable NBE in which unbiasedness
is modified so that beliefs are correct on mean instead of median.
In the right panel of Figure 1.4, we illustrate the set of attainable NBE in which the unbiasedness
axiom is modified so that beliefs are correct on mean instead of median (which we generalize to any
matching pennies game in Appendix 1.8.2). The reaction function for player 1 must be increasing,
fall between the upward sloping lines, and include the corners of the square, with a similar condition
for player 2. Note that the reactions are unrestricted at the indifferent action, but there are still
testable restrictions on equilibria. If beliefs are correct on both median and mean, then the set of
attainable NBE would be the intersection of the gray regions from the two panels and account for
less than 10% of possible outcomes.
The next example illustrates the own payoff effect, which in this case is a simple comparative
static in player 1’s payoff parameter - . NE predicts that player 1’s action does not change with
- as he must mix to keep his opponent indifferent, but empirical evidence suggests a different
27By interior full support, beliefs are correct with probability one when the opponent is playing a pure action to
which a pure action is the unique best response. The QRE reaction functions would look qualitatively similar, except
would be bounded away from the corners by interiority.
28This is implicit in our proof of Theorem 3 in which, for any QRE reaction function and sufficiently small n > 0, we
construct a belief-map that induces an NBE reaction that agrees with the QRE reaction on A ∈ [n, 1 − n].
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pattern that is well-known to be explained by QRE ([2]). We now show that NBE makes the same
prediction (this is not a corollary of Theorem 3 which only concerns individual games).
2. Let - > 0. In the NBE (QRE) of the game in Figure 1.3, f* is strictly increasing in - and f! is
strictly decreasing in - .









where the reactions can be written as Ψ* (f! , -) = 1 − 12 (
1









), Ψ* (f! , -) is strictly increasing in both arguments, and Ψ! (f*) is strictly
decreasing in f* . From (1.5), as - increases, it must be that either f* increases and f! decreases,
f* decreases and f! increases, or that both f* and f! remain constant. The latter two cases are
impossible since (1.4) implies that as - increases, f* increases if f! is constant or increases. Thus,
as - increases, f* must strictly increase and f! must strictly decrease. 
Our next example combines previous results to make the simple point that, while NBE and QRE
can make similar predictions, this depends crucially on the structure of the game. In particular,
NBE’s relationship to non-rationalizable actions is very different.
Figure 1.5: A 3 × 3 game with a matching pennies “core”
L R R′
U 4, 0 0, 1 0,−1
D 0, 1 1, 0 0,−1
D′ −1, 0 −1, 0 /,−1
3. Figure 1.5 shows a 3 × 3 game with a matching pennies “core”. It is constructed from the game
in Figure 1.3 (- = 4) by giving each player one additional action, labelled  ′ and '′. '′ is strictly
dominated, and 
′
is either strictly dominated (for / < 0) or iteratively dominated after deleting '′
(for / > 0). After removing '′ and  ′, the reduced game is a standard matching pennies game.
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NBE respects rationalizability, so it is immediate that the set of attainable NBE for this game equals
the set of NBE in the reduced game as depicted in the left panel of Figure 1.4, a result that holds




are played with positive
probability and thus that behavior is sensitive to changes in / .
The types of predictions from Examples 1 and 2 find strong support in data, and we have shown
they are explained equally well by noise in actions (QRE) or noise in beliefs (NBE). By contrast,
Example 3 suggests an experiment (varying / in the game of Figure 1.5) in which the two types of
noise imply starkly different predictions. Which model would be a better description of the data,
however, is an open question. Certainly, some subjects would take dominated actions, but it is
unclear if the tendency to take them is sensitive to / in the manner prescribed by QRE. Furthermore,
we conjecture that, for any value of / and with sufficient opportunity to learn, subjects would play
the non-rationalizable actions with a probability that diminishes to zero long before play converges
to NE.
1.4 The effects of payoff magnitude
It is important for the external validity of experiments to understand the effects of payoff
magnitude in games. Indeed, games played in the lab are often meant to emulate their real-world
counterparts, but are typically played at much lower stakes.
In applications of QRE, it is common to assume the quantal response function takes the familiar
logit form. When parameter _ is chosen to best explain data from individual games, the fit is often
very good. However, it is well-known that logit implies considerable sensitivity to changes in the
payoff magnitude of games: for fixed _, equilibrium predictions are sensitive to scaling one or
more players’ payoffs by positive constants. Such predictions have been tested experimentally
by [8] using generalized matching pennies. They find that subjects’ behavior within a game is
qualitatively consistent with logit, but the scaling predictions across games find little support as
subjects’ behavior is unaffected by scale. Importantly, since equilibria vary continuously with
payoffs, this “scaling issue” implies a more general difficulty in explaining behavior across games.
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In this section, we establish that the scaling issue of logit is general to all QRE in the sense that,
if QRE is to explain the empirical regularities discussed in Section 1.3–systematic deviations from
NE and the own payoff effect–it must be non-trivially sensitive to scaling and/or translating payoffs.
For the class of translation invariant regular QRE, which includes logit and more generally all
structural QRE with i.i.d. errors, sensitivity to scale is inescapable. By contrast, we show that NBE
is invariant to both scaling and translation, and as we have already shown, explains both empirical
regularities. We discuss the economics of scale and translation invariance at the end of this section.
To study QRE’s properties, we begin with an analysis of quantal response functions directly
before extending the results to games. This is the approach taken by [2], who define a notion of
translation invariance for quantal response functions. We present their definition, along with an
analogous notion of scale invariance. For technical reasons, scale invariance can only be defined for
strictly positive utility vectors.29
Translation invariance: &8 (E8) = &8 (E8 + W4 (8)) for all E8 ∈ R (8) and W ∈ R.30
Scale invariance: &8 (E8) = &8 (VE8) for all E8 ∈ R (8)++ and V > 0.
For some results, we introduce an additional condition, requiring that an action is played
more often when the payoffs to all other actions are weakly lowered. Though not implied by
regularity alone, the condition is extremely weak: satisfied by all structural QRE31 and implied by
responsiveness when  (8) = 2.
Weak substitutability: &8 9 (E8) > &8 9 (E
′
8
) whenever E8 9 ≥ E
′
8 9
and E8: ≤ E
′
8:
for all : ≠ 9 with strict
for some : .
An example of a quantal response function that is translation invariant, but not scale invariant, is
logit:




, _ ∈ [0,∞), (1.6)
29To see why, consider the utility vector E8 = (1, 0, ..., 0) ∈ R (8) . Responsiveness implies that &81 (E8) < &81 (VE8)
for V > 1, and hence no quantal response function can be truly scale invariant over the entire domain R (8) .
304 (8) = (1, ..., 1) is the vector of ones with length  (8).
31It is a weakening of the strong substitutability condition of [2], which is satisfied by all structural QRE.
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where parameter _ controls the sensitivity to payoff differences. More generally, [2] show that all
structural quantal response functions are translation invariant.
An example of a quantal response function that is scale invariant, but not translation invariant, is
the Luce model ([27]) for strictly positive payoffs:







, ` ∈ (0,∞). (1.7)
Hence, there exist quantal response functions that are translation invariant and those that are scale
invariant. However, we show in Lemma 3 that no quantal response function satisfies both properties.
In particular, for translation invariant &8, scale increases lead to increasing sensitivity: the high
payoff actions are played with greater probability. For scale invariant &8, translation increases lead
to diminishing sensitivity: the high payoff actions are played with smaller probability. We also
characterize the limiting choice probabilities (as V and W tend to infinity, respectively).
For simplicity, we give the result in the binary-action case, whose proof has a simple geometry
which we plot in Figure 1.6. In Appendix 1.8.3, we generalize the result to arbitrary numbers of
actions with the additional assumption of weak substitutability.
3. Fix  (8) = 2 and let E8 ∈ R2++ be such that E81 > E82.
(i) Let &8 be translation invariant and V > 1:










(d) |&81(VE8) −&81(E8) | < n for all V ∈ (1, V̄] if and only if |&81(E81 + X, E82) −&81(E8) | < n
for all X ∈ (0, X( V̄)].
(ii) Let &8 be scale invariant and W > 0:
32 ;8<
G→∞
&81 (G, E82) = 1 for all structural QRE as well as for all parametric models of which we are aware, but (A1)-(A4)
only require that ;8<
G→∞
&81 (G, E82) > 12 .
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(a) &81(E8 + W42) = &81(E81, E82 + X(W)) where X(W) > 0 is strictly increasing in W and
;8<
W→∞
X(W) = E81 − E82 > 0.
(b) &81(E8 + W42) < &81(E8).
(c) ;8<
W→∞
&81(E8 + W42) = 12 .
(d) |&81(E8 + W42) −&81(E8) | < n for all W ∈ (0, W̄] if and only if |&81(E81, E82 + X) −&81(E8) | < n
for all X ∈ (0, X(W̄)].
Proof. (i): Take any E8 ∈ R++ and translation invariant &8. Referring to the left panel of Figure
1.6, scaling by V > 1 causes a shift along the dashed line to E ′
8
= VE8. By translation invariance
of &8, E8 and E
′
8




as the projection of E
′
8
along its iso-quantal response curve onto the horizontal
line passing through E8. This point is E
′′
8
= (E81 + X(V), E82) where X(V) ≡ (V − 1) (E81 − E82) > 0 is
strictly increasing in V and ;8<
V→∞
X(V) = ∞. By construction, E ′′
8












) > &81(E8), where
the inequality follows from responsiveness (A3). This shows (a) and (b); (c) follows from properties
of X(V); and (d) is immediate from part (a).
(ii): Take any E8 ∈ R++ and scale invariant &8. Referring to the right panel of Figure 1.6,
translating by W > 0 causes a shift along the dashed line to E ′
8
= E8 + W42. By scale invariance of
&8, E8 and E
′
8
are on different iso-quantal response curves (dotted rays that pass through them and
the origin). Define E
′′
8
as the projection of E
′
8
along its iso-quantal response curve onto the vertical
line passing through E8. This point is E
′′
8
= (E81, E82 + X(W)) where X(W) ≡ E81E81+W (E82 + W) − E82 > 0 is
strictly increasing in W and ;8<
W→∞
X(W) = E81 − E82 > 0. By construction, E
′′
8
is on the same iso-quantal
response curve as E
′
8









where the inequality follows from responsiveness (A3). This shows (a) and (b); (c) follows from
properties of X(W) and monotonicity (A4); and (d) is immediate from part (a). 
Lemma 3 establishes that quantal response cannot be invariant to both scale and translation,
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Notes: The left panel plots some iso-quantal response curves (dotted lines) for a translation invariant model and
illustrates the method of projection used in part (i) of the lemma. The right panel gives the analogous plot for scale
invariant quantal response that is used in part (ii).
but it does not rule out translation invariant quantal response functions with very weak scale
effects and vice versa. However, parts (i)-(d) and (ii)-(d) establish that translation (scale) invariant
quantal response functions are nearly insensitive to scale (translation) if and only if they are nearly
insensitive to payoff differences between actions. In particular, this implies that, in the limit as
translation (scale) invariant quantal response becomes insensitive to scale (translation), it must
assign uniform probabilities to all actions, independent of their payoffs. This generalizes what is
known of the logit model (3.1), where _ controls both sensitivity to payoff differences and sensitivity
to scale, and at one extreme (_ = 0) assigns uniform probabilities to all actions.33 An important
implication is that in order to explain the two empirical regularities discussed in Section 1.3, QRE
must be non-trivially sensitive to affine transformations.
We now extend our results to games. To this end, we define families of games that differ only in
affine transformations of payoffs.
4. Fix Γ = {#, , D}.
• The scale family S(Γ) consists of all games Γ′ such that # ′ = # , ′ = , and for all 8, there




33Similarly, in the Luce model (1.7), ` controls both sensitivity to payoff differences and sensitivity to translation,
and at one extreme (` = ∞) assigns uniform probabilities to all actions, independent of their payoffs.
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• The translation family T (Γ) consists of all games Γ′ such that # ′ = # , ′ = , and for all 8
and 0−8 ∈ −8, there exists W8 (0−8) ∈ R such that D̄
′
8 9
(0−8) = D̄8 9 (0−8) + W8 (0−8) for all 9 .
• The affine family34 A(Γ) consists of all games Γ′ such that # ′ = # , ′ = , for all 8 and
0−8 ∈ −8, there exists V8 > 0 and W8 (0−8) ∈ R such that D̄
′
8 9
(0−8) = V8D̄8 9 (0−8) + W8 (0−8) for
all 9 .
Theorem 4, which is immediate, extends the generalization of Lemma 3 (Appendix 1.8.3) to the
QRE of games.
4. Fix {Γ, &}.
(i) If & is translation (scale) invariant, the set of QRE is the same for all Γ
′ ∈ T (Γ) (Γ′ ∈ S(Γ)).
(ii) Let & be weakly substitutable, and suppose f ∈ Δ is a QRE of Γ in which f8 9 ≠ f8: for some
player 8 and actions 9 , ::
(a) If & is translation invariant, f is not a QRE of Γ
′ ∈ S(Γ).35
(b) If & is scale invariant, f is not a QRE of Γ
′ ∈ T (Γ).36
Note that in part (ii) of Theorem 4, we must rule out the case in which the expected utility to
each of player 8’s actions is the same, for in that case scaling and translation coincide. This occurs
in a QRE if and only if f8 9 = 1 (8) for all 9 , which is clearly non-generic.
Our results suggest that by augmenting regular QRE with translation or scale invariance, we may
sharpen out-of-sample predictions, i.e. that hold across games for a given quantal response function.
To this end, in Appendix 1.8.4, we extend the method of projection used in Lemma 3 to derive
necessary conditions for a dataset from sets of binary-action games to be consistent with QRE for
some regular quantal response function under the additional maintained assumptions of translation
or scale invariance, respectively. For each of translation or scale invariance, our result takes the
form of inequalities that the empirical choice probabilities must satisfy. [28] derive a similar result
34Note that the affine family is generically a strict superset of the others S(Γ) ∪ T (Γ) ( A(Γ) and that the scale
and translation families only overlap at the generating game S(Γ) ∩ T (Γ) = Γ.
35That is, if player 8’s payoffs are (non-degenerately) scaled (V ≠ 1).
36That is, if player 8’s payoffs are (non-degenerately) translated (W ≠ 0).
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for structural QRE in arbitrary games under additional maintained assumptions using results from
convex analysis, and when the games have binary actions, our translation invariant inequalities
coincide with theirs. Though beyond the scope of the current paper, it may be interesting to extend
our result to arbitrary games augmented with additional conditions.
Unlike QRE, NBE is invariant to affine transformations of the game, which is no more than a
simple observation. Given choice from lotteries, the (expected utility-maximizing) best response
does not depend on affine transformations of Bernoulli utilities, and this extends to games.
5. Fix {Γ, f∗}. The set of NBE is the same for all Γ′ ∈ A(Γ).
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.2. 
The next example uses results from this section to show that the comparative static predictions
of NBE and QRE may differ. In the game of Figure 1.7, parameter . scales player 2’s payoffs and
hence indexes games in the same scale family. For any fixed . , the sets of attainable NBE and QRE
are identical (Theorem 3), but the models’ comparative static predictions in . may differ. Here,
NBE makes an unambiguous prediction, while QRE does not. If QRE is augmented with scale
invariance, the QRE prediction coincides with that of NBE trivially. If QRE is augmented with
translation invariance, the predictions diverge. Of course, by Lemma 3, one cannot impose both
scale and translation invariance.
Figure 1.7: Matching Pennies .
L R
U 9, 0 0, .
D 0, . 1, 0
4. Let . > 0 and consider the game in Figure 1.7.
(i) Fix f∗. In the NBE, f* and f! are constant in . .
(ii) Fix scale invariant &. In the QRE, f* and f! are constant in . .
(iii) Fix translation invariant &. In the QRE, f* and f! are strictly decreasing in . .
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Proof.
(i) and (ii): These follow directly from Theorems 4 and 5.




, 1 − f!
−
) (1.8)





As . increases, it must be from (1.8) that either f* and f! remain constant, f* and f! increase, or
f* and f! decrease. The first case is impossible since if f* were constant, an increase in . (a scale
increase) would change f! (by Lemma 3) from (1.9). The second case is also impossible since
f* >
1
2 for all . > 0 (as is easy to show along the lines of Example 1), and thus an increase in f*
and . must increase f*. by more than (1 − f*). increases, which implies a decrease in f! from
(1.9) by translation invariance. 
The economics of translation and scale invariance. We view invariance to translation as an
appealing normative property. Without it, models would predict that giving players “side payments”
independent of the game’s outcome would systematically change their behavior through a channel
entirely distinct from a wealth effect, which could be embedded into the utility function directly. On
the other hand, many popular models predict that behavior will change systematically with scale, so
we view the question of whether behavior in games is sensitive to scale as best left to the data.
That QRE is sensitive to scale finds justification in the literature on control costs, which models
errors as resulting from “trembles” that can be reduced through costly effort. Both [29] and [30]
derive the multinomial logit from such an optimization, which is sensitive to scale.37
As stakes get higher, we may also expect subjects to expend more effort in forming their beliefs.
37It is tempting to interpret QRE as a model of rational inattention, as it is well-known from [31] that if the state is
a vector of payoffs (i.e. the payoff to each action), then the solution to the rational inattention problem with mutual
information costs is a generalized multinomial logit that depends on the prior. Such an interpretation does not readily
extend to QRE, however, since the vector of expected utilities is deterministic in equilibrium.
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However, by appealing to a particular theory of belief formation, we argue that in many types of
games, there is no reason to expect all subjects to revise their beliefs in a similar direction. As
a result, it may be that the aggregate distribution of beliefs, and hence actions, is unaffected by
scale. The “endogenous depth of reasoning” theory of [23] uses a level :-type framework in which
the “cognitive bound” depends on the payoffs of the game. Increasing the stakes induces subjects
to incur additional cognitive costs to walk through more steps of higher ordered thinking, which
has the effect of increasing their levels. However, if levels “cycle”,38 as is typically the case in
completely mixed games, then the assumption that levels increase with scale does not provide any
explanatory power for the aggregate distribution of beliefs. In other types of games, we do not
necessarily expect scale invariance to hold, though the extent to which it does may give insight into
subjects’ strategic considerations.
1.5 Logit transform NBE
For applications, we construct a parametric model based on the logit transform. In this section,
we consider the case of binary actions, and we give its generalization to normal form games in
Appendix 1.8.5.39 When actions are binary, player :’s action is A ∈ [0, 1], and we derive player 8’s
belief-map through the following procedure:






using the convention that L(0) = −∞ and L(1) = ∞.
2. Add gY8 to L(A) where Y8 ∼883 N(0, 1) and g ∈ (0,∞).
38For example, in generalized matching pennies (see Figure 3.3), the best response to ! is * to which the best
response is ' to which the best response is  to which the best response is !. If level 0 is taken to uniformly mix (a
common assumption), assuming* is the unique best response to f! = 12 and ' is the unique best response to f* =
1
2 ,
then the sequences of best responses indexed by levels for players 1 and 2 are f* = 12 ,*, , ,*,*, , , ... and
f! =
1
2 , ', ', !, !, ', ', ...
39The binary action model satisfies the axioms exactly, while the general model satisfies unbiasedness (B4) only
approximately.
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3. Map L(A) + gY8 back to [0, 1] via the inverse logit transform



















The parameter g is the standard deviation of the noise added to the logit transformed action, and
thus can be interpreted as the “noisiness” of beliefs. This belief-map admits closed form CDFs (and
PDFs).
1. A∗(A; g) has CDF40
8
:
















Proof. See Appendix 3.7.2. 
Figure 1.8 plots the CDF and PDF41 of logit transform belief distributions for different values of A .
Visually, it appears that the belief distributions increase in the sense of FOSD (belief-responsiveness)
as A increases and that the median belief is correct (unbiasedness).42 Since the noisy beliefs have
closed form CDFs, these and the other technical axioms are easily verified.
2. A∗(A; g) satisfies (B1′)-(B4′).
Proof. See Appendix 3.7.2. 
Since the logit transform L : [0, 1] → R ∪ {−∞,∞} is a strictly increasing homeomorphism,
and the normal distribution is symmetric, it is clear from the construction of the belief-map (1.10)
that they satisfy belief-responsiveness and unbiasedness. This suggests, more generally, that any
such homeomorphism and symmetric distribution with full support can be used to generate valid
noisy beliefs. The logit transform and normal distribution are chosen only for convenience.
40To make the CDF well-defined, we resolve indeterminacies as follows: −∞ − (−∞) = ∞ and∞−∞ = ∞. As is
standard, we also need Φ(−∞) = 0 and Φ(∞) = 1.
41Taking a derivative yields: 5 8
:





















42The distributions also have skewness: when the opponent is playing A > 0.5, the skew is toward the left and when
A < 0.5, the skew is toward the right. This is a consequence of the logit transform, but also a reasonable property given
the boundedness of the space.
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Figure 1.8: Distribution of logit transform belief distributions












Notes: This figure plots the CDFs and PDFs of player 8’s logit transform belief distributions for noise parameter g = 0.5
and player :’s action A ∈ {0.2, 0.5, 0.8}.
1.6 Analysis of experimental data
We consider data from several studies to test specific qualitative predictions as well as for
quantitative measures of fit. We focus on three studies, [8], [14], and [28], whose inclusion we
motivate on specific grounds. We also use additional datasets for a “survey” exercise in which we
fit parametric models to many datasets pooled together. First, we briefly explain the methodology
we use for fitting parametric models.
1.6.1 Methodology
Best-fit parameters for logit transform NBE and logit QRE are chosen to minimize the squared
distance between theoretical and observed values, as in [14], [32], and others. We focus on
minimizing squared distance instead of maximizing likelihood because when fitting models to
several games pooled together from different studies, we would like to equally weight each game to
get an overall measure of fit, despite the different sample sizes used.43 Also, squared distance is
more naturally extended to a measure of out-of-sample prediction error, which we make extensive
use of.
For model " with parameter \, the squared distance for game G is
43Importantly, we still make use of the sample sizes for inference.
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DG (", \) = ‖fG − f"G (\)‖2,
where fG is the empirical frequency of actions, f"G (\) is the model prediction, and ‖ · ‖ is the
Euclidean distance. We also define the best-fit parameter and resulting squared distance:
\̂G = 0A6<8=\ DG (", \) (1.12)
D̂G (") = DG (", \̂G),












To assess if NBE significantly outperforms QRE in a set of games, we analyze the difference in
pooled squared distance
ΔD̂ = D̂(&') − D̂(#),
so that ΔD̂ > 0 if and only if NBE outperforms QRE.
To determine if NBE significantly outperforms QRE, we bootstrap the distribution of ΔD̂ and
estimate the probability P(ΔD̂ > 0), which gives the maximum confidence level with which NBE
outperforms QRE. We explain the bootstrap procedure in Appendix 1.8.7.44 We report the bootstrap
estimate P ≡ 1 − P(ΔD̂ > 0), which is conceptually similar to the ?-value of the one-sided
hypothesis test that ΔD̂ > 0 against the null that ΔD̂ = 0.45 We say that NBE significantly
outperforms QRE if P is below the conventional levels for significance.
44Our baseline method ignores within-subject correlation and hence overstates significance, but we show that
significance is generally robust to “throwing away” a large percentage of the data and argue that this proxies for
within-subject correlation in the data-generating process.
45Since P(ΔD̂ > 0) gives the confidence level of the largest one-sided confidence interval [1,∞) of ΔD̂ that
excludes 0, if the conditions for standard asymptotics were met, P would coincide with the ?-value.
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1.6.2 McKelvey et al. 2000
We include [8] in our analysis, and give it special attention, because their study was designed to
test the payoff magnitude predictions of QRE.
Figure 1.9: Matching Pennies from [8]
A
L R
U 9, 0 0, 1
D 0, 1 1, 0
B
L R
U 9, 0 0, 4
D 0, 4 1, 0
C
L R
U 36, 0 0, 4
D 0, 4 4, 0
D
L R
U 4, 0 0, 1
D 0, 1 1, 0
Statistical evidence for scale effects. [8] played the generalized matching pennies games in
Figure 1.9. Games - are part of the same scale family. Relative to , player 2’s payoffs are
scaled by 4 in  and both players’ payoffs are scaled by 4 in . Game , though similar in form, is
not part of this family. The action frequencies from these games are given in Table 1.1 and plotted
in Figure 1.10. As is clear from the figure, the data from games - are very similar, with the
data from game  standing out from the rest. This seems consistent with a hypothesis of scale
invariance, which requires equilibria to be the same in - but allows for differences between 
and the others.




 0.643 0.241 1800
 0.630 0.244 1200
 0.594 0.257 1200
 0.550 0.328 600
Table 1.2 reports the results of C-tests to determine whether scale invariance can be rejected
statistically. Separate tests are run for each pair of games in -. Since each subject in the study
played a game 50 times, we cluster standard errors at the subject level to account for within-subject
correlation between observed actions.46 In all cases, scale invariance cannot be rejected with very
46[8] run similar tests without clustering, though note that they are under-estimating the standard errors for exactly
this reason. Even so, without clustering, only 1 of the 6 tests is significant at the 5% level.
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Figure 1.10: Data from [8]







Table 1.2: Statistical Tests of Scale Effects






















































0.244 < 0.257 0.212 0.833
Notes: This table reports the results of C-tests to determine if scale invariance can be rejected. Standard errors are
clustered at the subject level.
large ?-values ranging from 0.376 to 0.951. In the words of [8], there is an “apparent absence of
payoff magnitude effects”.
Qualitative predictions. We now statistically explore other qualitative predictions of NBE and
QRE. Table 1.3 reports the results of standard C-tests of the models’ predictions, and is adapted from
Table 6 of [8]. These predictions come in several forms. Some predictions are about the relative
action frequencies across games and some are predictions about action frequencies within a game
relative to the NE benchmark. We label these two kinds of predictions as “OOS” for out-of-sample
and “IS” for in-sample. We mark the out-of-sample predictions across games - with an “S”
since they are related to changes in scale. We also label in-sample predictions relative to the NE
prediction with an “NE”.
The NBE predictions in Table 1.3 hold generally under the axioms. QRE, on the other hand,
makes ambiguous comparative static predictions across games  and  and across  and  without
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additional structure, so we augment axioms (A1)-(A4) with translation invariance following our
discussion in Section 1.4.47 We have already derived several of the predictions in the table as games
 and  correspond to - = 9 and - = 4 in Figure 1.3 and games  and  correspond to . = 1 and
. = 4 in Figure 1.7. The remaining predictions can be similarly derived. Importantly, the out-of-
sample predictions in the table constitute every such prediction that can be made unambiguously,
and the in-sample predictions are the selection chosen by [8].48
Since the predictions hold for all NBE and all translation invariant QRE, they can be visualized
in Figure 1.11 which plots the set of logit transform NBE and logit QRE (which is translation
invariant), indexed by parameters g and _ respectively. The out-of-sample predictions in the table
correspond to all those that can be made unambiguously from the figure, i.e. those that hold for any
parameter value (held fixed across the pair of games).
The results are clear. All predictions shared by NBE and QRE are in the correct direction, with
most of the in-sample predictions highly significant and the out-of-sample predictions marginally
significant. All of the NBE-only predictions are in the correct direction and only 1 out of 5 QRE-only
predictions are in the correct direction. While none of the NBE-only or QRE-only predictions
are significant at conventional levels, the ?-values of the NBE-only predictions (0.164-0.296) are
uniformly lower than those of the QRE-only predictions (0.405-0.715). Furthermore, as is clear
from Figure 1.11, even when the models make unambiguous sign predictions across games, the
theory allows for the differences to be arbitrarily small. Hence, marginal significance may be the
best one can hope for in finite data. In any case, the qualitative patterns in the data clearly favor
NBE over QRE, especially in light of the absence of scale effects documented in Table 1.2.
Fitting the data. We have established the qualitative patterns in the [8] data using statistical tests,
which seem to favor NBE over translation invariant QRE. So far, we have only used the structure
provided by the models’ axioms. We now study their parametric forms for quantitative measures of
fit.
47[8] show that these predictions hold for logit QRE, but our results establish that they hold generally for all
translation invariant QRE.
48Additional such predictions are shared by both NBE and QRE, follow from transitivity of predictions already in the
table, and are supported.
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Table 1.3: Summary of Predictions vs. Actual Behavior
















































































































































0.257 < 0.328 0.837 0.204
QRE f
*




> 0.5 0.630 > 0.500 2.958 0.004
f
*




> 0.5 0.550 > 0.500 0.717 0.244
f
!




< 0.5 0.241 < 0.500 6.173 0.000
f
!




> 0.1 0.241 > 0.100 3.344 0.001
f
!




> 0.1 0.257 > 0.100 3.648 0.001
f
!




< 0.5 0.328 < 0.500 2.247 0.023
Notes: This table reports the results of C-tests of model predictions. Standard errors are clustered at the subject level.
“IS” and “OOS” mark predictions within and across games respectively. “S” refers to a prediction across games related
by scale, and “NE” refers to a prediction relative to the corresponding NE prediction. Positive (negative) C-values
indicate that the predicted direction of the effect is correct (incorrect).
aThese predictions require that QRE axioms (A1)-(A4) be augmented with translation invariance.
In Table 1.4, we compare the performance of the parametric models in the [8] data. NBE
outperforms QRE in 3 of 4 games individually by a small margin as well as when the individual
squared distances are averaged together. However, since axiomatic NBE and QRE cannot be
distinguished by looking at any game in isolation (Theorem 3), these differences in performance
must be related to model structures and should not be interpreted as fundamental. To distinguish
the two models, we favor the pooled squared distance for all four games as a measure of overall
goodness of fit. We find that NBE significantly outperforms QRE, with NBE’s pooled squared
distance (0.0159) 72% that of QRE (0.0218).
That NBE outperforms QRE in the pooled data is a finding we attribute to scale effects. Games
- belong to the same scale family, and the data from these games are very similar. NBE with a
single value of g predicts the same behavior in these games (scale invariance), whereas QRE with
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Figure 1.11: NBE and QRE Correspondences














Notes: This figure plots the entire set of logit transform NBE and logit QRE (i.e. indexed by their parameters) for
games - from [8].
a single value of _ predicts widely diverging behavior in - (sensitivity to scale). Hence, while
NBE and QRE perform similarly when fit to each game individually, QRE’s performance suffers
much more by restricting its parameter to be the same across games. For each model, we take the
ratio of the average individual squared distance to the pooled squared distance, which heuristically
measures the loss in reducing the number of parameters. For NBE and QRE, the figures are 0.95 and
0.72 respectively, indicating a sense in which NBE-g is more stable than QRE-_. This is also clear
from inspecting the _ estimates. For instance, since game  is the same as  up to a scale factor of
4, QRE makes the same prediction in these games when _ = 4_ , and indeed we see that _̂ is
much larger than _̂ . The pooled estimate satisfies _̂ < _̂?>>;43 < _̂, implying over-sensitivity to
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Table 1.4: Summary of Estimates from [8]
Game
Data NBE QRE NBE QRE NBE QRE
f* f! # f* f! f* f! ĝ _̂ D̂
 0.643 0.241 1800 0.747 0.221 0.662 0.110 1.411 6.459 0.0112 0.0174
 0.630 0.244 1200 0.748 0.227 0.707 0.210 1.451 0.800 0.0142 0.0071
 0.594 0.257 1200 0.629 0.114 0.607 0.104 0.436 2.513 0.0217 0.0234
 0.550 0.328 600 0.661 0.295 0.570 0.206 1.239 9.579 0.0134 0.0153
Pooled – – – – – – – 1.456 5.365 0.0159 0.0218
(P) – – – – – – – – – – (0.000)
payoff differences in  and under-sensitivity in .
Table 1.5: Out-of-sample Differences in Prediction Error (QRE minus NBE)
Δ ÊGH
   
 0.0062 0.0136 0.0024 0.0025
 0.0582 −0.0072 0.0249 0.0189
 0.0236 0.0002 0.0017 0.0124
 0.0081 0.0163 0.0038 0.0019
P
   
 0.000 0.019 0.325 0.261
 0.000 0.996 0.000 0.002
 0.016 0.389 0.000 0.019
 0.174 0.097 0.245 0.000
Notes: The GH-th entry corresponds to Δ ÊGH as in (1.13) for games G, H ∈ {, , , } and gives the difference in
prediction error between the two models using the data from game G (row) to make predictions about game H (column).
Positive (negative) entries indicate that NBE performs better than (worse than) QRE.
We have established that, qualitatively, NBE and QRE make similar predictions in-sample,
but very different predictions out-of-sample across games that differ in scale. We now quantify
these effects by examining the prediction error of the parametric models in making out-of-sample
predictions across games. For each game G ∈ {, , , }, we fit logit transform NBE and logit
QRE as in (1.12), resulting in estimates ĝG and _̂G . We then use these parameter estimates to make
out-of-sample predictions for game H ∈ {, , , }. We define the GH-difference in prediction
error as
Δ ÊGH ≡ DH (&', _̂G) − DH (#, ĝG), (1.13)
which we use to populate the matrix in Table 1.5. The diagonal entries are in-sample, the off-
diagonal entries are out-of-sample, and positive entries indicate that NBE outperforms QRE. From
the table, it is clear that NBE outperforms QRE in 3 of 4 games in-sample and in all 12 out-of-
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sample comparisons, though not all differences are significantly positive. Note also that the average
(absolute) in-sample difference in prediction error of 0.0043 is small compared to the out-of-sample
average of 0.0154.
Risk aversion. Several hypotheses have been proposed to account for QRE’s apparent over-
sensitivity to scale. In our view, the most successful is based on risk aversion and explored in [7]
who fit logit QRE to games - by jointly estimating _ and a risk aversion parameter. Incorporating
curvature into the utility function reduces the effect of scaling games’ monetary payoffs in the
following sense. Holding fixed the opponent’s action, scaling a game’s monetary payoffs by a
factor of 4 (say) increases expected utility differences by a factor less than 4. Hence, risk aversion
is a natural candidate for reconciling the QRE hypothesis with data. It is also the case that risk
aversion implies that - are no longer in the same scale family once expressed in utiles, and hence
NBE may give different predictions in these games for the same value of g. In Appendix 1.8.8,
we replicate the exercise from [7] by fitting both NBE and QRE with constant relative risk averse
(CRRA) utility to the data. We show that (1) NBE significantly outperforms QRE and (2) NBE is
invariant to scaling monetary payoffs under CRRA utility.
1.6.3 Selten and Chmura 2008
[14] collect data from 12 generalized matching pennies games, to which they fit several “station-
ary concepts” including logit QRE and sampling equilibrium ([13]).49 They state that "It is not easy
to understand why the predictions...are not very far apart, in spite of the fact that they are based on
very different principles”. However, due to the structure of the games and the fact that sampling
equilibrium approximately satisfies the NBE axioms (see Section 1.2.4), our results (Theorem 3)
suggest that the predictions should be very similar in individual games. The models should also
make similar predictions in sets of games as long as they are of similar payoff magnitude, which is
the case for the 12 games considered. Hence, we revisit their study to test this hypothesis and shed
light on the puzzle they put forth.
49[14] misreport the fits of both QRE and sampling equilibrium, which is pointed out in a comment by [33], who
report the correct fits and remark that the models are “about equally accurate”.
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Table 1.6: Summary of Estimates from [14]
Game
Data NBE QRE NBE QRE NBE QRE
f* f! # f* f! f* f! ĝ _̂ D̂
1 0.079 0.690 9600 0.059 0.689 0.037 0.688 0.960 1.342 0.0004 0.0017
2 0.217 0.527 9600 0.177 0.514 0.179 0.505 0.998 0.625 0.0018 0.0019
3 0.163 0.793 9600 0.150 0.796 0.172 0.790 0.911 1.199 0.0002 0.0001
4 0.286 0.736 9600 0.266 0.745 0.278 0.740 0.689 1.112 0.0005 0.0001
5 0.327 0.664 9600 0.310 0.671 0.312 0.670 0.542 1.257 0.0003 0.0002
6 0.445 0.596 9600 0.423 0.616 0.423 0.616 0.436 1.371 0.0009 0.0009
7 0.141 0.564 4800 0.077 0.550 0.073 0.530 1.473 0.609 0.0043 0.0058
8 0.250 0.586 4800 0.163 0.576 0.156 0.567 0.687 0.955 0.0077 0.0092
9 0.254 0.827 4800 0.226 0.896 0.211 0.865 0.199 2.731 0.0055 0.0033
10 0.366 0.699 4800 0.266 0.745 0.278 0.740 0.689 1.112 0.0121 0.0094
11 0.331 0.652 4800 0.306 0.660 0.309 0.660 0.627 1.094 0.0007 0.0006
12 0.439 0.604 4800 0.425 0.618 0.425 0.617 0.406 1.455 0.0004 0.0004
Pooled – – – – – – – 0.966 1.049 0.0059 0.0049
(P) – – – – – – – – – – (1.000)
The 12 games are reported in Appendix 1.8.6, and Table 1.6 reports the fits of logit transform
NBE and logit QRE. Unsurprisingly, the individual game performance between the two models
is virtually identical; averaging the squared distances across all 12 game gives 0.0029 for NBE
and 0.0028 for QRE. However, the pooled fit does favor QRE by a reasonable margin, which has a
squared distance (0.0049) that is 83% that of NBE (0.0059). We have no intuition for this finding
because the games are of similar payoff magnitude and there is no obvious relationship between
them.
1.6.4 Melo et al. 2018
We fit logit transform NBE and logit QRE to the 3 × 3 “Joker” games from [28]. We chose
these games because they are among the simplest games with unique regular QRE in which each
player has more than 2 actions. Our hypothesis is that NBE will behave similarly to QRE, and this
is indeed the case. The games and data are in Figure 1.12, and the estimates are in Table 1.7. Not
only is every NBE prediction also a regular QRE,50 the NBE predictions are very similar to the logit
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QRE predictions. All three games are of similar scale, and hence the pooled fits are very similar
also. These results suggest that it is difficult to distinguish noise-in-actions from noise-in-beliefs,
even in more general fully mixed games.
Figure 1.12: Joker games from [28]
2(= = 1620) 1 (0.359) 2 (0.439) J (0.202)
1 (0.253) 10, 30 30, 10 10, 30
2 (0.304) 30, 10 10, 30 10, 30
J (0.442) 10, 30 10, 30 55, 10
3(= = 940) 1 (0.258) 2 (0.323) J (0.419)
1 (0.340) 25, 30 30, 10 10, 30
2 (0.464) 30, 10 25, 30 10, 30
J (0.196) 10, 30 10, 30 30, 10
4(= = 300) 1 (0.487) 2 (0.147) J (0.366)
1 (0.473) 20, 30 30, 10 10, 30
2 (0.220) 30, 10 10, 30 10, 30
J (0.307) 10, 30 10, 30 30, 10
Table 1.7: Summary of Estimates from [28]
Game Player
NBE QRE NBE QRE NBE QRE
1 2 J 1 2 J ĝ _̂ D̂
2
1 0.279 0.279 0.441 0.286 0.286 0.428
1.358 0.206 0.0045 0.0052
2 0.399 0.399 0.201 0.391 0.391 0.217
3
1 0.368 0.368 0.265 0.368 0.368 0.263
8.840 0.149 0.0241 0.0168
2 0.325 0.325 0.350 0.297 0.297 0.407
4
1 0.389 0.306 0.306 0.384 0.308 0.308
0.934 0.363 0.0315 0.0320
2 0.386 0.228 0.386 0.388 0.224 0.388
Pooled – – – – – – – 1.173 0.243 0.0204 0.0197
(P) – – – – – – – – – – (0.811)
1.6.5 A survey
The [8] study was specifically concerned with the effects of scale, and hence ran games that
were constructed to be in the same scale family. While there are no formal results akin to Theorem
5 for games that are not precisely in the same scale family, it is obvious “by continuity” that QRE is
sensitive to the general scale of games in a way that NBE is not. Hence, we add to the evidence of
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the previous sections by fitting parametric models to a dataset of 21 generalized matching pennies
games from 5 studies: MPW 2000 ([8]), SC 2008 ([14]), Ochs 1995 ([6]), GH 2001 ([26]), and
NS 2002 ([32]). The dataset includes games with much larger scale differences than can be found
within any one study.
Logit transform NBE (or any parametric NBE) has the property that the estimates are insensitive
to the “exchange rate” between utility and money. That is, holding the data fixed but scaling the
arbitrary utilities in the payoff matrix for one or more players does not effect the estimated g or the
resulting prediction. Logit QRE on the other hand, or any translation invariant parameterization of
QRE, is sensitive to these scalings. If all players’ utility numbers are scaled up by some factor 2 > 0,




)_̂ and the predicted equilibria remain unchanged.
If, however, not all players’ utilities are scaled by the same factor, the _ estimate will change in
unpredictable ways and lead to different predicted equilibria as well.
Hence, to fit QRE to data pooled together from different studies (or to make _ estimates
comparable across studies) requires that the utility payoffs are adjusted for inflation and currency-
to-currency exchange rates. We take [8] as the base-study to derive the rate of 1 utile per 0.10
year-2000 US dollars. Using this rate, we multiply the utility payoffs from each game in our dataset
by a study-specific conversion factor prior to estimation. We explain the exact procedure and give
the conversion factors in Appendix 1.8.9. The 21 pre-transformed games are given in Appendix
1.8.6 along with details of the experimental procedures, though it is the transformed payoffs that are
used in all estimations.
We fit logit transform NBE, logit QRE, and Luce QRE (i.e. with quantal response function
(1.7)) to the data. Recall that logit is translation invariant, Luce is scale invariant, and NBE is
both. Table 1.13 of Appendix 1.8.10 gives the parameter estimates and resulting squared distances.
Unsurprisingly, the individual-game performance of all three models is very similar for most games.
In any case, the differences should not be interpreted as fundamental (due to Theorem 3) and we
favor a test based on all 21 game pooled together.
Comparing the pooled squared distances of the three parametric models yields a clear ordering
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from best to worst: NBE (0.0133), Luce QRE (0.0148), and Logit QRE (0.0248). The NBE
distance is 54% that of logit and 90% that of Luce; and that NBE outperforms the others is highly
significant. Since the models perform similarly when each game is fit individually, we interpret
this finding as suggesting the value of both scale and translation invariance in explaining the data.
It is unsurprising given the results of Section 1.6.2 that scale invariance is powerful in explaining
the data, which accounts for the large difference in performance between NBE and logit QRE.
Interestingly, translation invariance also seems somewhat valuable as NBE outperforms the scale
invariant (and translation sensitive) Luce QRE.
It is a valid concern that the pooled estimate of _ may be very sensitive to the utility-money
exchange rate conversions. If that were the case, even small errors in conversions could effect the
logit QRE squared distance (in either direction). Even holding fixed the year and country across
studies might not be sufficient, as different subject pools might value the same amount of real money
differently, resulting in different utility valuations. As a robustness check, we show in Appendix
1.8.9 that the result of this section is not sensitive to even very large perturbations of the conversion
factors.
1.7 Conclusion
It is well-known that Nash equilibrium (NE) fails to explain the richness of experimental
data. Many models have been proposed as a result. One prominent example is quantal response
equilibrium (QRE), which relaxes the rationality requirement of NE by allowing for “noise in
actions”. We introduce noisy belief equilibrium (NBE), which relaxes the other condition of NE by
allowing for “noise in beliefs”. In an NBE, axioms restrict belief distributions to be unbiased with
respect to and responsive to changes in the opponents’ behavior. We study the testable restrictions
imposed by NBE, which we compare to those of regular QRE in which axioms restrict the primitive
quantal response function.
We find that NBE explains, just as QRE does, some commonly observed deviations from
NE and the own payoff effect. The mechanism whereby QRE achieves this is a sensitivity to
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payoff differences, which we show is linked inextricably to a sensitivity to affine transformations
of payoffs. By contrast, beliefs-based models such as NBE are generally invariant to affine
transformations, which we show is valuable in explaining experimental data. Unlike QRE, NBE
respects rationalizability, and hence has a fundamentally different relationship to dominated and
iteratively deleted actions, which we believe merits further experimental study. It would also be




1. Fix {Γ<, f∗}. An NBE exists and is unique and interior.
Proof. Ψ : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2 is a continuous function mapping from a compact and convex set to itself
(from (B2
′
) as already shown). By Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, there exists a fixed point of Ψ. To show
interiority of any fixed points, suppose for purposes of contradiction that some player : is playing A ∈ {0, 1}
in an NBE. But then by (B1
′
), player 8 forms belief A∗(A) = A to which a pure action B ∈ {0, 1} is the only
best response. (A, B) cannot be an NBE, since if it were, it would also be an NE, and the game has no pure
strategy NE. Thus, all fixed points of Ψ are interior, and we only need to check (f* , f!) ∈ (0, 1)2. That the
fixed point is unique follows from the fact that Ψ* (f!) is strictly increasing in f! ∈ (0, 1) and Ψ! (f* ) is
strictly decreasing in f* ∈ (0, 1) by (B3
′
). 
2. Fix {Γ, f∗}. An NBE exists.
Proof. An NBE is a fixed point of Ψ : Δ ⇒ Δ . It is trivial to show that Ψ is non-empty and convex-valued;
and Δ is non-empty, compact, and convex. Existence of NBE follows from Kakutani’s fixed point theorem
after showing that Ψ8 (and thus Ψ) is upper hemicontinuous. To this end, let I8 ⊂ {1, 2, ...,  (8)} ≡ [ (8)]










'8 9 , f
′
−8 ∉ '8: for : ∉ I8
}
(1.14)
as the set of beliefs for which actions indexed in I8, and only those actions, are best responses (let 48 (∅) =
∅). [12] previously defined this object which is used in some of their results. Note that the collection
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E ≡ {48 (I8)}I8⊂[ (8) ] defines a partition of Δ−8. Let {fC−8} ⊂ Δ−8 be an arbitrary convergent sequence with
fC−8 → f∞−8 as C →∞. Ψ8 is upper hemicontinuous if, for all such sequences, there exists a rational strategy














−8 |f∞−8). There are two cases to
consider (any convergent sequence will fall into one of the cases for sufficiently high C), and for each, we
construct such a strategy B8.
Case 1: Let {fC−8} ⊂
∏
:≠8 Δ (f∞: ). Let  ∈ E be an arbitrary partition element. From (B2)-(i),
`−8 ( |fC−8) is continuous for all C, and hence we can set B8 to be any that is rational and constant within
each partition element.
Case 2: Let {fC−8} ⊄
∏
:≠8 Δ (f∞: ), meaning f
C
:
“gains zeros” in the limit for some : . Further suppose
C is sufficiently high such that, for all : , Δ (fC
:
) = Δ (fC
′
:
) for all C < C′ < ∞ so that along the remaining
sequence fC
:
does not gain or lose zeros except in the limit. We must modify the proof from that of case
1 because `−8 ( |fC−8) may be discontinuous for some  ∈ E as C → ∞ by (B1).51 Define 8 9 ≡ 2; ('8 9 ∩∏
:≠8 Δ (fC:)) for all 9 . Since '8 9 is closed, 8 9 ⊂ '8 9 . By construction, `−8 (8 9 |f
C
−8) = `−8 ('8 9 |fC−8)
for C < ∞ and by the second bullet point of (B2) `−8 (8 9 |fC−8) → `−8 (8 9 |f∞−8). The proof proceeds
exactly as in case 1, with 8 9 replacing '8 9 . That is, define 28 (·) as in (1.14) except with 8 9 replacing '8 9 .
C ≡ {28 (I8)}I8⊂[ (8) ] defines a partition of Δ−8 with  ∈ C an arbitrary element. By (B2)-(ii), `−8 ( |fC−8)
is continuous for all C, and hence we can set B8 to be any that is rational and constant within each partition
element.52 
1. Fix {Γ, f∗}. If D8 (08 9 , 0−8) ≠ D8 (08;, 0−8) for all 8, 08 9 , 08;, and 0−8, then Ψ is single-valued.
Proof. Fix player 8 and any f−8 ∈ Δ−8. If f−8 is a pure action profile, then it is immediate from (B1)
that player 8 will have correct beliefs with probability one, to which one of his pure actions is a strict
best response by assumptions on D8, making Ψ8 single-valued. So assume not, i.e. at least one : ≠ 8
has an action 9 such that f: 9 ∈ (0, 1). By (B1), with probability one, player 8’s beliefs only put positive
probability on pure actions in the support of f−8, and so we show that it is as if player 8 is playing a
restricted game Γ
′
= {# ′, ′, D′} in which his opponents take a fully mixed profile. Specifically, define
#
′
−8 (f−8) ≡ {: ∈ # |: ≠ 8, f: 9 ∈ (0, 1) for some 9} as the set of 8’s opponents who are mixing (over at least
2 pure actions) under f−8 and for each : ∈ #
′
−8 (f−8), define 
′
:
(f−8) ≡ {0: 9 ∈ : |f: (0: 9) ∈ (0, 1)} as the
set of pure actions played by : with interior probability under f: . Define 
′





′ (f−8) ≡ 8 × 
′
−8 (f−8) as restricted action spaces. Define D
′ (·;f−8) : 
′ (f−8) → R in the natural way
51Consider a 2 × 2 game in which player 8 (row) has 2 actions* and  in which* weakly dominates . Only when
player 8’s realized belief is A
′
= 0 is  a best response, and hence 48 (*, ) = {0}. (B1) implies that `8: ({0}|A) = 0 for
all A ∈ (0, 1) and `8
:
({0}|0) = 1, and hence D8
:
({0}|A) is discontinuous as A → 0+.
52In the example from Footnote 51, this construction implies the strategy B8 (A
′) = 1 (corresponding to *) for all
A





(08 9 , 0
′
−8;f−8) = D8 (08 9 , 1(0
′
−8 , f−8)) where 1(0
′
−8 , f−8) ∈ −8 records the pure actions taken by 8’s
opponents : ∉ #
′




−8 (f−8) (define D
′
:
for players : ≠ 8 arbitrarily).
Finally, defining f
′
−8 (f−8) ∈ Δ
′
−8 ≡ ×:∈# ′−8 (f−8)Δ
′
:
(f−8) as the natural projection of f−8 ∈ Δ−8 onto
Δ
′
−8 after dropping players : ∉ #
′
−8 (f−8) and zeros corresponding to f: 9 = 0 for : ∈ #
′
−8 (f−8), it is as
if player 8 faces Γ
′ (f−8) = {#
′ (f−8), 
′ (f−8), D
′ (·;f−8)} with opponents who are playing a fully mixed
profile f
′
−8 (f−8) ∈ Δ
′
−8. By (B1), player 8’s beliefs do not realize with positive probability in any subset of
Δ
′
−8 with zero Lebesgue measure. By assumption, D8 (08 9 , 0−8) ≠ D8 (08; , 0−8) for all 08 9 08;, and 0−8 ∈ −8,
and thus for no two actions 08 9 and 08; is it the case that D
′
8












By Lemma 8 of [12], the event that player 8 is indifferent between any two pure actions has zero Lebesgue
measure, and hence Ψ8 is single-valued. 
3. Fix Γ<. The set of attainable NBE is equal to the set of attainable QRE.
Proof. To simplify the proof, we additionally assume that NBE axiom (B2
′
) contains a differentiability
condition: for any Ā ∈ (0, 1), 8
:





|Ā ,A ∈(0,1) < 0 by (B3
′
). Including differentiability has no effect on the result, as it does not ef-
fect the set of attainable NBE; it simplifies the proof because of an analogous differentiability condition
assumed in QRE axiom (A2), which does not effect the set of QRE.




)), we construct the corre-
sponding QRE (satisfying (A1)-(A4)) and vice versa.
Step 1: Every NBE is a QRE.
Fix {Γ<, f∗}. Player 8’s belief-map A∗ induces NBE reaction function Ψ8 9 : [0, 1] → [0, 1].
By Theorem 1, all NBE are interior, so the unique NBE must be a fixed point of Ψ = (Ψ1 9 ,Ψ2;) :
[n, 1 − n]2 → [n, 1 − n]2 for sufficiently small n > 0. For convenience, define *8 (n) ≡ D̄8 ( [n, 1 − n]) =
(D̄81(A), D̄82(A))A ∈[n ,1−n ] ⊂ R2 as the set of utility vectors associated with any belief A ∈ [n, 1 − n].
Step 1a: Construct a pre-quantal response function &̃8 9 : *8 (n) → [0, 1] such that &̃8 9 ◦ D̄8 |[n ,1−n ] =
Ψ8 9 |[n ,1−n ] and &̃8 9 satisfies analogues of (A1)-(A4):
(A1◦): &̃8 9 ◦ D̄8 (A) ∈ (0, 1) for all A ∈ [n, 1 − n].
(A2◦): &̃8 9 ◦ D̄8 (A) is a continuous and differentiable function for all A ∈ [n, 1 − n].
(A3◦): m&̃81◦D̄8 (A )
mA
> 0, m&̃82◦D̄8 (A )
mA
< 0 for all A ∈ [n, 1 − n] (given mD̄81 (A )
mA
> 0, mD̄82 (A )
mA
< 0 without loss).
(A4◦): For A ∈ [n, 1 − n] such that D̄8 9 (A) > D̄8; (A), &̃8 9 ◦ D̄8 (A) > &̃8; ◦ D̄8 (A).
From this the result almost follows. Intuitively, &̃8 9 is very much like a quantal response function but is
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restricted to the subset of R2 that is relevant for equilibrium in this game, &̃8 9 ◦ D̄8 is a more convenient
reparameterization, and (A1◦)-(A4◦) are just (A1)-(A4) restricted to the relevant space. Once &̃8 9 is con-
structed for both players 8 ∈ {1, 2}, the fixed point of Ψ representing the NBE is also the fixed point of
(&̃1 9 ◦ D̄1, &̃2; ◦ D̄2) : [n, 1 − n]2 → (0, 1)2 representing the corresponding QRE. All that remains is to
extend &̃8 9 to a proper quantal response function defined over R2 that satisfies (A1)-(A4), which we do in
step 1b.
Take &̃8 9 : *8 (n) → [0, 1] defined by &̃8 9 (E8) ≡ Ψ8 9 (D̄−18 (E8)) as the pre-quantal response function,
which satisfies &̃8 9 ◦ D̄8 |[n ,1−n ] = Ψ8 9 |[n ,1−n ] by construction. We now show that &̃8 9 satisfies (A1◦)-
(A4◦). We make extensive use of the fact that (without loss) &̃81 ◦ D̄8 (A) = Ψ81(A) = 1 − 8: (Ā |A) and
&̃82 ◦ D̄8 (A) = Ψ82(A) = 8: (Ā |A) where Ā ∈ (n, 1 − n) is the unique value that satisfies D̄81(Ā) = D̄82(Ā).
(A1◦): &̃8 9 satisfies (A1◦) because &̃81 ◦ D̄8 (A) = 1 − 8: (Ā |A) ∈ (0, 1) for A ∈ [n, 1 − n] by (B1
′
).
(A2◦): &̃8 9 satisfies (A2◦) because &̃81 ◦ D̄8 (A) = 1 − 8: (Ā |A) is continuous and differentiable for all
A ∈ [n, 1 − n] by (B2′).
(A3◦): Without loss of generality, for all A ∈ [n, 1−n]: mD̄81 (A )
mA
> 0, mD̄82 (A )
mA
< 0, &̃81◦D̄8 (A) = 1−8: (Ā |A),






|Ā ,A ∈[n ,1−n ] < 0 from (B3
′
).
(A4)◦: Recall that D̄81(A) = D̄82(A) if and only if A = Ā. Notice that by (B4
′
), &̃81 ◦ D̄8 (Ā) = 1− 8: (Ā |Ā) =
1 − 12 =
1
2 and &̃82 ◦ D̄8 (Ā) = 
8
:
(Ā |Ā) = 12 . Hence, by (B3
′
), &̃81 ◦ D̄8 (A) = &̃82 ◦ D̄8 (A) if and only if A = Ā.
(A4◦) then follows from (A3◦).
Step 1b: Extend &̃8 9 : *8 (n) → [0, 1] to a proper quantal response function &8 9 : R2 → [0, 1] that satisfies
(A1)-(A4):
We now construct the extension, which we illustrate in Figure 1.13. First, assume without loss that D̄81
is strictly increasing (and D̄82 is strictly decreasing) in A. Define *8 (−∞) ≡ (D̄81(A), D̄82(A))A ∈(−∞,∞) as the
one-dimensional affine plane that results from evaluating the expected utility vector for any A on the real
line. Choose some function &81 : *8 (−∞) → (0, 1) such that &81 ◦ D̄8 : (−∞,∞) → (0, 1) agrees with
&̃81 ◦ D̄8 (A) on A ∈ [n, 1 − n] and is strictly increasing and differentiable on A ∈ (−∞,∞), which is possible






















the 45◦-line onto subspace *8 (−∞) (see right panel of Figure 1.13). It is easy to verify that &8 9 satisfies
(A1)-(A4).
Step 2: Every QRE is an NBE.
We are now given quantal response function &8 9 : R2 → [0, 1]. First, we construct a family of CDFs
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Figure 1.13: Construction of the Quantal Response Function























(·|A) representing belief-map A∗(A). We then show that A∗(A) induces a reaction function Ψ8 9 : [0, 1] →




), from which the result
follows.
We may assume D̄81(A) and &81 ◦ D̄8 (A) are strictly decreasing in A ∈ [0, 1] without loss by (A3). For
the unique Ā ∈ (n, 1 − n) such that D̄81(Ā) = D̄82(Ā), define
8: (Ā |A) ≡

6(A) A ∈ [0, n)
&81 ◦ D̄8 (A) A ∈ [n, 1 − n]
ℎ(A) A ∈ (1 − n, 1],
where 6(A) and ℎ(A) are any functions chosen so that the whole function is strictly decreasing, continuous,
differentiable, and 8
:
(Ā |0) = 1 and 8
:
(Ā |1) = 0. That this is possible relies on (A1)-(A3). Notice that
8
:
(Ā |A) |[n ,1−n ] = &81 ◦ D̄8 (A) |[n ,1−n ] and 8: (Ā |A) goes from the top left corner of the unit square to the
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bottom right corner. Also, by (A4), we have that 8
:
(Ā |Ā) = &81 ◦ D̄8 (Ā) = 12 . Now choose positive number
=0 sufficiently large such that (1 − A)=0 < 8: (Ā |A) < 1 − A
=0 for all A ∈ (0, 1), which exists since as =→∞,
(1 − A)= → 0 and (1 − A=) → 1 pointwise on A ∈ (0, 1). Figure 1.14 gives an illustration of the functions
defined so far, and is a useful reference for the whole construction.












Define A◦ ≡ {A : (1− A)=0 = 12 } and A
◦ ≡ {A : 1− A=0 = 12 }, and notice that A◦ < n < Ā < 1− n < A
◦. For
all Ã ∈ [A◦, Ā], define U(Ã) ≡ {U ∈ [0, 1] : U8: (Ā |Ã)+(1−U) (1−Ã)
=0 = 12 } and 
8
:
(Ã |A) ≡ U(Ã)8
:
(Ā |A)+(1−
U(Ã)) (1− A)=0 . Similarly, for all Ã ∈ [Ā , A◦], define V(Ã) ≡ {V ∈ [0, 1] : V8
:
(Ā |Ã) + (1− V) (1− (Ã)=0) = 12 }
and 8
:
(Ã |A) ≡ V(Ã)8
:
(Ā |A) + (1 − V(Ã)) (1 − A=0). Now for Ã ∈ (0, A◦), define 8: (Ã |A) ≡ (1 − A)
<(Ã ) where
<(Ã) ≡ {< ∈ [=0,∞) : (1 − Ã)< = 12 }. Similarly, for Ã ∈ (A
◦, 1), define 8
:
(Ã |A) ≡ 1 − A=(Ã ) where
=(Ã) ≡ {= ∈ [=0,∞) : 1 − Ã= = 12 }. Finally, set 
8
:
(0|A) = 0 and 8
:
(1|A) = 1 for A ∈ (0, 1). We have
defined a family of CDFs 8
:
(Ã |A)Ã ∈[0,1],A ∈(0,1) , pinning down belief-map A∗(A) for all A ∈ (0, 1). We may
also impose that A∗(0) = 0 and A∗(1) = 1, which gives 8
:
(Ã |1) = 1{Ã=1} and 8: (Ã |0) = 1, and thus we have
constructed the entire family 8
:
(Ã |A)Ã ∈[0,1],A ∈[0,1] . The NBE reaction is now given by Ψ81(A) = 8: (Ā |A)






) is immediate from construction of 8
:
(·|A). 
5. Fix {Γ, f∗}. The set of NBE is the same for all Γ′ ∈ A(Γ).
Proof. Fix {Γ, f∗}. First, we show that response set '8 9 is the same for all Γ
′ ∈ A(Γ). By definition of
A, for all 8 and 0−8, there exists V8 and W8 (0−8) such that D̄
′
8 9
(0−8) = V8D̄8 9 (0−8) + W8 (0−8) for all 9 . By
linearity of expected utility, for all 8 and f̃−8, V8 and W8 (f̃−8) ≡
∑





V8D̄8 9 (f̃−8) + W8 (f̃−8) for all 9 . Thus, we have that
'
′
8 9 = {f̃−8 : D̄
′
8 9 (f̃−8) ≥ D̄
′
8: (f̃−8) ∀: = 1, ...,  (8)}
= {f̃−8 : V8D̄8 9 (f̃−8) + W̄8 (f̃−8) ≥ V8D̄8: (f̃−8) + W̄8 (f̃−8) ∀: = 1, ...,  (8)}
= {f̃−8 : V8D̄8 9 (f̃−8) ≥ V8D̄8: (f̃−8) ∀: = 1, ...,  (8)}
= {f̃−8 : D̄8 9 (f̃−8) ≥ D̄8: (f̃−8) ∀: = 1, ...,  (8)}
= '8 9 .
It is immediate that, for any belief-map f∗, NBE reaction Ψ, and thus any NBE, is the same for all Γ
′ ∈
A(Γ). 
1. A∗(A; g) has CDF
















8: (Ā |A; g) ≡ P(A






























































is differentiable in Ā for Ā , A ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the PDF is easily derived as 5 8
:





|Ā ,A ∈(0,1) using the chain rule. 
2. A∗(A; g) satisfies (B1′)-(B4′).
Proof.
(B1) For any A ∈ (0, 1), 8
:
(Ā |A; g) is strictly increasing and continuous in Ā ∈ [0, 1]; A∗(0; g) = 0 and
A∗(1; g) = 1:
That A∗(0; g) = 0 and A∗(1; g) = 1 is obvious from the definition of A∗(·; g) and the convention that





. It is also obvious that, for any A ∈ (0, 1), 8
:
(Ā |A; g) is
continuous in Ā ∈ [0, 1]. For all A ∈ (0, 1), 8
:
(0|A; g) = 0 and 8
:




All we need to show is that 8
:

























> 0 since q(·) > 0, and we are done.
(B2
′
) For any Ā ∈ (0, 1), 8
:
(Ā |A; g) is continuous in A ∈ [0, 1]:
We show something stronger, that 8
:
(Ā |A; g) is jointly continuous in (Ā , A) ∈ (0, 1) × [0, 1]. 8
:
















is obviously continuous for every (Ā , A) ∈ (0, 1) × (0, 1). 8
:
(Ā |A; g) is also
continuous at all points (Ā , A) ∈ (0, 1) × {0, 1}. To see this, notice that 8
:
(Ā |0; g) = 1 for all Ā ∈ (0, 1) and
;8<A→0+8: (Ā |A; g) = 1 for all Ā ∈ (0, 1), showing continuity at (Ā , A) ∈ (0, 1) × {0}. A similar argument
shows continuity at (Ā , A) ∈ (0, 1) × {1}.
(B3
′
) For all A < A
′ ∈ [0, 1], 8
:
(Ā |A ′; g) ≤ 8
:
(Ā |A; g) for Ā ∈ [0, 1] and 8
:
(Ā |A ′; g) < 8
:
(Ā |A; g) for
Ā ∈ (0, 1):
(i) If A
′
> A ∈ (0, 1):
(a) If Ā ∈ (0, 1),
8: (Ā |A
′































































(b) If Ā = 0, 8
:
(Ā |A; g) = 8
:
(Ā |A ′; g) = 0 (from inspecting 8
:
(·|·; g)).
(c) If Ā = 1, 8
:
(Ā |A; g) = 8
:
(Ā |A ′; g) = 1 (from inspecting 8
:
(·|·; g)).
(ii) If 1 = A ′ > A > 0, 8
:
(Ā |A ′; g) = 1{Ā=1} ≤ 8: (Ā |A; g) for Ā ∈ [0, 1] (using A
∗(1; g) = 1).
(iii) If 1 > A ′ > A = 0, 8
:
(Ā |A ′; g) ≤ 8
:































(A |A; g) = 12 for A ∈ (0, 1):
For A ∈ (0, 1), 8
:















= Φ(0) = 12 . 
1.8.2 The NBE of generalized matching pennies
We derive the set of NBE (and hence QRE) attainable for arbitrary Γ<.









{0} f! = 0




{ 12 } f! = f
#
!




{1} f! = 1
Ψ! (f* ) ∈

{1} f* = 0




{ 12 } f* = f
#
*




{0} f* = 1.
The set of attainable NBE is given by {{f* , f!}|f* ∈ Ψ* (f!), f! ∈ Ψ! (f* )} and consists of the union




} = { 12 ,
1
2 } in which case the unique




We derive the set of attainable NBE when unbiasedness (B4
′
) is replaced with mean-unbiasedness.
We first derive the upper and lower bounds on player 1’s reaction function Ψ* (f!) under the restriction








(f!) ≥ f#! )








(f!) ≥ f#! ). These bounds can be achieved through the following





(f!) with probability 1 − U(f!)
f̄! (f!) with probability U(f!)
.
This violates continuity (B1
′
), but it is clear that a continuous version can approximate arbitrarily well the
reactions they induce, and hence it is sufficient to find Ψ̄* (f!) ≡ BD?






) and Ψ* (f!) ≡ 8= 5
f! , f̄! ,U | (1−U)f!+Uf̄!=f!
P(f̂∗
!
(f!) ≥ f#! ).
Case 1: f! ∈ (0, f#! ). It is obvious that Ψ* (f!) = 0. It is easy to check that Ψ̄* (f!) is achieved
when f
!




which implies Ψ̄* (f!) = U = f!f#
!
.





and f̄! = 1, and thus U is determined by the constraint (1−U)f!+Uf̄! = (1−U)f#! +U =














) f! ∈ (0, f#! )






, 1) f! ∈ (f#! , 1)
{1} f! = 1
Ψ<40=! (f* ) ∈





, 1) f* ∈ (0, f#* )
(0, 1) f* = f#*
(0, 1−f*1−f#
*
) f* ∈ (f#* , 1)
{0} f* = 1.
The set of attainable “mean NBE” is given by {{f* , f!}|f* ∈ Ψ<40=* (f!), f! ∈ Ψ<40=! (f* )} and









} = { 12 ,
1
2 }. The set always contains an open ball around the NE, and hence has a non-trivial
intersection with the set of NBE/QRE.
1.8.3 Generalizing Lemma 3
For the statement of the lemma and its proof, we let E8 ∈ R (8)++ be a utility vector with strictly positive
components, where, without loss, E81 ≥ E82 ≥ · · · ≥ E8 (8) . Let +(E8) ≡ { 9 : E8 9 ≥ E8: ∀:} and
−(E8) ≡ { 9 : E8 9 ≤ E8: ∀:} be the indices corresponding to the highest and lowest payoff components
respectively. +(E8) ∩ −(E8) = ∅ if and only if E8 9 ≠ E8: for some 9 and : .






(i) Let &8 be translation invariant (and weakly substitutable) and V > 1:
(a) &8 (VE8) = &8 (Ẽ8 (V)) for some Ẽ8 (V) such that Ẽ8; (V) = E8; + X; (V) where X; (V) = 0
if ; ∈ −(E8), X; (V) > 0 and X; (V) → ∞ if ; ∉ −(E8), and X 9 (V) − X: (V) → ∞ if E8 9 > E8: .
(b) &8 9 (VE8) > &8 9 (E8) for all 9 ∈ +(E8) and &8: (VE8) < &8: (E8) for all : ∈ −(E8).
(c) ;8<
V→∞
&8 9 (VE8) ≥ ;8<
G→∞
&8 9 (G, ..., G, 0, ..., 0) if 9 ∈ +(E8) (G in first |+(E8) | entries);
;8<
V→∞
&8: (VE8) ≤ ;8<
G→∞
&8: (0, .., 0,−G, ...,−G) if : ∈ −(E8) (−G in last |−(E8) | entries).
(ii) Let &8 be scale invariant (and weakly substitutable) and W > 0:
(a) &8 (E8 + W4 (8) ) = &8 (Ẽ8 (W)) for some Ẽ8 (W) such that Ẽ8; (W) = E8; + X; (W) where X; (W) = 0 if
; ∈ +(E8), X; (W) > 0 and X; (W) → E81 − E8; if ; ∉ +(E8).
(b) &8 9 (E8 + W4 (8) ) < &8 9 (E8) for all 9 ∈ +(E8) and &8: (E8 + W4 (8) ) > &8: (E8) for all : ∈ −(E8).
(c) ;8<
W→∞
&8; (E8 + W4 (8) ) = 1 (8) for all ;.
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Proof. (i): Fix E8 with +(E8) ∩ −(E8) = ∅ and let V > 1. It is easy to show that W̄(V) ≡ (V − 1)E81 > 0
and W(V) ≡ (V − 1)E8 (8) > 0 satisfy VE8 9 − W̄(V) = E8 9 for all 9 ∈ +(E8) and VE8: − W(V) = E8: for all
: ∈ −(E8). Notice that E81 > E8: ⇐⇒ VE8: − W̄(V) < E8: and E8 (8) < E8 9 ⇐⇒ VE8 9 − W(V) > E8 9 and
thus VE8: − W̄(V) < E8: for all : ∉ +(E8) and VE8 9 − W(V) > E8 9 for all 9 ∉ −(E8).
By translation invariance, &8 (VE8) = &8 (VE8 − W(V)4 (8) ) = &8 (VE8 − W̄(V)4 (8) ). Since &8 (VE8) =
&8 (VE8 − W(V)4 (8) ), we have that &8 (VE8) = &8 (Ẽ(V)) where Ẽ8; (V) ≡ VE8; − W(V) = VE8; − (V− 1)E8 (8) =
E8; + X; (V) where X; (V) = (V − 1) (E8; − E8 (8) ). This shows (a).
By weak substitutability, &8 9 (VE8 − W̄(V)4 (8) ) > &8 9 (E8) for all 9 ∈ +(E8) and&8: (VE8 −W(V)4 (8) ) <
&8: (E8) for all : ∈ −(E8). Therefore, &8 9 (VE8) > &8 9 (E8) for all 9 ∈ +(E8) and &8: (VE8) > &8: (E8) for
all : ∈ −(E8). This shows (b).
By translation invariance, &8 (Ẽ8 (V)) = &8 (Ẽ8 (V) − W̃(V)4 (8) ) for any W̃(V). Since X 9 (V) − X: (V) → ∞
if E8 9 > E8: , we can set W̃(V) such that Ẽ8 9 (V) − W̃(V) → ∞ for 9 ∈ +(E8) and Ẽ8: (V) − W̃(V) → −∞ for
all : ∉ +(E8). By weak substitutability ;8<
V→∞
&8 9 (Ẽ8 (V) − W̃(V)4 (8) ) ≥ ;8<
G→∞
&8 9 (G, ..., G, 0, ..., 0) (G in first
|+(E8) | entries) and thus ;8<
V→∞
&8 9 (VE8) ≥ ;8<
G→∞
&8 9 (G, ..., G, 0, ..., 0) if 9 ∈ +(E8). Similarly, one can show
that ;8<
V→∞
&8: (VE8) ≤ ;8<
G→∞
&8: (0, .., 0,−G, ...,−G) if : ∈ −(E8), which shows (c).
(ii): Fix E8 with +(E8) ∩ −(E8) = ∅ and let W > 0. It is easy to show that V̄(W) ≡ E81E81+W ∈ (0, 1) and
V(W) ≡ E8 (8)
E8 (8)+W ∈ (0, 1) satisfy V̄(W) (E8 9 + W) = E8 9 for all 9 ∈ 
+(E8) and V(W) (E8: + W) = E8: for all
: ∈ −(E8). Notice that E81 > E8: ⇐⇒ V̄(W) (E8: + W) > E8: and E8 (8) < E8 9 ⇐⇒ V(W) (E8 9 + W) < E8 9
and thus V̄(W) (E8: + W) > E8: for all : ∉ +(E8) and V(W) (E8 9 + W) < E8 9 for all 9 ∉ −(E8).
By scale invariance, &8 (E8 + W4 (8) ) = &8 (V(W) (E8 + W4 (8) )) = &8 ( V̄(W) (E8 + W4 (8) )). Since &8 (E8 +
W4 (8) ) = &8 (V(W) (E8 + W4 (8) )), we have that &8 (E8 + W4 (8) ) = &8 (Ẽ(W)) where Ẽ8; (W) ≡ V̄(W) (E8; + W) =
E81
E81+W (E8; + W) = E8; + X; (W) where X; (W) =
W (E81−E8;)
E81+W . This shows (a).
By weak substitutability, &8 9 ( V̄(W) (E8 + W4 (8) )) < &8 9 (E8) for all 9 ∈ +(E8) and &8: (V(W) (E8 +
W4 (8) )) > &8: (E8) for all : ∈ −(E8). Therefore, &8 9 (E8 + W4 (8) ) < &8 9 (E8) for all 9 ∈ +(E8) and
&8: (E8 + W4 (8) ) > &8: (E8) for all : ∈ −(E8). This shows (b).
As W →∞, Ẽ8; (W) → E81 for all ;. Thus &8; (E8 + W4 (8) ) = &8; (Ẽ8 (W)) → &8; (E81, ..., E81) = 1 (8) , which
shows (c). 
1.8.4 QRE in sets of binary action games: necessary conditions
. Fix dataset {G, f̂, D̂} where G = {61, ...6<, ..., 6" } is a set of games that differ only in payoffs with  (8) =
2 for all 8, f̂ = {f̂<
8 9
}8 9< are action frequencies, and D̂ = {D̂<8 9}8 9< are expected utilities (D̂<8 9 ≡ D̄<8 9 (f̂<−8)).
Without loss, relabel all actions so that D̂<
81 ≥ D̂
<
82 for all < and 8.
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for all < and <
′















































2 for all < by monotonicity (A4).

















82 , 1) for all
< and <
′















































2 for all < by monotonicity (A4). 
1.8.5 Logit transform NBE in normal form games
For arbitrary normal form games, we generalize (1.10) by parametrizing player 8’s belief-map over
action 9 of player : as















































∼883 N(0, 1), and g ∈ (0,∞) determines the noisiness of beliefs. This belief-map is derived
through the following procedure:
53Here, we require also that D̂<
8 9
> 0 for all 8, 9 , and <.
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1. Map each f: 9 ∈ [0, 1] to the extended real line via the logit transform
L(f: 9) = ;=
(
f: 9
1 − f: 9
)
,
using the convention that L(0) = −∞ and L(1) = ∞.
2. Add gY8
: 9
to each L(f: 9).
3. Map each L(f: 9) + gY8: 9 back to [0, 1] via the inverse logit transform





















4. Normalize the set of {L−1(L(f:;) +gY8:;)}
 (:)



























This belief-map does not satisfy unbiasedness (B4) exactly, but simulations (unreported) suggest that the
bias is negligible for low g, such as those estimated in the [28] data in Section 1.6.4.
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1.8.6 Details of games, data, and experiments
Table 1.8: Details of games, data, and experiments.
Study Game #
Notes
Rounds (') Subject pairs () Feedback?
MPW 2000
 1800 50 36 yes
 1200 50 24 yes
 1200 50 24 yes
 600 50 12 yes
SC 2008
1 9600 200 48 yes
2 9600 200 48 yes
3 9600 200 48 yes
4 9600 200 48 yes
5 9600 200 48 yes
6 9600 200 48 yes
7 4800 200 24 yes
8 4800 200 24 yes
9 4800 200 24 yes
10 4800 200 24 yes
11 4800 200 24 yes
12 4800 200 24 yes
Ochs 1995
2 448 56 8 yes
3 516 64 8 yes
GH 2001
AMP 25 1 25 no
RA 25 1 25 no
NS 2002 NS 6720 60 112 yes
MPS 2018
2 1620 20,20,10 34,32,30 yes
3 940 20,10 32,20 yes
4 300 10 30 yes
Notes: MPW 2000 = [8], SC 2008 = [14], Ochs 1995 = [6], GH 2001 = [26], NS 2002 = [32], and MPS 2018 = [28]
MPW 2000 ([8])
For any one game (see Figure 1.9), each subject takes an action 50 times against randomly matched
opponents with feedback. Subjects play multiple games, and maintain their role as either player 1 or player
2 for the duration of the experiment. The exchange rate is $0.10 (year 2000 Dollars).
SC 2008 ([14])
Each subject plays just one game, and takes an action 200 times against randomly matched opponents
with feedback. Subjects maintain their role as either player 1 or player 2 for the duration of the experiment.
61
The exchange rate is 0.016 (year 2008 Euros), and the experiment took place in Germany.
1
L R
U 10, 8 0, 18
D 9, 9 10, 8
2
L R
U 9, 4 0, 13
D 6, 7 8, 5
3
L R
U 8, 6 0, 14
D 7, 7 10, 4
4
L R
U 7, 4 0, 11
D 5, 6 9, 2
5
L R
U 7, 2 0, 9
D 4, 5 8, 1
6
L R
U 7, 1 1, 7
D 3, 5 8, 0
7
L R
U 10, 12 4, 22
D 9, 9 14, 8
8
L R
U 9, 7 3, 16
D 6, 7 11, 5
9
L R
U 8, 9 3, 17
D 7, 7 13, 4
10
L R
U 7, 6 2, 13
D 5, 6 11, 2
11
L R
U 7, 4 2, 11
D 4, 5 10, 1
12
L R
U 7, 3 3, 9
D 3, 5 10, 0
Ochs 1995 ([6])
Each subject plays only one of the two games. Those who play game 2 (game 3) take an action 56
(64) times against randomly matched opponents with feedback. Subjects maintain their role as either player
1 or player 2 for the duration of the experiment. Following [1], who note that “The subjects in the Ochs
experiments were paid using a lottery procedure,” we convert the payoffs described in [6] to those in the
matrices below before estimation. The exchange rate is $0.01 (expected 1982 Dollars).
2
L R
U 1.1141, 0 0, 1.1141
D 0, 1.1141 0.1238, 0
3
L R
U 1.1141, 0 0, 1.1141
D 0, 1.1141 0.2785, 0
GH 2001 ([26])
Each subject takes just one action against an anonymous opponent, and the exchange rate is $0.01 (year




U 320, 40 40, 80
D 40, 80 80, 40
RA
L R
U 44, 40 40, 80
D 40, 80 80, 40
NS 2002 ([32])
Each subject plays one of four treatments, which differ in terms of details regarding a belief-elicitation
procedure. Since there are no significant differences in empirical frequencies of actions across treatments,
we pool all data together. Each subject takes an action 60 times against randomly matched opponents with
feedback. Subjects maintain their role as either player 1 or player 2 for the duration of the experiment. The
exchange rate is $0.05 (year 2000 Dollars).
NS
L R
U 6, 2 3, 5
D 3, 5 5, 3
MPS 2018 ([28])
The data for games 2-4 (see Figure 1.12) were collected over three sessions. Game 2 was played with
20 rounds twice and 10 rounds once (34, 32, and 30 subject pairs respectively). Game 3 was played with 20
rounds and 10 rounds once (32 and 20 subject pairs respectively). Game 4 was played with 10 rounds with
30 subject pairs. In all cases, there was feedback and random rematching.
1.8.7 Bootstrap procedure
We estimate the distribution of ΔD̂ (and hence P) via a simple parametric bootstrap. For each game,
each of 5,000 bootstrap samples is a number of draws (equal to the sample size #) from independent
Bernoulli distributions (i.e. for each player) with parameters given by the aggregate empirical frequencies.
However, for all studies considered, except for [26], each subject participated in multiple rounds. For a
breakdown of how the total number of observations is broken into number of subject-pairs and rounds, see
Table 1.8. Thus, if there is within-subject correlation in actions, then the assumption of independence would
artificially lower sampling variation (relative to that of the population) and lead to overstated significance.
To address this concern, we use an alternate bootstrap procedure for robustness. At one extreme, within-
subject correlation is perfect and each subject takes the same action in each of his rounds. At the other
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extreme, each subject’s rounds are independent. In the former case, the effective sample size should only
count one round from each subject. In the latter case, the effective sample size should count every round
played by each subject, and the original bootstrap is fine. We thus proxy for within-subject correlation by
“throwing away” a fraction j ∈ [0, 1) of each subject’s rounds. Specifically, for each subject who played
a game ' rounds, we re-run the bootstrap as if he only played b(1 − j)'c rounds, where b·c is the “floor”
function and larger j represent more conservative tests (throwing away at least a fraction j of each subject’s
data). We do not adjust the [26] study in which each subject played only one round.
Tables 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, and 1.13 assume j = 0, but we show in Tables 1.9 and 1.10 that inference is
fairly robust to j ∈ {0.5, 0.75, 0.90}.
Table 1.9: Revisiting pooled fits
Study QRE
P
j = 0 j = 0.5 j = 0.75 j = 0.90
MPW 2000 Logit 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.093
SC 2008 Logit 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.985
MPS 2018 Logit 0.808 0.726 0.640 0.547
Survey
Logit 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Luce 0.048 0.080 0.132 0.231
Notes: The conclusions based on the initial bootstrap procedure (j = 0) remain largely unchanged.
Table 1.10: Revisiting out-of-sample performance in [8]
P
       
 0.000 0.019 0.325 0.261  0.000 0.068 0.366 0.308
j = 0  0.000 0.996 0.000 0.002 j = 0.5  0.000 0.954 0.002 0.014
 0.016 0.389 0.000 0.019  0.064 0.430 0.002 0.072
 0.174 0.097 0.245 0.000  0.272 0.227 0.341 0.000
       
 0.000 0.134 0.379 0.327  0.000 0.215 0.392 0.368
j = 0.75  0.002 0.882 0.035 0.049 j = 0.90  0.032 0.744 0.115 0.129
 0.149 0.477 0.032 0.167  0.236 0.539 0.096 0.253
 0.326 0.398 0.415 0.001  0.375 0.516 0.484 0.027
Notes: This replicates Table 1.5 for different values of j. That logit transform NBE outperforms logit QRE in
out-of-sample tests is moderately-to-very robust, depending on the pair of games.
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1.8.8 Risk aversion
[7] construct “game 4” in Figure 1.15 to “exaggerate the effects of possible risk aversion” by giving
each player a “safe” option with payoffs of 200 and 160 and a “risky” option with payoffs of 370 and 10.54
It is easy to show that under risk neutrality, the data from the game, (f* , f!) = (0.53, 0.65), is inconsistent
with any QRE, and hence NBE also by Theorem 3. With risk aversion, however, both models can rationalize
the data.
Figure 1.15: Matching Pennies with safe and risky decisions from [7]
4
L R
U 370, 200 10, 370
D 200, 160 160, 10
[7] fit logit QRE to game 4 and games - from [8] by jointly estimating _ and risk aversion parameter





Note that utility is normalized so that DA (10) = 0 and DA (370) = 1. To make monetary payoffs comparable
across game 4 and games -, the payoffs of - given in Figure 1.9 are first multiplied by 10 before the
models are fit. Table 1.11 is essentially a replication of Table 3 of [7], but includes NBE for comparison (and
minimizes squared distance instead of maximizing likelihood). We find that the fit of game 4 is statistically
the same for both models. However, for games -, NBE’s squared distance (0.0005) is 31% that of QRE
(0.0016), and that NBE outperforms QRE is highly significant. Interestingly, the estimated risk aversion
parameters are extremely stable, both across games (as [7] noted) as well as across models.
Finally, we show that for CRRA (but not for general utility functions), NBE predictions are invariant
to scaling the monetary payoffs. We think this is potentially important as it provides a robustness argument
for the prediction of scale invariance in the presence of risk aversion. For an arbitrary normal form game,
we now interpret D8 (08 9 , 0−8) as the monetary payoff to player 8 of taking action 08 9 given the opponents’
play 0−8. The corresponding utility payoff is simply DA (D8 (08 9 , 0−8)). After a V-scaling, the utility payoff
becomes DA (VD8 (08 9 , 0−8)) = V1−A (D8 (08 9 , 0−8)). Using this, it is clear that V drops out of the expression for
the 8 9-response set for all 8 and 9 , from which the result is immediate:
54Relative to how the matrix is given in [7], we have switched the rows so that the game has the form of Figure 3.3.
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Table 1.11: Parameter Estimates of Models with Risk Aversion
Study Game
Data NBE QRE NBE QRE NBE QRE
f* f! # f* f! f* f! ĝ Â _̂ Â D̂
(P)
GHP 4 0.53 0.65 340 0.53 0.67 0.53 0.67 1.091 0.45 6.71 0.45 9.6e7 2.5e6
2003 – (0.555)
 0.64 0.24 1800 0.62 0.25 0.65 0.26 0.691 0.40 22.97 0.44 0.0005 0.0016
MPW  0.63 0.24 1200 0.62 0.25 0.57 0.25 – (0.016)
2000  0.59 0.26 1200 0.62 0.25 0.58 0.24
 0.55 0.33 600 0.57 0.33 0.59 0.35
Notes: MPW 2000 = [8] and GHP 2003 = [7].
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−8 (0−8) ∀: = 1, ...,  (8)}.
A consequence of this is that when fitting the logit transform model with risk aversion to games -
pooled together in Table 1.11, we have that the predictions are the same in each of -, consistent with the
fact that scale invariance cannot be rejected statistically (see Table 1.2).
1.8.9 Utility-money exchange rate conversions
Procedure
To make estimates of logit QRE-_ comparable across studies in the exercise in Section 1.6.5, we convert
all utility-money exchange rates in the studies considered to be consistent with that of [8], the arbitrarily
chosen “base study” denominated in U.S. currency.
Given an exchange rate of 1 utile per 5 C , where 5 C is a numerical amount denominated in the currency
of country 5 in year C, we calculate a “conversion factor” W 5 C using the formula











where  5 C is the year C PPP adjustment factor to U.S. dollars, %0 and %C are the U.S. CPI price indices in
the base year and year C respectively, and 0 is the dollar value of 1 utile in the base study. Before fitting
QRE to a study with an exchange rate of 1 utile per  5 C , the payoff matrices are multiplied by W 5 C .
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Table 1.12: Utility-Money Exchange Rate Conversion Factors
Study Currency ( 5 C ) PPP ( 5 C ) CPI 2000 (%0) CPI (%C ) 0 W 5 C
MPW 2000
$0.10
















1 172.192 172.192 0.10 0.5
(2000 U.S.)
PPP adjustment factors are from the World Bank55 and CPI is from the St. Louis Federal Reserve
Bank56. In all cases, we use annual statistics from the calendar year in which the studies were published
(we acknowledge this may be a bit later than when the experiments took place). Table 1.12 gives the
conversion factors as well as their components.
Robustness
After calculating conversion factors, we consider the effect of perturbing the factors on the overall
performance of logit QRE in the exercise of Section 1.6.5. For each study B ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} (other than the
base study), we calculate WB via the procedure in the previous section and then we consider all
W̃B ∈ {.5WB, .6WB, ..., WB, ..., 1.4WB, 1.5WB} ≡ ΠB,
i.e. perturbed factors that are off by as much as 50% in either direction in 10% increments. We calculate
the pooled squared distance from fitting QRE to all 21 games across the 5 studies, just as in Section 1.6.5,
for every possible combination of perturbed conversion factors:
(W̃1, ..., W̃4) ∈ Π1 × ... × Π4.
Figure 1.16 plots the histogram of QRE squared distances for all 14,641 factor combinations, as well




distance presented in Section 1.6.5, and the minimum QRE squared distance across all factor combinations.
Clearly, NBE outperforms QRE for all factors considered. At worst, the squared distance of NBE is no
more than 68% that of QRE.
Figure 1.16: Robustness to the Utility-Money Exchange Rate











1.8.10 A survey of generalized matching pennies games
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Table 1.13: Parameter estimates from a survey of matching pennies games
Study Game
Data NBE QRE NBE QRE
Logit Luce Logit Luce
f* f! # ĝ _̂ ˆ̀ D̂
MPW 2000
 0.643 0.241 1800 1.411 6.459 0.908 0.0112 0.0174 0.0113
 0.630 0.244 1200 1.451 0.800 0.918 0.0142 0.0071 0.0143
 0.594 0.257 1200 0.436 2.513 0.254 0.0217 0.0234 0.0220
 0.550 0.328 600 1.239 9.579 0.002 0.0134 0.0153 0.0118
SC 2008a
1 0.079 0.690 9600 0.960 8.602 0.090 0.0004 0.0017 0.0020
2 0.217 0.527 9600 0.998 4.012 0.288 0.0018 0.0019 0.0020
3 0.163 0.793 9600 0.911 7.708 0.125 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003
4 0.286 0.736 9600 0.689 7.096 0.172 0.0005 0.0001 0.0000
5 0.327 0.664 9600 0.542 8.084 0.180 0.0003 0.0002 0.0000
6 0.445 0.596 9600 0.436 8.641 0.002 0.0009 0.0009 0.0002
7 0.141 0.564 4800 1.473 3.904 0.180 0.0043 0.0058 0.0058
8 0.250 0.586 4800 0.687 6.143 0.143 0.0077 0.0092 0.0089
9 0.254 0.827 4800 0.199 17.430 0.057 0.0055 0.0033 0.0030
10 0.366 0.699 4800 0.689 7.064 0.173 0.0121 0.0094 0.0084
11 0.331 0.652 4800 0.627 6.986 0.182 0.0007 0.0006 0.0002
12 0.439 0.604 4800 0.406 9.407 0.167 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002
Ochs 1995
2 0.595 0.258 448 0.451 18.408 0.004 0.0219 0.0030 0.0090
3 0.542 0.336 516 1.690 14.917 0.004 0.0155 0.0059 0.0062
GH 2001
AMP 0.960 0.160 25 1.280 0.455 0.002 0.0629 0.0228 0.0261
RA 0.080 0.800 25 1.488 0.977 0.195 0.0266 0.0738 0.0635
NS 2002 NS 0.458 0.390 6720 0.791 3.348 0.158 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Pooled – – – – 1.057 6.233 0.181 0.0133 0.0248 0.0148
(P) – – – – – – – – (0.000) (0.048)
Notes: MPW 2000 = [8], SC 2008 = [14], Ochs 1995 = [6], GH 2001 = [26], and NS 2002 = [32].
a[33] point out that the fit of logit QRE and the empirical frequencies in Game 3 were misreported in [14].
We re-did the analysis using the raw data, which we thank Thorsten Chmura for providing.
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Chapter 2: Stochastic Choice and Noisy Beliefs in Games: an Experiment
with Jeremy Ward
2.1 Introduction
Nash equilibrium is the central concept of game theory. It describes a situation of stability in
which (i) players best respond to their beliefs over opponents’ behavior and (ii) these beliefs are
correct. However, both of these deterministic assumptions are unrealistic in many contexts.
The aim of this paper is to understand the ways in which beliefs and actions deviate from the
assumptions of Nash equilibrium. Since the deterministic assumptions of Nash will be trivially
rejected,1 we first characterize as a benchmark model a generalization that allows for both stochastic
choice given beliefs and randomness in the beliefs themselves. This model is based on four natural
axioms which represent stochastic generalizations of “best response” and “correct beliefs”. Next,
we collect experimental data–actions and elicited beliefs–in order to test these axioms. While we
find evidence for stochasticity in both actions and beliefs, there are systematic violations of the
axioms. We show that these failures are qualitatively consistent with non-linearities in the utility
function and an effect of the player role itself on subjects’ strategic sophistication. This is confirmed
by estimates of a unified structural model applied to actions and belief statements jointly.
Existing equilibrium models that incorporate stochastic elements have had success in explaining
deviations from Nash. Most notably, quantal response equilibrium (QRE) ([1]), which allows
for “noise in actions” while maintaining correct beliefs, has become a standard tool for analyzing
experimental data. More recently, [34] introduced noisy belief equilibrium (NBE), which is shown
to explain several of the same phenomena as QRE by injecting “noise in beliefs” while maintaining
1Even one failure to best respond or any variance in beliefs is inconsistent with the model’s assumptions.
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best response.2 Both models, however, make some unrealistic predictions that are directly related to
the fact of having noise in only one of actions or beliefs.3 Despite this, the equilibrium effects of
allowing both sources of noise have not been examined.
Our first contribution is to introduce a model that allows for noise in both actions and beliefs,
which will serve as our benchmark. The model, which we call QNBE, nests QRE and NBE. It
is defined by an action-map which determines the mixed actions taken by players given their
beliefs, and a belief-map that determines the distribution of players’ beliefs (i.e. a distribution
over opponents’ mixed actions) as a function of the opponents’ mixed actions. The action-map is
restricted to satisfy the axioms of regular QRE ([2]), requiring that, for any given belief, higher
payoff actions are played with higher probability (monotonicity) and that an all-else-equal increase
in the payoff to some action increases the probability that action is played (responsiveness). The
belief-map is restricted to satisfy the axioms of NBE, requiring that belief distributions are unbiased
(unbiasedness) and shift (in the sense of stochastic dominance) in the same direction as changes in
the opponents’ behavior (belief-responsiveness).
As we illustrate through examples, QNBE does impose testable restrictions in standard actions
data, but it is fairly permissive in games for which optimal actions depend on beliefs. Hence, using
actions data alone, the test of the model would be weak. Moreover, even if we did find a rejection in
actions data, this would not pin down which axiom is violated. To resolve this, we elicit beliefs
directly, which allows us to identify both the action- and belief-maps without strong auxiliary
assumptions. Using this augmented data, we test the axioms. Now, even if the actions data can be
rationalized as QNBE outcomes, we may still reject the model and name the offending axiom.
In our second contribution, we run a laboratory experiment in which subjects choose actions
and we directly elicit beliefs for a series of games with systematically varied payoffs. This allows
us to observe multiple points on (or “trace out”) the empirical action-map and belief-map. Using
2NBE shares much of the same structure as random belief equilibrium ([12]), but differs in that the belief distributions
are restricted to satisfy behavioral axioms which gives rise to these predictions.
3For instance, [34] shows that QRE cannot be invariant to both scaling and translating payoffs, and, in order to
explain observed deviations from Nash equilibrium within individual games (e.g. as documented in [8]), QRE implies
an oversensitivity to affine transformations. On the other hand, NBE is invariant to affine transformations but implies
that non-rationalizable actions are played with probability zero, which is rejected in many datasets.
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Notes: Player 1’s payoff parameter - controls the asymmetry of payoffs. We assume - > 0 which ensures a unique,
fully mixed Nash equilibrium.
these maps, we (i) test the axioms, (ii) offer explanations to the extent that the axioms fail, and (iii)
quantify the relative importance of action- and belief-noise in explaining features of the data.
Central to our design are the 2 × 2 asymmetric matching pennies games whose payoffs are
in Table 2.1.4 Indexed by different values of player 1’s payoff parameter - > 0, these --games
have unique mixed strategy Nash equilibria. By varying - , QNBE predicts variation in actions
and beliefs for both players so that we may observe multiple points on the empirical action- and
belief-maps. This is important because some of the axioms cannot be falsified otherwise, and
violations of axioms may be local to particular regions of the domain.
In addition to the --games, which are our focus, we also include some dominance solvable
games.5 We use these to derive a subject-level measure of strategic sophistication that helps to
rationalize our findings on beliefs.
At the beginning of our experiment, subjects are sorted into player roles (row or column), which
they maintain throughout. Subjects state beliefs and take actions for games that appear in random
order. These include the --games for six different values of - . At no point do subjects receive
feedback, and each game appears several times so that we may observe multiple elicitations per
subject.
In testing the axioms, we find that comparative statics (responsiveness and belief-responsiveness)
hold, but restrictions on levels (monotonicity and unbiasedness) do not. For the axioms that are
rejected, our findings differ across player roles.
4Similar games were played in the lab for the first time in [6].
5We also include a small number of additional games whose data we do not analyze in this paper.
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Consistent with responsiveness, we find that an increase in the expected payoff to an action
(through variations in beliefs for a given game) increases the probability the action is played. This
is true for both players, all games, and for all regions of expected payoffs.
In testing monotonicity, we find systematic failures for player 1 only: for each game, there is an
interval of beliefs to which subjects fail to best respond more often than not. These intervals involve
beliefs for which the action that has a higher expected payoff is also more likely to result in a zero
payoff.
Consistent with belief-responsiveness, we find that player 8’s belief distributions tend to be
ordered by stochastic dominance across games in the same direction as differences in player 9’s
action frequencies. Beliefs tend to overreact in the sense that small differences in action frequencies
are associated with large differences in average beliefs, but this is entirely consistent with the axiom.
In testing unbiasedness, we find that player 1 is marginally biased, tending to form slightly
conservative beliefs that are closer to the uniform distribution than player 2’s actual frequency
of play. Player 2, on the other hand, forms very biased, extreme beliefs: whereas player 1’s
behavior is relatively close to uniform across all --games, player 2 tends to think that player 1
will overwhelmingly choose* when - is large and similarly choose  when - is small. Whereas
conservative beliefs have been found in games played without feedback (e.g. [35]), we believe this
asymmetric pattern of bias is novel.
This gives two puzzles with respect to the benchmark QNBE model. These are a failure of
monotonicity for player 1-subjects who fail to best respond more often than not given some intervals
of beliefs and a failure of unbiasedness, with the nature of bias depending on player role. We
provide explanations and a fitted model that can capture these features of the data.
To explain the failure of monotonicity for player 1, we show that, given stated beliefs, concavity
in the utility function over payoffs qualitatively predicts precisely the violations we observe (payoffs
are in probability points of earning a prize, so this is distinct from risk aversion). This is backed
by structural estimates, which suggest that most subjects individually have concavity and that a
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reasonable calibration can accommodate most of the violations.6
To explain the failure of unbiasedness, our first clue is that the belief-bias is qualitatively
different for the two players. This leads us to conjecture that one player, by merit of her role in the
game, is induced to think about her opponent more deeply or with greater “strategic sophistication”.
This could generate the bias as player 2 believes that player 1 tends to take the low-level action
(the best response to random behavior: * when - is large,  when - is small) whereas player 1
anticipates this and acts accordingly.
This sophistication hypothesis cannot be tested within the --games directly, but can be studied
with the help of the dominance solvable games. All subjects face the same action and belief choices
in these games, so we can use the belief statements to derive a subject-level measure of strategic
sophistication that is collected identically for all subjects. We formally justify this measure through
a level :-type framework.7 Using this measure, we find that player 1-subjects have much higher
levels of sophistication than player 2-subjects. All subjects see exactly the same games throughout
the experiment, were randomly assigned to their roles, and played a number of --games before
playing a dominance solvable game. Hence, we conclude that experience in the player 1-role of the
--games causally induces greater sophistication and this somehow spills over to the dominance
solvable games.
Based on these sophistication results, we consider generalized level :-type models to rationalize
the beliefs data. The simplest model that explains the large majority of individual subjects’ belief
patterns is a parametric, subjective cognitive hierarchy model ([40]) that embeds payoff sensitivity
(as in QRE) into players’ models of others. We fit the model to individual subjects’ belief data from
the entire set of --games. We interpret one of the fitted parameters as strategic sophistication, and
find that this model also captures the sophistication gap between the players. The model predicts
that this inferred sophistication should be correlated at the subject level with the measure derived
from the dominance solvable games. We find very strong correlations, which we take as further
6Previous studies eliciting beliefs in games ([36] and [37]) find little evidence of risk aversion though there are
exceptions ([38]).
7The level : literature was started by [20] and [21], and is reviewed in [39].
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evidence that player 1-subjects’ beliefs in the --games indicate higher levels of sophistication.
Next, we conduct a counterfactual exercise to determine the relative importance of action-noise
and belief-noise for explaining the data. Specifically, we consider (i) the action frequencies that
we would have observed if subjects best responded to all of their stated beliefs and (ii) the action
frequencies we would have observed if subjects had beliefs equal to their opponents’ empirical
action frequencies (and their actions were determined by a best-fit random utility model). These
correspond to “turning off” action-noise and belief-noise, respectively. Both counterfactuals deviate
considerably from the empirical action frequencies, indicating that both sources of noise are
important. Comparing the performance of the counterfactuals, we find that the latter is more
accurate for player 1 (i.e. action-noise is more important) and the former is more accurate for
player 2 (i.e. belief-noise is more important). Hence, ignoring any one source of noise may lead to
misspecification, and which source of noise is more important depends on the context.
Our analysis throughout the paper implicitly assumes that stated beliefs equal the underlying
“true” beliefs that subjects hold in their minds and guide their actions. This is, of course, a hypothesis
that cannot be directly tested (see [41] for a discussion). Since we take “noise in beliefs” seriously,
we consider the possibility that stated beliefs are simply noisy signals of true beliefs. Assuming this
were the case, can we reject the axioms with respect to true beliefs? Could we say that true beliefs
are noisy at all? We show that, under mild assumptions, the answer to both questions is yes.
This paper contributes to a large literature on behavioral game theory ([42]) that focuses on
bounded rationality. More narrowly, we contribute to the theory and empirical study of equilibrium
models that inject stochasticity into actions and beliefs (especially [1], [10], [12], and [34]). Our
central tool is belief elicitation, so we engage with the growing methodological literature on belief
elicitation (see [43] and [44] for review articles) and benchmark our findings against those from
well-known studies that elicited beliefs (e.g. [32], [36] and [37]). Our key innovation is to collect
multiple elicitations per subject without feedback for each game within a family of closely related
games. This allows us to study noise in beliefs and examine how beliefs vary across games. We
refer to Section 2.9 for a detailed discussion of the literature.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the theory, Section 2.3 gives the
experimental design, and Section 2.4 provides an overview of the data. Section 2.5 presents the
results from testing the axioms, Section 2.6 offers explanations for the axioms’ failure, and Section
2.7 studies the relative importance of action- and belief-noise. Section 2.8 discusses issues of belief
elicitation and the interpretation of stated beliefs–and how these may affect the interpretation of our
results. Section 2.9 discusses the relationship of this paper to the existing literature, and Section
2.10 concludes.
2.2 Theory
The deterministic assumptions of “best response” and “correct beliefs” implicit in Nash equi-
librium will be trivially rejected, so we introduce a new benchmark model that replaces these
deterministic assumptions with stochastic generalizations.
The model we study is a hybrid, defined by an action-map satisfying the axioms of regular QRE
([2]) and a belief-map satisfying the axioms of NBE ([34]). Anticipating the experiment, we present
the case of 2 × 2 games in which there are two players with two actions each, but as QRE and NBE
are defined very generally, the model generalizes to all finite, normal form games.
A game is defined by Γ2×2 = {#, , D} where # = {1, 2} is the set of players,  = 1 × 2 =
{*, }×{!, '} is the action space, and D = (D1, D2) is a vector of payoff functions with D8 : → R.
In other words, this is any game in which player 1 can move up (*) or down () and player 2 can
move left (!) or right (').
We use 8 to refer to a player and 9 for her opponent. We reserve : and ; for action indices. Since
each player has only two actions, we write player 8’s mixed action as f8 ∈ [0, 1]. In an abuse of
notation, we use f1 = f* and f2 = f! to indicate the probabilities with which player 1 takes* and






∈ [0, 1] be an arbitrary belief that player 8 holds over player 9’s action. Given this belief,













expected payoff to action : . We use E8 = (E81, E82) ∈ R2 as shorthand for an arbitrary such vector.
That is, E8 is understood to satisfy E8 = D̄8 (f
′
9
) for some f ′
9
.
As in QRE, the action-map is induced by a quantal response function &8 : R2 → [0, 1]. This
maps any vector of expected payoffs (given beliefs) to a mixed action, and it is assumed to satisfy
the following regularity axioms ([2]):
(A1) Interiority: &8: (E8) ∈ (0, 1) for all : ∈ 1, 2 and for all E8 ∈ R2.
(A2) Continuity: &8: (E8) is a continuous and differentiable function for all E8 ∈ R2.
(A3) Responsiveness: m&8: (E8)
mE8:
> 0 for all : ∈ 1, 2 and E8 ∈ R (8) .
(A4) Monotonicity: E8: > E8; =⇒ &8: (E8) > &8; (E8) and E8: = E8; =⇒ &8: (E8) = 12 .
(A1) and (A2) are non-falsifiable technical axioms. Taken together, (A3) and (A4) are a
stochastic generalization of “best response”, requiring than an all-else-equal increase in the payoff
to an action increases the probability it is played and that, given any belief, the best response is
taken more often than not.8
2.2.2 Belief-map
Player 8’s belief about 9’s mixed action is drawn from a distribution that depends on 9’s mixed
action. In other words, player 8’s beliefs are a random variable f∗
9
(f9 ) whose distribution depends
on f9 and is supported on [0, 1]. This family of random variables, or belief-map, is described by
a family of CDFs: for any potential belief f̄9 ∈ [0, 1], 8 (f̄9 |f9 ) is the probability of realizing a
belief less than or equal to f̄9 given that player 9 is playing f9 . Following [34], the belief-map is
assumed to satisfy the following axioms:
8Requiring that E8: = E8; =⇒ &8: (E8) = 12 in (A4) is unnecessary since it is implied by E8: > E8; =⇒ &8: (E8) >
&8; (E8) and (A1). We added this condition to (A4) in order to have a clean division between technical and behavioral
axioms.
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(B1) Interior full support: For any f9 ∈ (0, 1), 8 (f̄9 |f9 ) is strictly increasing and continuous in
f̄9 ∈ [0, 1].
(B2) Continuity: For any f̄9 ∈ (0, 1), 8 (f̄9 |f9 ) is continuous in f9 ∈ [0, 1].
(B3) Belief-responsiveness: For all f9 < f
′
9
∈ [0, 1], 8 (f̄9 |f
′
9
) < 8 (f̄9 |f9 ) for f̄9 ∈ (0, 1).
(B4) Unbiasedness: 8 (f9 |f9 ) = 12 for f9 ∈ (0, 1). f
∗
9
(0) = 0 and f∗
9
(1) = 1 with prob. 1.
(B1) and (B2) are non-falsifiable technical axioms. (B1) requires that belief distributions have
full support and no atoms when the opponent’s action is interior, and (B2) requires that the belief
distributions vary continuously in the opponent’s behavior except possibly as the opponent plays a
pure action with a probability that approaches one. Taken together, (B3) and (B4) are a stochastic
generalization of “correct beliefs”. (B3) requires that, when the opponent’s action increases, beliefs
shift up in a strict sense of stochastic dominance.9 (B4) imposes that belief distributions are
correct on median. Both median- and mean-unbiasedness can be microfounded via a model of
sampling ([34]). The technical axioms allow for either or both types of unbiasedness. We use
median-unbiasedness to derive theoretical results because it turns out to be much simpler in our
setting, but we test for both types of unbiasedness in our data.
2.2.3 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, player 8 quantal responds to belief realizations where the beliefs are drawn
from a distribution that depends on 9’s mixed action–and 9’s mixed action is her expected quantal
response similarly induced by quantal responding to belief realizations.
Given player 9’s mixed action f9 ∈ [0, 1], player 8’s beliefs are drawn according to 8 (·|f9 ).
For each belief realization f
′
9
∈ [0, 1], player 8’s mixed action is given by quantal response to
expected payoffs &8 (D̄8 (f
′
9
)) ∈ [0, 1]. Player 8’s expected quantal response as a function of f9 ,
which we call the reaction function, simply integrates over belief realizations: Ψ8 (f9 ;&8, f∗9 ) ≡∫






|f9 ) ∈ [0, 1]. Since &8 : R2 → [0, 1] is single-valued, Ψ8 is also single-
9This is stronger than standard stochastic dominance, which helps with comparative statics and in establishing
uniqueness of equilibria, but the distributions can still be arbitrarily close, so it is only slightly stronger.
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valued, i.e. a function as opposed to a correspondence.
A given profile of quantal response functions & = (&1, &2) and belief-maps f∗ = (f∗1 , f
∗
2 )
induce the reaction function Ψ = (Ψ1,Ψ2) : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2. Equilibrium is defined as a mixed
action profile that is a fixed point along with the supporting belief distributions.
5. Fix {Γ2×2, &, f∗}. A quantal response-noisy belief equilibrium (QNBE) is a pair {f, f∗(f)}
where f = Ψ(f;&, f∗) is a mixed action profile and f∗(f) is the supporting profile of belief
distributions.
The mapping Ψ is continuous, so existence follows from Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.
1. Fix {Γ2×2, &, f∗}. A QNBE exists.
Proof. See Appendix 2.11.2. 
2.2.4 QRE and NBE
QRE is defined as in QNBE except that beliefs are correct with probability one.
6. Fix {Γ2×2, &}. A quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is any mixed action profile f such that
f = &(D̄(f)).
Similarly, NBE is defined as in QNBE except that players best respond to all belief realizations.
7. Fix {Γ2×2, f∗}. A noisy belief equilibrium (NBE) is a pair {f, f∗(f)} where f ∈ k(f;f∗) and
k8 (f9 ;f∗9 ) ≡
∫






|f9 ) defines the expected best response correspondence.10
In other words, the QRE belief-map is the identity map and the NBE action-map is the best
response correspondence. For almost every game, the sets of attainable QRE and NBE mixed action
profiles–that can be supported for some primitives–are nested in the set of attainable QNBE mixed
action profiles.11 For the games we analyze in this paper, we show this directly.
10'8 is the standard best response correspondence: '8 (E8) = 1 if E81 > E82, '8 (E8) = 0 if E81 < E82 and
'8 (E8) = [0, 1] if E81 = E82. k8 is the expected best response correspondence, where the expectation is over belief
realizations whose distribution depends on the opponent’s behavior. [34] shows that k8 single-valued in generic games
since the probability of indifference is zero by (B1).
11A non-generic counterexample. If players are indifferent between all of their actions, independent of their opponents’
behavior, then any distribution of actions is an NBE for any belief-map by (B4). On the other hand, QNBE and QRE
predict that all players uniformly mix, and this is true for all primitives by (A4).
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2.2.5 --games
We specialize theory for the family of --games whose payoffs are in Table 2.1. This serves to
illustrate the QNBE model and provides our justification for using the --games in the experiment.12
The --games have unique, mixed strategy Nash equilibria (NE). As is well-known, NE predicts
each player must mix to make the other player indifferent, and so f#,-
!




(i.e. constant for all -). Since we are only working within the --game family and f#,-
!
is a strictly
decreasing function of - , we think of f#,-
!




First, we establish that, for any fixed primitives, the QNBE is unique.
2. Fix {-,&, f∗}. There is a unique QNBE.
Proof. See Appendix 2.11.2. 
There is a unique QNBE for any fixed primitives, but since the primitives are only restricted to
satisfy axioms, we characterize the set of equilibria that can be attained for some primitives. The
next result characterizes the reaction functions consistent with the axioms and thus the set of mixed
action profiles that can be supported as QNBE outcomes. The proof is by construction, and hence
implicitly gives the equilibrium belief distributions as well, though we abstract from that here.
3. Fix - . (i) Any reaction function Ψ* : [0, 1] → [0, 1] that is continuous, strictly increasing,
and satisfying the restrictions of (2.1) can be induced for some primitives {&* , f∗!}. (ii) Any
reaction function Ψ! : [0, 1] → [0, 1] that is continuous, strictly decreasing, and satisfying the
restrictions of (2.2) can be induced for some primitives {&! , f∗*}. (iii) Any f = (f* , f!) satisfying
f* ∈ Φ-* (f!) and f! ∈ Φ-! (f*) can be supported as QNBE outcomes for some primitives {&, f∗}.
12The results characterizing behavior within a game generalize to all 2 × 2 games with unique, mixed strategy Nash




(0, 3/4) f! < f#,-!
(1/4, 3/4) f! = f#,-!




(1/4, 1) f* < 12
(1/4, 3/4) f* = 12
(0, 3/4) f* > 12
(2.2)
Proof. See Appendix 2.11.2. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the proposition for - = 80, in which case f#,-
!
= 1/5. Here, we plot
equilibrium mixed actions in the unit square of f! − f* space. The first panel plots Φ-* (f!) (2.1)
and the second panel plots Φ-
!
(f*) (2.2). Where these two regions intersect (third panel) is the set
of QNBE mixed action profiles that can be attained for some {&, f∗} (part (iii) of the proposition).
As shown in Figure 2.1, the set of attainable QNBE mixed action profiles can be rather large.
For - = 80, the Lebesgue measure is 51.25%, meaning just over half of all possible mixed action
profiles can be supported as QNBE outcomes. However, QNBE makes predictions over actions
and beliefs, so even if the actions data falls in this region, the axioms–and thus the model–may be
falsified.
[34] showed that for any 2 × 2 game with a unique, fully mixed NE–and hence for any --game
also–the sets of attainable QRE and NBE mixed action profiles coincide. In Figure 2.1, we plot this
set as a cross-hatched rectangle, which has a measure of 15% (see [2] and [34] for the derivation of
such sets in similar games). Hence, allowing for just one of action-noise or belief-noise leads to the
same measure of outcomes, but allowing for both increases the set of outcomes more than 3-fold.
Our next result is a comparative static.
4. Fix {&, f∗}. f&#
*




is strictly increasing in f#,-
!
.
Proof. See Appendix 2.11.2. 
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Figure 2.1: QNBE in game - = 80
Notes: The first panel gives the region in which player 1’s QNBE reaction must lie, with an example drawn in blue. The
second panel gives the region in which player 2’s QNBE reaction must lie, with an example drawn in red. The third
panel plots the intersection of the two regions which gives the set of QNBE mixed action profiles that can be attained
for some primitives. The black diamond is the Nash equilibrium, the cross-hatched rectangle gives the sets of attainable
QRE and NBE, which coincide, and the green dot is an example QNBE mixed action profile.
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}- of mixed actions for the set of --games with
- ∈ {80, 40, 10, 5, 2, 1}. The left panel plots f̂-
*
and the right panel plots f̂-
!
(green dots), both as functions of f#
!
.
The data can be supported as QRE or NBE outcomes for some primitives (held fixed across games) if and only if the
data is in the gray region, decreasing in the left panel, and increasing in the right panel.
The proposition says that, under QNBE, varying - will cause systematic variation in mixed
actions, and thus belief distributions also, for both players. This comparative static holds for QRE
and NBE also ([2] and [34]) and is essential in order to “trace out” the empirical action- and
belief-maps.





}- be a dataset of mixed actions from an arbitrary (finite) set of --games. It
is immediate that in order to support the dataset as QNBE outcomes for some primitives (held
fixed across games), it is necessary for the restrictions of Proposition 3 to hold for each - and






}- be a dataset of mixed actions for any finite number of --games. The data can be
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is strictly increasing in f#,-
!
.
Proof. See Appendix 2.11.2. 
Since we are concerned with tracking patterns of behavior across games, we would like a plot
to help visualize both the data and model predictions from the entire set of --games. However,
since the set of attainable QNBE mixed action profiles is not rectangular (see Figure 2.1), it is too
cumbersome to plot the QNBE predictions as a function of one variable. For this reason, we provide






}- be a dataset of mixed actions for any finite number of --games. The data can
be supported as QRE or NBE outcomes for some primitives (held fixed across games) if and only if
(i) f̂-
*
∈ ( 12 , 1) for f
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< 12 ; f̂
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is strictly increasing in f#,-
!
.
Proof. See Appendix 2.11.2. 
Figure 2.2 plots the sets of attainable QRE and NBE as functions of f#
!
, which are given in
the proposition. The vertical dotted lines correspond to specific values of - (marked at the top). We




}- as green dots: the left panel plots f̂-* and the right panel
plots f̂-
!
–both as functions of f#
!
. The proposition says that a dataset can be supported as QRE
or NBE outcomes if and only if it looks qualitatively like the green dots in the figure: in the gray
regions, decreasing in the left panel, and increasing in the right.
2.3 Experimental Design
Recall that the goal of our experiment is to make observable the empirical action- and belief-
maps, which we pursue through collecting actions and beliefs data for a family of games. An
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important consideration is to be able to interpret within-subject variations in actions and beliefs as
the result of idiosyncratic “noise” as opposed to other predictable variations.
2.3.1 Overall structure
The experiment consisted of two treatments, which we label [A,BA] and [A,A]. Our sessions
were run in the Columbia Experimental Laboratory in the Social Sciences (CELSS). Subjects were
mainly undergraduate students at Columbia and Barnard Colleges, all of whom were recruited via
the Online Recruitment System for Economics Experiments (ORSEE) ([45]).
The main treatment is [A,BA], which we describe here. The treatment [A,A] is similar, but does
not involve belief elicitation. It was included to test whether belief elicitation itself has an effect on
behavior, and we defer its discussion to Section 2.8.
The experiment involved 2 × 2 matrix games, and at the beginning of the experiment, subjects
were divided into two equal-sized subpopulations of row and column players, which we refer to as
players 1 and 2, respectively. The [A,BA] treatment consisted of two stages. Each round of the first
stage involved taking actions, and each round of the second stage involved stating a belief and taking
an action. The name of the treatment reflects this (“A” for “action”, “BA” for “belief-action”).
In each of the 20 rounds of the first stage, subjects were anonymously and randomly paired and
took actions simultaneously. In each of the 40 rounds of the second stage, subjects were presented
with a payoff matrix that appeared in the first stage. Subjects then stated their beliefs over opponents’
expected action choices before taking actions.13 These beliefs were elicited over actions taken by
subjects in the first stage, and these actions were similarly paired against randomly selected actions
(from the relevant games) taken in the first stage. In this way, subjects in the second stage were both
forming beliefs about and playing against subjects from the first stage whose actions had already
been recorded. Subjects in the second stage were not paired since they were playing against subjects
from the first stage. For this reason, subjects in the second stage were not required to wait for all
subjects to finish a round before moving on to the next, though in both stages subjects were required
13After entering a belief for the first time in a round, subjects could freely modify both their actions and beliefs in
any order before submitting. In any case, we see very few revisions of stated beliefs.
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to wait for 10 seconds before submitting their answers. Screenshots of the experimental interface
are given in Appendix 2.11.5.
Before the start of the first stage, instructions (see Appendix 2.11.1) were read aloud accom-
panied by slides. These instructions described the strategic interaction and taught subjects how to
understand 2 × 2 payoff matrices. Subjects then answered 4 questions to demonstrate understanding
of how to map players’ actions in a game to payoff outcomes. All subjects were required to answer
these correctly. Subjects then played 4 unpaid practice rounds before proceeding to the paid rounds.
After the first stage, additional instructions for the second stage were given. Only at that point were
subjects introduced to the notion of a belief and the elicitation mechanism described. Subjects then
played 3 unpaid practice rounds before proceeding to the paid rounds of the second stage.
We are interested in observing the stochasticity inherent in beliefs, not changes in beliefs that
are due to new information. For this reason, at no point during the experiment (including the unpaid
practice rounds) were subjects provided any feedback. In particular, no feedback was provided about
other subjects’ actions, the outcomes of games, or the accuracy of belief statements. Only at the end
of the experiment did subjects learn about the outcomes of the games and belief elicitations that
were selected for payment. This also simplifies the analysis because subjects could not condition on
the history of play.
We also wish to avoid other non-inherent sources of stochasticity in beliefs. Since we elicited
beliefs about the first-stage actions which had already been recorded, multiple elicitations for a
given game all refer to the same event. Hence, variation in an individual subject’s beliefs for a
given game cannot be due to a higher-ordered belief that other subjects were learning. To avoid
stochasticity in stated beliefs due to mechanical error, belief statements had to be entered as whole
numbers into a box rather than via a slider.
Each game was played multiple times. This was necessary because we wish to analyze stochas-
ticity and patterns in individual subjects’ belief data. However, we took several measures to
approximate a situation in which each game was seen as if for the first time. First, there was no
feedback, as described. Second, there was a large “cross section”, i.e. more distinct games than
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the number of times each game was played. Third, the games appeared in a random order which is
described in Section 2.3.2.
In addition to a $10 show-up fee, subjects were paid according to one randomly selected round
(based on actions) from the first stage and four randomly selected rounds from the second stage–two
rounds based on actions and two rounds based on beliefs (see Section 2.3.3 for details on belief
payments). Since there were twice as many rounds in the second stage as in the first stage, this
equated the incentives for taking actions across the stages. Each unit of payoff in the matrix
corresponded to a probability point of earning $10 (e.g. 20 is a lottery that pays $10 with probability
20% and $0 otherwise). This was to mitigate the effects of risk aversion as expected utility is linear
in probability points.14 This is important for our purposes since several of our tests require that
utilities are identified.
To allay any hedging concerns, all five payments were based on different matrices and this was
emphasized to subjects.
Table 2.2: Overview of experiment.
Treatment Player 1-subjects Player 2-subjects Total
[A,BA] 54 56 110
[A,A] 27 27 54
Total 81 83 164
Table 2.2 summarizes the number of subjects who participated in the experiment by treatment
and player role.15 On average, the experiment took about 1 hour and 15 minutes, and the average
subject payment was $19.5.
2.3.2 The games
As discussed in Section 2.2.5, the --games take center-stage since they are predicted to give
rise to systematic variation in actions and beliefs. Henceforth, we say “-80” to refer to the game
14Evidence suggests that this significantly, but not completely, linearizes payoffs in the sense that people still behave
as if they have a utility function over probability points with some curvature. See for example, [46].
15There are two fewer player 1-subjects than player 2-subjects in [A,BA]. This is because two subjects (in separate
sessions) had to leave early. They left after the first stage, and since the whole experiment was anonymous and without
feedback and the second stage was played asynchronously, this had no effect on the rest of the subjects. These two
subjects’ data was dropped prior to analysis.
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- = 80 and similarly for the other games.
The --games have other important features for the experiment. Since they are very simple and
fully mixed, we would not expect there to be much no-feedback learning ([47]). This is important
since we are studying stochasticity in beliefs, and so want to minimize variation in beliefs due to
learning. The payoffs are also “sparse” in the sense of having many payoffs set to 0. This makes the
games’ structure more transparent and easier to calculate best responses. The fact that one player’s
payoffs are symmetric and fixed across games also makes it easier to perceive differences across
games.
For the experiment, we chose the six values of - given in Table 2.3. These correspond to the
vertical lines in Figure 2.2. They were chosen so that the corresponding values of f#
!
are relatively
evenly spaced on the unit interval and come close to the boundary at one end. The values of -
also go well above and well below 20 so that across the set of games, one player does not always
expect to receive higher payoffs. Games -80 and -5 as well as -40 and -10 are symmetric-pairs
in that f#,-80
!




= 1 − f#,-10
!
. This does not, however, imply the same
relation for QNBE without additional conditions.16
Table 2.3: Selection of --games.
- 80 40 10 5 2 1
f#
!
0.2 0.333 0.667 0.8 0.909 0.952
f#
*
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
In addition to the --games, we also included the games whose payoffs are in Appendix Table
2.16. 1 and 2 are dominance solvable games, which are identical up to which player faces
which set of payoffs. These are included in order to derive, for each subject, a measure of strategic
sophistication (using a level :-type framework), which we conjectured would help to rationalize
observed deviations from theoretical predictions. We discuss the dominance solvable games at
16If & is scale invariant (&8 (VE8) = &8 (E8) for V > 0) and label invariant (&81 ((E, F)) = &82 ((F, E)) for any
















Table 2.4: Games by section.
Stage Games Rounds of each Rounds
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length in Section 2.6. For brevity, we will not discuss the data from the three remaining games,
-80B, '1, and '2, in this paper.17
Table 2.4 summarizes the games played in both stages of the experiment and the number of
rounds for each. Note that, for each of the --games, there are two rounds in the first stage and
five rounds in the second stage. The dominance solvable games appeared at fixed, evenly spaced
rounds.18 The other games appeared in random order subject to the same game not appearing more
than once within 3 consecutive rounds. Subjects were told nothing about what games to expect, the
number of times each was to appear, or their order.
2.3.3 Eliciting beliefs using random binary choice
We used the random binary choice (RBC) mechanism ([48]) to incentivize subjects to state
their beliefs accurately.19 In an RBC, subjects are asked which option they prefer from a list of 101
binary choices, as in Table 2.5 with option A on the left and option B on the right. If a subject holds
belief 1% over the probability that event  occurs and her preferences respect stochastic dominance
(in particular, she does not have to be risk-neutral), it is optimal to choose option A for questions
17These were included to test specific hypothesis related to the models under scrutiny. -80B (“s” for “scale”) is the
same as -80, except with all payoffs divided by 10. This was included because QRE and NBE make very different
predictions with respect to scaling payoffs ([34]), and this gives direct insight into the effects of scale on beliefs and the
effects of scale on actions given beliefs. '1 and '2 are similar to -5, except the symmetry of player 2’s payoffs have
been broken. These were included to determine if payoff symmetry is driving results.
18For a subject in role 8 in the first stage, 8 and  9 appeared in rounds 7 and 14 or 14 and 7 with equal probability.
In the second stage, 8 appeared in rounds 7, 21, and 35, and  9 appeared in rounds 14 and 28.
19Another popular method for incentivizing beliefs is the quadratic scoring rule (see, for example, [32]), which has
advantages but requires risk neutrality for incentive compatibility. [43] and [44] review these and other elicitation
mechanisms.
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numbered less than 1 and option B for questions numbered greater than 1. Otherwise, the subject
is failing to choose the option that she believes gives the highest probability of receiving the prize.
Table 2.5: Random binary choice.
Would you rather have:
Option A: Option B:
Q.0 $5 if the event E occurs or $5 with probability 0%
Q.1 $5 if the event E occurs or $5 with probability 1%
Q.2 $5 if the event E occurs or $5 with probability 2%
...
...
Q.99 $5 if the event E occurs or $5 with probability 99%
Q.100 $5 if the event E occurs or $5 with probability 100%
Beliefs were elicited in the second stage of the experiment in which the event  was that a
randomly selected subject from the first stage chose a particular action. Specifically, subjects were
shown a matrix that appeared in the first stage and told that “The computer has randomly selected
a round of Section 1 in which the matrix below was played.” Player 1 (blue) subjects were then
asked “What do you believe is the probability that a randomly selected red player chose L in that
round?”, and similarly for player 2 (red) subjects (see Appendix 2.11.5 for screenshots). By entering
a belief into a box, a whole number between 0 and 100 inclusive, the rows of the table were filled
out optimally given the stated belief (indifference broken in favor of option B). The table did not
appear on subjects’ screens by default, but they could see it by “scrolling down”.
For each round selected for a subject’s belief payment, one of the 101 rows was randomly
selected and she received her chosen option. If she chose option A in the selected row, a subject of
the relevant type was randomly drawn and she received $5 if the randomly drawn subject chose
the relevant option. If she chose option B in the selected row, she received $5 with the probability
given. Since each row was selected for payment with positive probability, subjects were incentivized
to state their beliefs accurately. In addition, subjects were told explicitly that it was in their best
interest to state their beliefs accurately.
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2.4 Overview of the data
Prior to testing the axioms, we examine the data at a high level. Since our procedures are novel,
we benchmark our findings against those from other experiments in which data is collected in a more
conventional way. Since this paper is concerned primarily with noisy behavior, we also explore
measures of variability in stated beliefs.
2.4.1 Actions
Throughout the paper, we refer to actions data from various parts of the experiment and in some
cases pool across treatments. For clarity, we use the following notation to indicate the data source:
• [A, ◦ ]: first-stage actions, pooled across [A,BA] and [A,A]
• [A,BA]: second-stage actions from [A,BA]
• [A,BA]: first-stage actions from [A,BA]
• [A,A]: first-stage actions from [A,A]
• [A,A]: second-stage actions from [A,A]
We focus primarily on [A, ◦ ] and [A,BA]. We consider [A, ◦ ] because, in testing axioms on the
belief-map, we must compare beliefs to the actions they refer to, and beliefs refer to the first stage.
Since there is no feedback provided to subjects and the first stages are identical in [A,BA] and [A,A],
we pool across treatments to arrive at [A, ◦ ]. We consider [A,BA] because, in testing axioms on
the action-map, we must associate to each belief statement a corresponding action.
Table 2.6 gives the empirical frequencies from [A, ◦ ] and [A,BA]. We observe some differences
between the two sets of frequencies. In Section 2.8, we show that this difference is caused by the
process of belief elicitation itself and discuss the implications for our results. This does not affect
our main conclusions, but requires that we be careful about what data sources we are using for
different tests. In particular, we cannot pool actions data across the two stages.
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Table 2.6: Empirical action frequencies.
-80 -40 -10 -5 -2 -1 1 2
[A, ◦ ] f̂* 0.50 0.42 0.51 0.40 0.40 0.31 0.04 0.22
f̂! 0.27 0.25 0.66 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.78 0.02
[A,BA]
f̂* 0.38 0.39 0.65 0.61 0.51 0.49 0.10 0.30
f̂! 0.21 0.22 0.74 0.78 0.83 0.82 0.80 0.04
Even in the first-stage, before we elicit beliefs, our procedures for collecting actions data are
somewhat unusual in that we play a large number of games, without feedback, and without the same
game appearing consecutively. How does our actions data compare to actions data that is collected
under more standard experimental conditions? Figure 2.3 plots our action frequencies from [A, ◦ ],
superimposed with those from three studies, [6], [8], and [41]. For inclusion, we sought studies that
played games with “sparse” payoffs20 and f#
!
= 12 (after relabelling). This latter feature allows
us to plot their data in our figure as a function of f#
!
. In these studies, a single game was played
36-50 times consecutively with feedback against either randomly re-matched opponents or a fixed
opponent. We find that our data is remarkably close to theirs despite the differences in procedures.
That being said, we cannot find precedents in the literature for games closely matching our
more symmetric games–those with f#
!
relatively close to 12 . The only surprising behavior is for
-40 in which the data falls significantly outside of the QRE-NBE region. In all cases, however, the
empirical frequencies from individual games can be supported as QNBE outcomes, as we show in
Appendix Figure 2.26.
2.4.2 Rates of best response
As we did with the actions data, we compare our findings on beliefs to a benchmark from the
literature on belief elicitation. To this end, we look at rates of best response to stated beliefs, which
this literature has suggested as a method for validating elicited beliefs (see [43] for a discussion
of this view). Appendix Figure 2.27 plots histograms of subjects’ rates of best response from the
20[26] played similar games one-shot without sparse payoffs and found data that deviated much farther from NE than
in any of these other papers.
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Notes: This figure plots the first stage empirical frequencies [A, ◦ ] with 90% confidence bands (clustered by subject),
superimposed with the empirical frequencies from other studies.
--games. Compared to the study of [32] who report an average rate of 75% for an asymmetric
matching pennies game played many times with feedback, we find lower rates for player 1 (64%)
and higher rates for player 2 (85%).
Appendix Table 2.15 shows the average rates of best response for each game. Our relatively
low rates for player 1 are driven by the very asymmetric games with low values of - . For games
with higher values of - that resemble the games from [32] more closely, we have very similar rates.
That our rates are higher for player 2 is unsurprising since player 2 faces symmetric payoffs and
thus has an easier choice to make for any given belief.
2.4.3 Are beliefs noisy?
To our knowledge, this is the first study to have multiple belief elicitations per subject-game
without feedback. A natural question is: are beliefs noisy?
For each subject and --game, we calculate the spread of her beliefs–the highest belief minus
the lowest–across the five belief statements. We average this across the six --games for each
subject to to get an average spread measure. Figure 2.4 plots histograms of subjects’ spreads by
player role. There is considerable heterogeneity in spreads, and there is a right tail of very noisy
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Figure 2.4: Subjects’ spreads of beliefs
Notes: This figure gives histograms of subjects’ spreads of beliefs, averaged across all --games.
subjects. The average spreads are 24 and 21 belief-points for player 1- and player 2-subjects,
respectively. This seems large to us, though these are lower than that expected of the benchmark
of uniformly randomizing over a range of 50 belief points (expected value of 33).21 In unreported
results, ANOVA reveals much larger between- than within-subject variance in beliefs for all games
and roles. This suggests that, while subjects do have noisy beliefs, patterns in individual subjects’
beliefs are relatively stable but heterogeneous.
2.4.4 Actions given expected payoffs (given beliefs)
The premise of quantal response is that beliefs determine actions only insofar as they pin down
expected payoff vectors. Hence, we visualize the variation in expected payoffs observed in the data
and the extent to which it is predictive of the actions subjects take.
The left panel of Figure 2.5 plots the convex hull of all expected payoff vectors that we may
observe in the data. (E81, E82) is a vector of expected payoffs. In the case of player 1, E81 and E82 are
the payoffs to * and , respectively. In the case of player 2, E81 and E82 are the payoffs to ! and
', respectively. Each of the straight black lines refer to expected payoffs given beliefs that can be
observed in different player-game combinations. The line labelled “-1” refers to player 1 in -1,
the line labelled “-2” refers to player 1 in -2, and similarly for lines labelled “-5”, “-10”, “-40,”
21We consider this a natural benchmark because it results from believing one action is more likely than another but
otherwise reporting beliefs randomly subject to that constraint.
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Figure 2.5: Actions given expected payoffs (given beliefs)
Notes: The left panel gives the convex hull of all expected payoff vectors that may be observed in the data in any of the
--games. (E81, E82) refers to either the payoffs to (*, ) for player 1 or the payoffs to (!, ') for player 2. “X1”, “X2”,
... , and “X80” refer to player 1’s vectors in the corresponding games, and “P2” refers to player 2’s vectors in any of the
games. The right panel plots the action taken as a function of the expected payoff vectors observed in the data, with*
and ! coded as 1 ( and ' coded as 0). The surface is the predicted action from a local linear (lowess) regression
(smoothing parameter 0.85). The left panel gives the corresponding level sets.
and “-80”. Recalling that player 2’s payoff matrix is fixed across games, the line labelled “%2”
refers to player 2 in any of these games. The right panel plots, as black dots, the empirical expected
payoff vectors (i.e. given stated beliefs) and associated actions, where* and ! are coded as 1 and
 and ' are coded as 0. We also plot a surface that gives the expected action as a function of payoff
vectors based on a local linear (lowess) regression. The left panel gives the associated level sets.
From this exercise, we conclude that there is a wide range of belief statements–and thus of
expected payoff vectors–both within and across games. Furthermore, this variation is predictive of
the actions subjects take.
2.5 Testing the Axioms




Responsiveness states that an all-else-equal increase in the expected payoff to some action
increases the probability that action is played. To test this, we must associate actions with their
expected payoffs given beliefs, and so we use the data from [A,BA].
Since player 1’s payoff parameter - is different in each game and there is variation in beliefs
across games, not all of player 1’s expected payoff vectors across games can be ordered by an
all-else-equal increase in the payoff to some action. In such cases, responsiveness imposes no
restrictions on stochastic choice. With additional conditions, one can complete the order, but we do
not pursue that here.22 Instead, we first consider tests game-by-game. Then, we consider player 2
only, whose payoff parameters are fixed across games, allowing us to pool data across the entire set
of games. In all cases, the variation in expected payoffs is through variation in beliefs.
Since expected payoffs are one-to-one with beliefs within a game, responsiveness is easily
translated into a condition on beliefs. For player 1 and game G, we state the hypothesis23 as
> :&* (D̄G1(f
′
!)) is everywhere weakly increasing in f
′
! .
Similarly, for player 2:
> :&! (D̄G2(f
′
*)) is everywhere weakly decreasing in f
′
* .
We visualize the relevant data in Figure 2.6, which plots estimates of &̂ for games -80 and
-5 for both players. Appendix Figure 2.28 gives the plots for all six games. These are simply the
predicted action frequencies from regressing actions on beliefs using a flexible specification (see
22Consider two unordered vectors, E8 = (E81, E82) = (5, 2) and F8 = (F81, F82) = (3, 1). One can complete
the order with additional restrictions. For instance, if the quantal response function is translation invariant, then
&81 (E8) > &81 (F8) since &81 ((5, 2)) = &81 ((4, 1)) > &81 ((3, 1)) where the inequality is due to responsiveness. If the
quantal response function is scale invariant, then &81 (F8) > &81 (E8) since &81 (3, 1) = &81 (6, 2) > &81 (5, 2) where the
inequality is due to responsiveness.
23The null hypothesis, by allowing for weak monotonicity, is slightly weaker than the axiom, but it allows for the use
of more standard tests.
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Notes: For each player and games -80 and -5, we plot the predicted values (with 90% error bands) from restricted
cubic spline regressions of actions on beliefs (4 knots at belief quintiles, standard errors clustered by subject). Belief
histograms appear in gray and the average action within each of ten equally spaced bins appear as black dots. The





, and the horizontal line is set to one-half.
figure caption for details). Recall that, for each game and player role, there are five observations per
subject and so these plots represent a mix of between- and within-subject variation. The vertical





and the horizontal dashed line is set to one-half.
To get a better sense of the raw data, the plots also include belief histograms and the average
action within each of ten equally spaced bins (black dots). In some of these bins, there are very few
datapoints and so the average action is not very meaningful. The predicted &̂ uses data much more
efficiently.
Responsiveness is equivalent to an increasing slope for player 1 and a decreasing slope for
player 2. Applying the non-parametric monotonicity test of [49] (see Appendix 2.11.3 for details
of implementation),24 we reject this for both players in all six games with ?-values close to 0.
24It is a bootstrap-based test where the data generating process is, heuristically, the best-fit (non-parametrically
estimated) monotonic (upward sloping for player 1, downward sloping for player 2) function plus noise, and the ?-value
is constructed as the fraction of simulations for which a non-parametric regression estimator is non-monotonic.
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However, we must be careful in interpreting this result. Different subjects form different beliefs, and
hence the &̂-curves plotted in Figure 2.6 are patched together from different subjects representing
different parts of the domain. Hence, the violation could result from individual subjects who violate
responsiveness to variations in their own beliefs or it could be, in the case of player 1 (and similarly
for player 2), there are subjects who tend to hold lower beliefs and favor taking* (whose payoff
increases in beliefs). This latter possibility could lead to violations of responsiveness even if all
individual subjects are responsive to variations over the range of their own stated beliefs.
To determine if individual subjects are responsive to variations in their own stated beliefs, we run
fixed effects regressions for different regions of stated beliefs (responsiveness is a local property, so




} be the ;th action-belief pair
of subject B in role 8 in game G. As has been our convention, the actions of* and ! are coded as 1,
and  and ' are coded as 0 (e.g. 08G
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be the subject-level averages. For each role 8 and game G, we run the following regression for each
tercile of belief statements {18G
B;
}B; , which we label as “low”, “medium”, and “high” beliefs:25
08GB; − 0̄
8G
B = V(18GB; − 1̄
8G
B ) + Y8GB; . (2.3)
Since there is no difference across subjects in the averages of their demeaned variables (by con-
struction), the coefficient estimate V̂ reflects within-subject variation.
The results are displayed in Table 2.7. Consistent with responsiveness, we find that every slope
is positive for player 1 and all but one (which is extremely close to 0 and insignificant) are negative
for player 2, with many of these being highly statistically significant. Furthermore, the magnitudes
are large: a majority of slopes have an absolute value greater than 0.005,26 indicating that a 1
percentage point change in belief is associated with a 0.5 percentage point change in the probability
of taking an action. Since the slopes all have the sign predicted by responsiveness, this suggests that
individual subjects are overwhelmingly responsive.
25Results are largely unchanged, but a bit underpowered, if instead use 4 or 5 bins.
26For player 1, the absolute slopes average 0.065 and range from 0.000-0.015. For player 2, the average is 0.065 and
range from 0.000-0.018.
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Table 2.7: Fixed effect regressions of actions on beliefs
Player 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
X80 X40 X10 X5 X2 X1
low beliefs 0.000 0.006∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.004∗∗
(0.958) (0.077) (0.017) (0.002) (0.035) (0.043)
medium beliefs 0.007∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.005 0.006 0.006∗
(0.033) (0.020) (0.000) (0.153) (0.141) (0.051)
high beliefs 0.005∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.007∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.002) (0.448) (0.164) (0.283) (0.004)
Observations 270 270 270 270 270 270
p-values in parentheses
∗ ? < .1, ∗∗ ? < .05, ∗∗∗ ? < .01
Player 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
X80 X40 X10 X5 X2 X1
low beliefs -0.010∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.007∗ -0.004∗ -0.004
(0.001) (0.000) (0.038) (0.074) (0.071) (0.133)
medium beliefs -0.013∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.002 -0.000 -0.010∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.174) (0.490) (0.930) (0.058) (0.969)
high beliefs -0.008∗∗ -0.004 -0.010∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.004 -0.005∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.199) (0.003) (0.046) (0.127) (0.009)
Observations 280 280 280 280 280 280
p-values in parentheses
∗ ? < .1, ∗∗ ? < .05, ∗∗∗ ? < .01
Notes: For each game and player, we divide individual belief statements into terciles–low, medium, and high beliefs.
For each belief tercile, we run a separate linear regression of actions on beliefs that are both first demeaned by
subtracting subject-specific averages. Standard errors are clustered by subject.
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Figure 2.7: Player 2 subjects–actions and beliefs, pooled across games
Notes: All plots involve player 2-subjects whose data is pooled across all games. Action ! is coded as 1, and action '
is coded as 0. The top panel uses all player 2-subjects and gives the predicted action frequencies (with 90% error bands)
from restricted cubic spline regressions of actions on beliefs (4 knots at belief quintiles, std. errors clustered by subject)
superimposed over the histogram of beliefs. The remaining plots are for specific player 2 subjects. The solid black
curve is the parametric regression estimator used in Step 2 of the [49] test (Appendix 2.11.3), and data is separately
marked for each game. All datapoints involve a value of 1 or 0 on the vertical axis, but are plotted with a bit of (vertical)
noise for visual clarity.
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Following our discussion at the beginning this section, we now turn to player 2 data pooled
across all games. Using this data, the top panel of Figure 2.7 reproduces Figure 2.6, and Appendix
Table 2.17 presents results of the fixed effects regressions. Since we have much more data that
is distributed more uniformly within the space of possible beliefs, we run regressions for each
belief-quintile instead of tercile (first column) and also present a version using evenly spaced bins
of 20 belief points (second column). Consistent with responsiveness, we find that every slope is
highly statistically negative and with large magnitudes.
An interesting question is whether within-subject variation in beliefs has predictive power only
insofar as beliefs go on one side or the other of the indifferent belief. Inspecting Appendix Table
2.17, the answer is definitive. Even for player 2, whose indifferent belief is salient, constant across
games, and invariant to curvature in the utility function, this variation is highly predictive of actions.
Restricting attention to beliefs that are in the bottom or top quintiles–at least 30 points away from
the indifferent belief–a 1 percentage point change in belief is associated with a 0.5-0.6 percentage
point change in the probability of taking an action.
Being able to pool across games for player 2-subjects results in many more datapoints per
subject (30 as opposed to 5) that typically cover much more of the space of possible beliefs. In
particular, this allows us to test for responsiveness for individual subjects using the [49] test. Figure
2.7 plots some representative individual subjects’ data pooled across all six games, superimposed by
the non-parametric regression estimator used in Step 2 of the [49] test (see Appendix 2.11.3). The
four subjects depicted in the figure are representative of the types of subjects we observe: subject 65
is characterized by step function-like responsiveness and always best responds;27 subject 87 is also
responsive, but has action-probabilities that are more continuous in beliefs; subject 59 is similar to
subject 87 but noisier, and the non-parametric test rejects responsiveness; subject 82 is an “opposite
type” who fails responsiveness trivially. In all, responsiveness is rejected in only 19% of player
2-subjects.




Monotonicity is a weakening of best response which states that, given belief s, the action with a
higher expected payoff is played more often than not and, if players are indifferent, they uniformly
randomize. Since we must associate expected payoffs given beliefs to actions, we again use the data
from [A,BA].
For the games studied in this paper, since players are indifferent when their beliefs equal the
opponent’s Nash equilibrium strategy, monotonicity takes a particularly simple form. For player 1
























In order to visualize potential monotonicity violations, we appeal once again to Figure 2.6,
which plots estimates of &̂ for games -80 and -5 for both players (see figure caption for details;






and the horizontal dashed line is set to one-half. As opposed to responsiveness that
concerns the slope, monotonicity concerns the levels of the graph. Specifically, for player 1 (left
panels), &̂* should be less than 12 to the left of the vertical line and greater than
1
2 to the right of the
vertical line; for player 2 (right panels), &̂! should be greater than 12 to the left of the vertical line
and less than 12 to the right of the vertical line.
In testing monotonicity, we conduct the analysis at the aggregate level since we have only 5
belief statements for each subject-game. Unlike for responsiveness, there is no issue in aggregation.
Since monotonicity is a condition that holds pointwise, if all subjects have monotonic quantal
response over the range of their stated beliefs (even if different subjects form very different beliefs),
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the aggregate will also be monotonic.
Our test for monotonicity is the natural one suggested by eyeballing Figure 2.6. After running
flexible regressions of actions on beliefs, we calculate the standard error of the prediction (clustering
by subject), which we use to calculate error bands for the estimated &̂. From the figure, one can
observe rejections of the null at the given level of significance. For instance, in the top left panel
(game -80, player 1), we see that for beliefs just above 20, whereas monotonicity requires that &
should be above 12 , we observe that the estimated &̂ is significantly below
1
2 . Since it is the 90%
error band that is plotted, inspection reveals that monotonicity is rejected with a ?-value less than
0.1. Similarly, if the 95% error band still leads to a violation, then the ?-value is less than 0.05.
By considering error bands of increasing size, all violations will eventually disappear. Hence, we
calculate the ?-value as 2, where the 100(1 − 2)% error band is the smallest which results in no
violations.
One weakness of the test is that it is sensitive to the regression specification, so we report
the results (?-values) of the statistical tests in Table 2.8 for 5 different specifications (see table
caption for details). The second panel of the table gives a reduced-form measure of the degree of
monotonicity violations–the total area enclosed between &̂ and the one-half line over beliefs that
lead to (not necessarily significant) violations.
We find that monotonicity cannot be rejected for player 2 in any game, and this is consistent
across regression specifications. In particular, it is not rejected with very high ?-values for the most
flexible specifications (see table caption for details). For player 1, on the other hand, we observe
consistent and highly significant violations of monotonicity in all games that occur over a region
of 5-30 belief points, depending on the game. Moreover, based on the belief histograms in Figure
2.6, it is clear that a large mass of beliefs (including the mode) fall in the regions with monotonicity
violations.
From Figure 2.6, it is clear that the nature of player 1’s monotonicity violations is systematic.
For - > 20, the violations occur over an interval of beliefs just “right of” the indifferent belief, and
for - < 20, the violations are over an interval of beliefs just “left of” the indifferent belief. We
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Table 2.8: Testing monotonicity
Tests of Monotonicity (?-values)
Player 1 (&* ) Player 2 (&!)
4∗ !4∗ 5 6 7 Avg 4∗ !4∗ 5 6 7 Avg
-80 0.00∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.35 0.36 0.47 0.42 0.50 0.42
-40 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.23 0.47 0.87 0.34
-10 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.09∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.13 0.66 0.87 0.35
-5 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.11 0.10∗ 0.22 0.41 0.58 0.28
-2 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.06∗ 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.13
-1 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.30 0.34 0.86 0.77 0.97 0.65
Avg 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ – 0.16 0.16 0.34 0.48 0.67 –
Size of Monotonicity Violation
Player 1 (&* ) Player 2 (&!)
4∗ !4∗ 5 6 7 Avg 4∗ !4∗ 5 6 7 Avg
-80 2.08 1.88 1.69 2.29 2.19 2.03 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.28 0.25 0.21
-40 0.82 1.68 1.57 1.27 1.39 1.35 0.32 0.38 0.34 0.19 0.02 0.25
-10 2.33 2.86 3.33 3.67 3.45 3.13 0.19 0.29 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.15
-5 5.27 5.82 5.50 5.68 5.85 5.62 0.34 0.42 0.81 0.46 0.30 0.46
-2 6.54 6.63 6.83 6.49 6.47 6.59 1.35 1.33 1.90 1.81 1.81 1.64
-1 5.85 5.84 5.65 5.29 5.62 5.65 0.51 0.48 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.21
Avg 3.81 4.12 4.10 4.12 4.16 – 0.48 0.51 0.60 0.46 0.40 –
Notes: For each player and game, we test for monotonicity in the manner described in Section 2.5.2 using 5 different
regression models to estimate &̂. The 5 models are based on restricted splines: cubic with 4 knots based on belief
quintiles (4∗); linear with 4 knots based on belief quintiles (!4∗); and cubic with 5, 6, or 7 equally spaced knots (5,
6, and 7, respectively). The top panel reports ?-values, as well as the ?-values averaged across games for a given
model and averaged across models for a given game. The bottom panel reports a reduced-form measure of
monotonicity violations–the total area enclosed between &̂ and the one-half line over beliefs that lead to (not
necessarily significant) violations.
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consider explanations for this pattern in Section 2.6.1.
A weak implication of monotonicity is that best responses will be taken with probability
greater than one-half. As shown previously in Appendix Table 2.15, best responses are taken with
probability greater than one-half in all games. Thus, even though subjects tend to best respond to
the beliefs that they form, they systematically fail to best respond to beliefs that realize in particular
regions of the belief-space. Hence, our analysis expands upon previous studies using elicited beliefs
(e.g. [36] and [37]) that have focused only on rates of best response.
2.5.3 Belief-responsiveness
Belief-responsiveness states that, if the frequency of player 9’s action increases, so too does the
distribution of player 8’s beliefs in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Recalling that the
beliefs are elicited about behavior in the first stage and that the first stages are identical across the
treatments, we use the beliefs data from [A,BA] and the actions data from [A, ◦ ].
Across games G and H, we seek tests of the form28
> :fG9 > f
H
9







> fG9 and 8 (·|f
H
9
) $( 8 (·|fG9 ).
(2.4)
Prior to testing, we visualize the data in Figure 2.9, which plots histograms of stated beliefs,
superimposed with median beliefs (solid vertical lines) and the corresponding empirical frequencies
of actions (dashed vertical lines). It appears that the distributions of beliefs shift monotonically in
- in the direction predicted by QNBE: as - increases, player 2 believes that player 1 will play*
more often and player 1 believes player 2 will play ! less often. Furthermore, plotting the CDFs of
beliefs in Figure 2.8 suggests that the belief distributions are ordered by stochastic dominance. The
empirical action frequencies also typically, but not always, move in the same direction, consistent
with belief-responsiveness.
Our test of hypothesis (2.4) is simple and conservative in the sense of not over-rejecting. To
28The null hypothesis here is slightly weaker than used in the axiom, but it allows for the use of more standard tests.
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this end, we perform one-sided tests of the null hypotheses 0 : fG9 > f
H
9
and 0 : 8 (·|fH9 ) $(
8 (·|fG9 ). If f
H
9
is greater than fG
9
, belief-responsiveness dictates that 8 (·|fH9 ) $( 8 (·|fG9 ), so





and that 8 (·|fH9 ) $(




8 (·|fG9 ) $( 8 (·|f
H
9
) for every combination of games G and H ≠ G and for each player 8
and her opponent 9 (see table caption for details of these tests). These are reported in matrix
form as entries in row G and column H. We find only one significant violation across the many
comparisons. This can be seen from the ?-values in bold, indicating rejections of both f-401 > f
-10
1
and 1(·|f-101 ) $( 1(·|f
-40
1 ). We conclude that belief-responsiveness cannot be rejected in
our data.
Figure 2.8: CDFs of belief distributions














Notes: We plot the empirical CDFs of belief distributions. The left panel is for player 2’s beliefs about*, and the right
panel is for player 1’s beliefs about !.
29This would be a conservative test if a situation in which belief distributions were unordered by stochastic dominance
did not lead to rejection of the axiom, and in most cases the ordering is clear (Figure 2.8).
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Notes: The left panel is for player 2’s beliefs about*, and the right panel is for player 1’s beliefs about !. The solid
lines mark the median of 8’s beliefs and the dashed line marks the empirical frequency of 9’s actions.
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Table 2.9: Testing belief-responsiveness
Actions
Players 8 = 1, 9 = 2 (?-values) Players 8 = 2, 9 = 1 (?-values)
-80 -40 -10 -5 -2 -1 -80 -40 -10 -5 -2 -1
-80 – 0.58 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ – 0.89 0.42 0.95 0.93 1.00
0 : -40 0.42 – 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.11 – 0.07∗ 0.65 0.61 0.96
fG
9
-10 1.00 1.00 – 0.08∗ 0.08∗ 0.07∗ 0.58 0.93 – 0.97 0.95 1.00




-2 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.50 – 0.50 0.07∗ 0.39 0.05∗∗ 0.54 – 0.91
-1 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.50 0.50 – 0.00∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.10∗ 0.09∗ –
Beliefs
Players 8 = 1, 9 = 2 (?-values) Players 8 = 2, 9 = 1 (?-values)
-80 -40 -10 -5 -2 -1 -80 -40 -10 -5 -2 -1
-80 – 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ – 0.87 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0 : -40 0.80 – 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ – 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
8 (·|fG9 ) -10 0.96 0.93 – 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ – 0.84 0.98 0.73
$( -5 0.97 0.92 0.76 – 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ – 0.95 0.77
8 (·|fH9 ) -2 1.00 0.72 0.79 0.68 – 0.01∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ – 0.78
-1 1.00 0.83 0.66 0.72 0.73 – 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗∗ –
Notes: The top panel reports ?-values from tests of 0 : fG9 > f
H
9
across games G (row) and H (column). This is from




across games G (row) and H (column). This is from non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov-type tests in which the test
statistic is bootstrapped following [50] in a way that preserves the within-subject correlation of beliefs observed in the
data (see Appendix 2.11.3 for details). The entries in bold correspond to the only rejection: f-401 ≯ f
-10
1 and





Unbiasedness states that beliefs are correct on median. Hence, for each player 9 and game G,
we test the hypothesis
> : <43 (f∗,G9 ) = f
G
9 ,
where <43 (·) denotes the median of a random variable. Once again, we use the beliefs data from
[A,BA] and the actions data from [A, ◦ ].







Notes: The left panel gives player 1’s action frequency from [A, ◦ ] and the median of player 2’s beliefs about player 1.
Blue circles are individual belief statements. The right panel gives player 2’s action frequency from [A, ◦ ] and the
median of player 1’s beliefs about player 2. Red circles are individual belief statements.
Unbiasedness requires that beliefs are correct on median, so we plot in Figure 2.10 the aggregate
action frequencies and median beliefs as well as the individual belief statements. Appendix Table
2.18 reports the bias in both median- and mean-beliefs with ?-values of the hypothesis that beliefs
are unbiased (see caption for details).
We find that player 1’s beliefs about player 2 (f̂∗
!
) are remarkably unbiased in that we fail to
reject unbiasedness for most games individually. When using the mean belief instead of median, we
find that there is a small “conservative” bias in the sense that mean beliefs are closer to the uniform
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distribution than the actual distribution of actions. Such bias has been documented by [35] and [36]
in other settings, and is relatively common in experiments in which beliefs are elicited.
More interestingly, we find that player 2’s beliefs about player 1 (f̂∗
*
) are very “extreme” and
we reject unbiasedness for all games (and similarly for mean-unbiasedness). Whereas player 1’s
actions are relatively close to uniform for all values of - , player 2 overwhelmingly believes player
1 takes* when - is large and similarly takes  when - is small. Hence, the nature of bias depends
qualitatively on player role, which we take as one of the key facts to be explained in the next section.
2.6 Explaining the Failure of the Axioms
Having identified violations of monotonicity and unbiasedness, we offer behavioral explanations.
2.6.1 Monotonicity
We observe, for player 1 only, a systematic failure of monotonicity, as shown in Figure 2.6.
Under the maintained assumption of expected utility, utility is linear in matrix payoffs since they
are in probability points. Monotonicity thus predicts that &̂* should cross the one-half line at the
indifferent belief plotted in the figure (dashed vertical lines). However, we observe systematic
failures: for - > 20, &̂* crosses to the right of the indifferent belief, and for - < 20, &̂* crosses
to the left of the indifferent belief. If, however, there is non-linearity in the utility function over
matrix payoffs, the actual indifferent belief–and thus where monotonicity predicts &̂* crosses the
one-half line–may deviate systematically from that under linear utility. The proposition below states
that, with concavity in the utility function, the indifferent belief moves right for - > 20 and left for
- < 20, which is consistent with the observed violations.
7. Let F and E be any strictly increasing Bernoulli utility functions. For player 1 in game - ,




) : [0, 1] → R2. Let f̃F,-
!
be the unique








). (i) If F is more concave than E (F = 5 (E) for
















, 12 ) for - > 20 and f̃
F,-
!
∈ ( 12 , f
#,-
!
) for - < 20.
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Proof. See Appendix 2.11.2. 
Since player 2 faces symmetric payoffs, curvature does not affect her indifferent belief. Hence,
both players having concave utility is qualitatively consistent with the whole of the data.
To test for concavity, we fit a random utility model (e.g. [51]) with curvature to each player
1-subject’s actions data given belief statements. Since we will fit random utility models to both
players’ data later on, we keep the notation general by using 8 for player role.




};- where ; ∈ {1, ..., 5}
indexes each elicitation and - indexes the game. We assume that the utility function is the constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function with curvature parameter d, which has been modified
to allow for 0 monetary payoffs by adding a constant n > 0 (arbitrarily pre-set to 0.001) to each
payoff. We also normalized utility so that it is between 0 and 1:30
F(I; d) = (I + n)
1−d − n1−d
(80 + n)1−d − n1−d
.
This utility function induces, for each game - and stated belief 1̂8-
B;













; d)). We assume that the probability of taking the first action
(* in the case of player 1, ! in the case of player 2) depends only on this vector, based on the Luce
quantal response function with sensitivity parameter `0 > 0:31
?- (0̂8-B; |1̂
8-






















For subject B in role 8, we choose d and `0 to maximize the log-likelihood of observed actions given
stated beliefs:







B; ; d, `0)).
We find that for 37 of 54 player 1-subjects (69%), a likelihood ratio test rejects the restriction of
30By construction, F(0; d) = 0 and F(80; d) = 1.
31The Luce rule (2.5) fits the data much better than the logit quantal response function, but is undefined when one of
the expected utilities is 0. This happens if and only if the stated belief is 0 or 100, which occurs very few times in the
data. When this occurs, we instead use 1 or 99, respectively, to calculate the expectations.
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Notes: For player 1 and games -80 (left panel) and -5 (right panel), we plot the predicted values (with 90% error
bands) from restricted cubic spline regressions of actions on beliefs (4 knots at belief quintiles, standard errors clustered






and the horizontal line is set to one-half. The solid vertical line is the indifferent belief with concave utility that is
estimated from fitting a single curvature parameter to player 1-subjects’ data from all --games.
linear utility, that d = 0, at the 5% level. For 31 of those 37 subjects (84%), the estimated d̂ is
positive, indicating concavity.
We also fit d and `0 to the player 1 data pooled across all subjects and games, i.e. to maximize
! (0̂ |1̂; d, `0) =
∑
B !
B (0̂ |1̂; d, `0). We find the estimate d̂ = 0.87, indicating concavity. In Figure
2.11, we reproduce Figure 2.6 for player 1, but we now plot the indifferent beliefs implied by the
best-fit utility function as solid vertical lines (see Appendix Figure 2.29 for all six games). Each
such line intersects &̂* near to where it crosses the horizontal one-half line. Hence, if the subjects
admitted a representative agent with this concave utility, nearly all of the monotonicity violations
would disappear. This also captures the fact that the regions of violations are larger for the more
asymmetric games (compare, for example, -10 and -1 in Appendix Figure 2.29).
There are several potential explanations as to why subjects’ behavior can be rationalized by
concave utility over matrix payoffs. First, it could be that subjects thought of probability points as
money and were risk averse. We do not believe, however, that subjects were confused about the
nature of payoffs: they had to answer four questions demonstrating understanding of how to map
players’ actions in a game to payoff outcomes (see Section 2.3), and these emphasized that payoffs
were in probability points. Second, it could be that subjects simply wanted to “win” the game by
taking the action that maximized the probability of earning positive probability points unless the
112
other action was sufficiently attractive.
2.6.2 Unbiasedness
Unbiasedness is rejected in the --games: player 1 forms unbiased/conservative beliefs whereas
player 2 forms extreme beliefs. That the players systematically form qualitatively different biases is
mysterious, though the number of models that can rationalize this observation is potentially large.
What is the true mechanism?
We argue that the roles subjects find themselves in causally induce different degrees of strategic
sophistication in the level : sense (e.g. [20] and [21]). In particular, player 1-subjects are made more
sophisticated than player 2-subjects, and this generates precisely the biases we observe: whereas
player 2-subjects overwhelmingly attribute the low-level action to player 1 (* when - is large, 
when - is small), a sizable fraction of player 1-subjects correctly anticipate this.
We provide two types of corroborating evidence for this sophistication hypothesis. First, all
subjects stated beliefs in both roles of a dominance solvable game, from which we derive a subject-
level measure of strategic sophistication that is collected identically for all subjects. By this measure,
player 1-subjects are much more sophisticated than player 2-subjects. Second, player 1-subjects
have much longer response times, suggestive of deeper thinking.
We first present this evidence. Then, we argue that player 1-subjects’ stated beliefs in the
--games also suggest much higher levels of strategic sophistication. To this end, we fit a structural
model to each subject’s beliefs data from the --games and show, in the context of the model, that
this implies much higher levels of sophistication for player 1-subjects. We then validate this finding
by showing that the implied measures of sophistication correlate strongly with those measured in
the dominance solvable games.32
The data tell us that player role itself has a causal effect on sophistication but it cannot tell us the
precise mechanism. We conclude this section by discussing potential mechanisms and suggestions
for future work.
32This is internally consistent in that the structural model predicts such a correlation between the measures.
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Dominance solvable games and a measure of sophistication
If player 1-subjects are truly made more sophisticated because of their role in the --games, we
conjecture that this should “spill over” to other games.33 To this end, we consider the dominance
solvable games reproduced in Figure 2.12.
Figure 2.12: Dominance solvable games
D1 L:≥2 R:=1 D2 L R:≥1
U 0 20 U:=1
0 20




8 20 0 20
Notes: In game 8, player 8 has a strictly dominant action (taken by levels : ≥ 1). Player 9 can either best respond to a
uniform distribution (: = 1) or to player 8’s dominant action (: ≥ 2).
Games 1 and 2 (“Dominant 1” and “Dominant 2”) are identical up to which player faces
which set of payoffs. In the former, player 1 has a strictly dominant action and in the latter, player
2 has a strictly dominant action. Furthermore, in game 8, one of player 9’s actions is the best
response to a uniform distribution and the other is the best response to 8’s dominant action.
In the level : framework of strategic sophistication (e.g. [20] and [21]), level 0 is assumed to
uniformly randomize, level 1 best responds to level 0, and so on, with level : best responding to
level : − 1. In game 8, the following characterizes level-types. Player 8: levels : ≥ 1 take the
dominant action. Player 9 : level 1 best responds to a uniform distribution and levels : ≥ 2 best
respond to 8’s dominant action.
This suggests two benchmark beliefs: (1) 8’s belief that 9 takes her dominant action in  9 and
(2) 8’s belief that 9 best responds to 8’s dominant action in 8. Assuming 8 believes 9 is drawn from
a distribution of level types, for any fixed probability that 8 believes 9 is level 0, these correspond to
increasing functions of 8’s belief that 9 is any level : ≥ 1 and 8’s belief that 9 is any level : ≥ 2,
respectively. We call these benchmark beliefs V(: ≥ 1) and V(: ≥ 2), and they are readily seen as
33One concern is that, since experience in the fully mixed --games affects behavior in the dominance solvable 1
and 2, these latter games may also have an affect on behavior in the former. However, we find this implausible since
the --games take up a large majority of the experiment, so we think of behavior in 1 and 2 as reflections of the
cognitive processes used in the --games.
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coarse measures of sophistication as they measure the belief that the opponent is of a sufficiently
high level.
Throughout the paper, we aggregate V̂(: ≥ 1) and V̂(: ≥ 2) to the subject level by averaging
beliefs across instances of 8 and  9 , respectively (player 8 sees 8 three times and  9 two times
in the second stage). Figure 2.13 gives histograms of these measures for each player role.
From the top panel of Figure 2.13, we see that both players have very similar distributions of
V̂(: ≥ 1) that are highly concentrated toward the right of the space with modes close to 100 and
very similar means of approximately 85 (solid lines). The corresponding action frequencies (from
[A, ◦ ]) are even higher: greater than 95 for both players (dashed lines). From the bottom panel
of Figure 2.13, we see that player 1’s distribution of V̂(: ≥ 2) is relatively uniform whereas that
of player 2 is concentrated below 50, and the respective means are 56 and 33 (solid lines). The
corresponding action frequencies are nearly the same for both players at approximately 78 (dashed
lines).
Our main takeaways from Figure 2.13 are twofold. First, there is much more variation in
V̂(: ≥ 2) than in V̂(: ≥ 1). In other words, subjects overwhelmingly believe other subjects respond
to incentives, but vary greatly in how many additional steps of reasoning they perform. Therefore,
we will use V̂(: ≥ 2) as our measure of sophistication.
Second, player 1 is much more sophisticated than player 2 by this measure, with an average
difference in V̂(: ≥ 2) of 22. In Table 2.19 of Appendix 2.11.7, we show that this sophistication
gap is highly significant, robust to various controls, and not driven by erratic subjects.
Importantly, since 1 and 2 are exactly the same up to which player faces which payoffs,
the sophistication measure is derived in exactly the same way for both players. Furthermore, all
subjects observed exactly the same games throughout the experiment and were randomly assigned
to their roles. Thus, the difference in measured sophistication must be caused by their experience in
different roles of the --games.
The frequency of actions taken in the dominance solvable games are nearly identical across
player 1- and player 2-subjects in the first stage. That stated beliefs (and to some extent actions)
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Figure 2.13: Sophistication by player
V̂(: ≥ 1)
V̂(: ≥ 2)
Notes: The top panel gives histograms of V̂(: ≥ 1), 8’s belief that 9 best responds to his dominant action in  9 , across
subjects. The bottom panel gives histograms of V̂(: ≥ 2), 8’s belief that 9 best responds to 8’s dominant action in 8 (as
opposed to the a uniform distribution), across subjects. The solid lines mark 8’s average beliefs, and the dashed lines
mark 9’s corresponding action frequencies from [A, ◦ ].
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differ across player roles in the second stage suggests that role-dependent no-feedback learning took
place. Interestingly, however, there is no evidence of learning throughout the experiment in the sense
that, within each stage of the experiment, there is no within-player trend in actions or beliefs across
multiple rounds of the same game. Hence, we believe that there was some no-feedback “belief
learning” in the first stage that did not manifest in actions. In the second stage, player 1-subjects’
stated beliefs already indicated higher levels of sophistication in the very first instance of 8, so we
believe all of the learning had already taken place by that point.
Response times
For additional support, we consider response times. If the player 1-role induces greater strategic
sophistication, we would expect for player 1 to also take longer to form beliefs since they go farther
in terms of strategic reasoning.
In Appendix Figure 2.30, we plot the average time to finalize belief statements for each game
and player role. Player 1 takes longer on average for all games. That player 1-subjects take longer on
games 8 and  9 is further suggestion that their experience in the role of player 1 in the --games
spills over to these new environments even though they are the same for both players.
The relationship between sophistication and behavior
If differential sophistication across player roles is to explain behavior in the --games, sophis-
tication measured in dominance solvable games should be predictive of behavior in the --games
within-role. We establish this before formally modeling the relationship between sophistication and
beliefs in the next subsection.
To this end, we divide player 1-subjects into low and high sophistication groups based on having
values of V̂(: ≥ 2) below and above the player 1-median, and similarly for player 2-subjects. We
then compare behaviors across the sophistication groups, focusing on beliefs data and first-stage
actions data [A,BA] (results using the second-stage actions are similar). Appendix Table 2.20
summarizes our results, which we discuss in detail below. In each column, we regress beliefs or
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Notes: For each player, we plot the empirical action frequencies [A,BA] for high- and low-sophistication groups. Player
1 is on the left, and player 2 is on the right.
actions on indicators for each of the six --games (omitted from the table) and indicators for each of
the six games interacted with an indicator for the high sophistication group. The results are robust
to alternate groupings34 and using V̂(: ≥ 2) as a continuous variable.
Compared to less sophisticated player 1s, more sophisticated player 1s tend to believe that
player 2 plays ! less often for - > 20 (more often for - < 20). Compared to less sophisticated
player 2s, more sophisticated player 2s tend to believe that player 1 plays* less often for - > 20
(more often for - < 20). In Appendix Figure 2.31, we plot histograms of beliefs by sophistication
group for both players and all games. This shows that sophisticated player 1s have more extreme
beliefs while for player 2, it is the opposite. Hence, low sophistication does not simply proxy for
more conservative beliefs.
In Figure 2.14, we plot the empirical action frequencies from [A,BA]. For player 1, the difference
between high and low sophistication groups is quantitatively very large, highly significant (column
2 of Appendix Table 2.20), and qualitatively surprising. Consistent with the differences in their
beliefs, the low sophistication group tends to take * for - > 20 and  for - < 20, while for the
34We tried terciles and quartiles as well as using the median of V̂(: ≥ 2) across all subjects for both players instead
of player-specific medians.
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high sophistication group, it is the opposite. Interestingly, the low sophistication group is very
consistent with the joint QRE-NBE predictions and the high sophistication group looks bizarre from
the perspective of this theory. On average, however, the behavior is not far from Nash (left panel of
Figure 2.3). For player 2, the two sophistication groups have very similar actions data which cannot
be distinguished statistically (column 4 of Appendix Table 2.20).
Beliefs and sophistication in the --games
Our analysis shows that player 1-subjects are more sophisticated than player 2-subjects in the
dominance solvable games and that beliefs in the dominance solvable games predict behavior in the
--games. However, this does not imply in of itself that player 1-subjects form more sophisticated
beliefs in the --games. To determine if this is the case, we introduce a simple model of belief
formation that provides a formal link between beliefs in the --games and sophistication. The goal
is not to propose a general theory of belief formation, but to infer sophistication from the --game
data to test the hypothesis that player 1 is more sophisticated than player 2 and determine if this can
generate the biases we observe. As such, the model is highly specialized to the --games.
Table 2.10: Levels in game -
:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 ...
- > 20 Player 1 (f
:
*





2 0 0 1 1 0 ...
- < 20 Player 1 (f
:
*





2 1 1 0 0 1 ...
To this end, we will use a modified cognitive hierarchy framework ([22]) in which each subject
believes she faces opponents drawn from a distribution of level types (e.g. [21] and [20]). Recall
that level 0 is uniformly randomizes, level 1 best responds to level 0, and so on, with level : best
responding to level : − 1. In forming beliefs, subjects believe they face a distribution of level types.
We say that a subject is sophisticated if her beliefs imply that she believes she faces types with high
levels.
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. In the case of indifference we assume uniform tie-breaking. We make two observations.








for odd : . Second,
- matters only insofar as it is greater than or less than 20.
The fact that levels cycle causes problems for identification: any action can be interpreted as
coming from an arbitrarily high level and therefore any belief can be rationalized as being arbitrarily
sophisticated. We restore identification by truncation.
[22] find that an average of 1.5 steps of reasoning fits the data from many games, so we assume
player 8 forms beliefs according to the following three step procedure. First, player 8 imagines
what 9 would do naively, which we assume is a best response to uniform play. Second, player 8
imagines her own best response to that action. Third, player 8 imagines 9’s best response to that
action. During this process, player 8 imagines player 9 taking the level 1 and level 3 actions, so we
assume player 8 believes she faces a fraction (1 − U) of level 1s and a fraction U of level 3s. Player
8’s belief in game - is thus given by
f̄-9 (U) = (1 − U) · f
1,-
9
+ U · f3,-
9
, (2.6)
where U is a free parameter that we interpret as sophistication as it is the belief that the opponent
is of a high level. Our decision to begin the process of introspection at level 1, as opposed to
level 0, is motivated by the fact that subjects overwhelmingly expect their opponents to take the
dominant action in  9 (top panel of Figure 2.13), which is unsurprising in simple games. That the
introspection process skips level 2 is a consequence of iterated best response in asymmetric games,
not an arbitrary restriction.
The fact that f:,-
9
only depends on - insofar as - is greater or less than 20 means that beliefs
formed as in (2.6) will also have this property. However, this is counterfactual: the analysis of
Section 2.5.3 shows that beliefs change systematically across all values of - . For this reason, we
generalize level : to allow for each level type to make payoff sensitive errors.35 Player 8 believes
35The idea of injecting noise into the description of levels is not new. See, for example, [52], [53], and [54].
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where parameter ` > 0 controls the sensitivity to payoff differences. The action of player 9 of level









in (2.6) with f:,-
9
(`) which yields
f̄-9 (U, `) = (1 − U) · f
1,-
9
(`) + U · f3,-
9
(`). (2.8)
We still interpret U as sophistication and ` is the payoff sensitivity player 8 attributes to 9 . We favor
the Luce form of quantal response (2.7) because it is scale invariant, which implies beliefs described
by (2.8) are symmetric in f#
!
–a feature we will show matches the data.
To gain some intuition for the types of beliefs implied by (2.8), we first consider the cases of
` = 0 and ` = 1. When ` = 0, player 8 believes each level-type of player 9 best responds to their
beliefs: (2.8) collapses to (2.6) and hence - only matters insofar as - is greater than or less than 20
or equivalently if f#
!
is less than or greater than 12 . Beliefs thus follow a step pattern:
f̄-* (U, 0) =








f̄-! (U, 0) =

1










For ` > 0, player 8 believes each level-type of player 9 makes payoff sensitive errors in best
responding to her beliefs. Hence, 8’s beliefs are sensitive to all changes in - and therefore also to
changes in f#
!




f̄-* (U, 1) = (1 − U) · (1 − f
#,-
!
) + U · 1
2
f̄-! (U, 1) = (1 − U) ·
1
2
+ U · f#,-
!
.
Thus, when beliefs are viewed as functions of f#
!
, identification of sophistication is based on
levels for ` = 0 and based on the slope for ` = 1. Note also that, in the ` = 1 case, beliefs coincide
with Nash equilibrium when players are fully sophisticated (U = 1). In general, it is easy to generate
parameter values for which the beliefs fall in the interior of the QRE-NBE region.
Structural model
We adapt the model of the previous section to be fit to individual subjects’ belief data from the
--games. By fitting the model to each subject’s data, we infer a measure of strategic sophistication
for each subject.
We recast the belief f̄-
9
defined in (2.8) as the central tendency of beliefs and assume that beliefs
are noisy with a parametric error structure. For player 8 with parameters U and `, we assume belief
1 ∈ {0, 1, ..., 100} is drawn in game - according to











so that the belief closest to 100 · f̄9 is the mode and _ > 0 is a precision parameter.
The data of subject B in role 8 is a set of 30 belief statements {1̂8-
B;
};- where ; ∈ {1, ..., 5} indexes
each elicitation and - indexes the game. For each subject, we choose U, `, and _ to maximize the
log-likelihood of stated beliefs:





;=(?- (1̂8-B; ;U, `, _)).
We find that for 50 out of 110 subjects (45%), a likelihood ratio test rejects the restriction ` = 0 at
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Notes: We plot representative individual subjects’ stated beliefs, superimposed with the best fit f̄-
9
(Û, ˆ̀). The top row
is for player 2-subjects forming beliefs about player 1, and the bottom row is for player 1-subjects forming beliefs about
player 2.
the 5% level, meaning that a substantial fraction of subjects are significantly sensitive to variations
in - in ways allowed by the model.
Figure 2.15 plots the beliefs of some representative subjects, superimposed with the best-fit
f̄-
9
(Û, ˆ̀) for - ∈ (0,∞). The top panels are for player 2-subjects forming beliefs about player 1,
and the bottom panels are for player 1-subjects forming beliefs about player 2. Clearly, there is
considerable heterogeneity across subjects, but the model is flexible enough to accommodate their
diverse belief patterns.
The top panel of Figure 2.15 features player 2-subjects who, from left to right, are increasing in
inferred sophistication Û. Subject 105 believes, overwhelmingly, that player 1 will take * when
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- is large and take  when - is small, or in other words to engage in level 1 behavior. For this
reason, the model infers the low level of sophistication Û = 0.04. At the other extreme, subject 104
believes that player 1 will mostly take  when - is large and take* when - is small, or in other
words to engage in level 3 behavior, and so the model infers a high level of sophistication Û = 0.76.
Interestingly, it is the very sophisticated subjects whose beliefs systematically fall outside of the
QRE-NBE region.
The bottom panel of Figure 2.15 features player 1-subjects who, from left to right, are increasing
in inferred sophistication Û. Subject 26 believes that player 2 will tend to take ' when - is large and
take ! when - is small, consistent with a mix of level 1 and level 3 behavior. The same can be said
of Subject 5, however, the model infers that Subject 5 is much more sophisticated than Subject 26,
with values of Û = 1 and Û = 0.47, respectively. Inspecting their beliefs more closely, we observe
that Subjects 26 and 5 have estimated sensitivities of ˆ̀ ≈ 0 and ˆ̀ ≈ 1, respectively, corresponding
to step-like and linear belief patterns. Hence, while the two subjects may have similar beliefs when
averaged across games - > 20 (and similar beliefs when averaged across games - < 20), Subject 5
believes in a much higher fraction of level 3 opponents, albeit much noisier ones.
Player 1 is more sophisticated than player 2 in the --games
We show that the structural model applied to the --games implies that player 1-subjects tend to
be much more sophisticated by Û than player 2-subjects. This can be seen from Figure 2.16, which
replicates the bottom panel of Figure 2.13 by plotting histograms of inferred sophistication Û for
player 1- and player 2-subjects.
To further validate this finding, we show that Û estimated from the fully mixed --games and
V̂(: ≥ 2) directly measured in dominance solvable 8 are strongly correlated. Applying the
structural model to 8, U and ` cannot be separately identified in the sense that V(: ≥ 2) may
be consistent with different (U, `)-pairs.36 However, for any fixed `, V(: ≥ 2) is an increasing
function of U. Hence, if ` is sufficiently uncorrelated with U, V̂(: ≥ 2) is predicted to correlate
36This is not an issue in the --games because of variations in - .
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Figure 2.16: Inferred sophistication by player
Û
with Û. We are therefore justified in comparing Û and V̂(: ≥ 2) to validate the structural model.
Figure 2.17: Inferred versus directly measured sophistication
Notes: We give a scatterplot of subjects’ Û versus V̂(: ≥ 2), with best-fit lines for player 1-subjects, player 2-subjects,
and all subjects.
Figure 2.17 gives a scatter plot of inferred versus directly measured sophistication. We find
there is a strong positive correlation for player 1-subjects, player 2-subjects, and all subjects; and
this is confirmed in Table 2.11 which presents the correlations.
For robustness, in addition to the 2-parameter (U, `) model, we also consider the 1-parameter
restrictions (U, ` = 0) and (U, ` = 1) discussed in the previous section. We also report both Pearson
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Table 2.11: Correlation between inferred and directly measured sophistication
Player 1 Player 2 Both
U, `
Pearson 0.53∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
spearman 0.54∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗
U, ` = 0 pearson 0.48
∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗
spearman 0.50∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
U, ` = 1 pearson 0.52
∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
spearman 0.54∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗
(linear) coefficients and spearman (rank-based) coefficients. We find that the correlations are in all
cases highly significant, with large magnitudes ranging from 0.34 to 0.63. The correlations are a bit
higher for player 1 than for player 2, and highest for both players pooled together. The 2-parameter
model and restricted ` = 1 model lead to very similar correlations, which are slightly higher than
the correlations implied by the ` = 0 restricted model.
Taken together, the results of this section provide support for the sophistication hypothesis. The
structural model is qualitatively consistent with the patterns observed in subjects’ beliefs data, it
captures the stylized fact of the sophistication gap, and it implies degrees of sophistication that
correlate strongly with the direct measures.
Discussion
Our results indicate that player 1 forms more sophisticated beliefs than player 2 in the --games.
Since the subjects in the two roles were ex-ante identical, this suggests a model of endogenous
role-dependent sophistication. It is beyond the scope of this paper, but we consider developing such
models collecting datasets to differentiate between them is a promising direction for future research.
It seems difficult to reconcile our data with a rational, optimizing model of endogenous sophisti-
cation (e.g. the model of [23]) for the reason that one player or the other faces much higher average
payoffs depending on - , and yet it is always player 1 who forms more sophisticated beliefs. We
believe psychological explanations related to the salience of player 1’s payoffs are more promising.
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2.6.3 Modeling actions and beliefs jointly
In Sections 2.6.1 and 2.6.2, we offered explanations for the failures of monotonicity and
unbiasedness, respectively. These explanations came with structural models that were fit to actions
given beliefs and then to beliefs, respectively. In this section, we combine the previously introduced
elements to maximize the likelihood of actions and beliefs jointly, which we show can rationalize
the whole of the data, including the belief biases we observe.
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;=(?- (1̂8-B; ;U, `, _))
= !B (0̂ |1̂; d, `0) + !B (1̂;U, `, _),
where !B (0̂ |1̂; ·) and !B (1̂; ·) are as before. Hence, we find the same parameter estimates as before
for each subject. For player 2-subjects, we fit the same model, except under the assumption of linear
utility d = 0 as curvature cannot be identified due to the symmetry of player 2’s payoffs (see Section
2.6.1).
After fitting the model to each subject, we simulate the aggregate data. In Figure 2.18, we plot
the simulated empirical frequencies and median beliefs, which we compare to the data from [A,BA]
to which the model was fit. We find that the model generates the observed belief biases, and we
already know from Section 2.6.2 that the fitted model implies much higher levels of sophistication
for player 1-subjects.
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2.7 Action-noise or belief-noise?
Clearly, there is considerable noise in both actions and beliefs. What is lost in ignoring either
source of noise?
In this section, we explore this question via a counterfactual exercise. Specifically, we construct
two counterfactual action frequencies that result from “turning off” just one source of noise in the
second-stage data [A,BA] (for which we can associate actions with beliefs). f̂14BC A4B?>=B4
8
is what
we would observe if subjects best responded to every stated belief, and f̂2>AA42C 14;84 5 B
8
is what we
would observe if subjects had correct beliefs (over first-stage actions [A, ◦ ]). The former can be
constructed directly from the data. To construct the latter, we set 8’s beliefs equal to 9’s empirical
action frequency and assume actions are governed by the random utility model with curvature fitted
to each subject’s data from Section 2.6.1.




, and f̂2>AA42C 14;84 5 B
8
for both players. As a
measure of the performance of each counterfactual, we consider the average absolute differences


















− f̂2>AA42C 14;84 5 B,-
8
|. These
represent the prediction errors or loss in ignoring action-noise and belief-noise, respectively, and
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are displayed in Table 2.12.







We see that, for both players, the two counterfactuals are fairly inaccurate, indicating that
action-noise and belief-noise are both important ingredients for explaining behavior. Models that
ignore any one–as indeed the large majority of models applied to experimental data do–may suffer
from misspecification. Interestingly, which source of noise is more important depends on player
role. For player 1, f̂2>AA42C 14;84 5 B
8
is much more accurate than f̂14BC A4B?>=B4
8
, whereas for player 2,
it is the opposite. This is intuitive as player 1’s stated beliefs are fairly accurate but she faces a
difficult decision for any given belief, and it is the opposite for player 2.





2>AA42C 14;84 5 B
8
player 1 (8 = 1) 0.30 0.16
player 2 (8 = 2) 0.13 0.23
2.8 Issues of belief elicitation: a discussion
Our analysis depends on making beliefs observable through direct elicitation, so we discuss
two well-known and potentially confounding issues of belief elicitation. First, it may be that
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stated beliefs are only noisy signals of subjects’ underlying latent or “true” beliefs. Second, belief
elicitation itself may affect the actions subjects take. We argue that these issues do not affect our
main conclusions.
2.8.1 Stated beliefs as noisy signals of true beliefs
Throughout the paper, we have implicitly assumed that stated beliefs equal the latent or “true”
beliefs that subjects hold in their minds and guide their actions. More generally, it may be that
stated beliefs are noisy signals of the underlying true beliefs due to errors in reporting or noisy
introspection about one’s beliefs (see [41] for a discussion). In that case, can we still say that the
unobserved true beliefs are noisy? Can we reject the same axioms with respect to the true beliefs?
We argue that the answer to both questions is yes.
We suppose that, for a given game, 1∗B and 1
∗
0 are stated and true beliefs, respectively. These are
(possibly degenerate) random variables whose support is contained in [0,1]. Let 10 be a realization
of true beliefs, and let 1∗B (10) be the random stated beliefs conditional on 10. We assume that
actions depend on true belief realizations through the function &8 (D̄8 (10)).
Are true beliefs noisy? If within-subject-game, the true belief were fixed and stated beliefs were
simply noisy signals of the underlying belief, then within-subject-game variation in stated beliefs
would not be predictive of actions. If this were the case, we would see coefficients of 0 in Table 2.7,
but this is strongly rejected. Hence, we conclude that true beliefs are noisy.
As we found using stated beliefs, are monotonicity and unbiasedness also rejected with respect
to true beliefs? To answer this, we require additional structure. To this end, assume that stated
beliefs are drawn from a distribution that is centered, in the sense of median, around the true belief
realization: <43 [1∗B (10)] = 10 for all 10 (and 1∗B (10) = 10 w.p. 1 if 10 ∈ {0, 100}). Under this
assumption, we argue that it is very unlikely that either axiom holds in true beliefs given our data.
Consider player 1 in game -5 (see Figure 2.6). The indifferent belief is 80, and the monotonicity
violation occurs in the interval of stated beliefs [60, 80]. Suppose that actions given true beliefs are
governed by &8 (D̄8 (10)) = 12 for 10 ≤ 80 and &8 (D̄8 (10)) = 1 for 10 > 80, which is the monotonic
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quantal response function most likely to generate the observed violation. Under the assumption
that <43 [1∗B (10)] = 10 for all 10, the expected mass of stated beliefs in [60, 80] that is associated
with a true belief 10 > 80, and thus the action &8 = 1, is at most equal to the mass of stated beliefs
greater than 80. It is clear that this is insufficient to rationalize the violation we observe. Hence, the
underlying &8 defined over true beliefs cannot be monotonic.
We found that player 2 forms very biased stated beliefs over player 1’s actions. For instance, in
-80, <43 (1∗B) > f̂* (see top left panel of Figure 2.9). Suppose that, in true beliefs, <43 (1∗0) = f̂* .
This does not imply that <43 (1∗B) = f̂* , but it does imply that P(1∗B > f̂*) ≤ 34 ,
37 and we observe
that P̂(1∗B > f̂*) is much greater than three-fourths in the data. Hence, the underlying true beliefs
cannot be unbiased.
2.8.2 The effects of belief elicitation
There is little consensus on if, how, and under what conditions belief elicitation has an effect
on the actions subjects take. In their recent review articles on belief elicitation, [44] describes
the evidence as “scanty and contradictory” whereas [43] state that the “evidence presents a more
consistent picture in favor of the idea that belief elicitation is innocuous”. We are unaware of studies
that elicit beliefs for asymmetric matching pennies without the influence of feedback, and, for the
studies that have used feedback, the documented effects have been small.38
It has been conjectured that belief elicitation may increase strategic sophistication (see the
discussion in [44]), but to the best of our knowledge, no previously documented effects can readily
be interpreted in this way.39
In Appendix 2.11.4, we show that there are small, but systematic and statistically significant,
37That <43 (1∗0) = f̂* implies that P(1
∗
0 > f̂* ) = P(1
∗
0 < f̂* ) =
1
2 . Given that <43 [1
∗
B (10)] = 10 for all 10,
P(1∗B > f̂* ) is maximized when P(1∗B (10) > f̂* |10 > f̂* ) = 1 and P(1∗B (10) > f̂* |10 < f̂* ) = 12 , which implies that
P(1∗B > f̂* ) = 34 .
38[32] find no effect. [41] find an effect for only one player and only during early rounds. They claim to be the first
to find any such effect in games with unique, mixed strategy Nash equilibria, and we are unaware of any studies to do
so since.
39[36] find, in the context of 3 × 3 dominance solvable games, that beliefs seem more sophisticated than the
corresponding actions, but they also find that the belief elicitation has no effect on actions. [43] suggest that belief
elicitation may hasten convergence to equilibrium in games played with feedback, but this is distinct from sophistication.
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differences between the first- and second-stage action frequencies in [A,BA]. We find no such
differences between the two stages of the [A,A] treatment that did not involve belief elicitation, and
so we conclude that there is a belief elicitation effect. In Appendix 2.11.4, we provide additional
discussion and argue that this does not affect our main conclusions.
2.9 Relationship to the existing literature
A central goal of behavioral game theory ([40]) is to describe how real people play games.
This paper contributes to the large sub-literature that focuses on bounded rationality as drivers of
behavior (as opposed to, for example, other-regarding preferences ([55])).
We fit most squarely in the literature on stochastic equilibrium models that maintain fixed-point
consistency between players’ actions but allow for random elements. The prominent example is
quantal response equilibrium (QRE), a concept that allows for “noise in actions” but maintains that
beliefs are correct. Early QRE theory was developed in a series of papers ([1], [9], [10], and others)
and is surveyed in a recent monograph ([11]).
Many papers acknowledge that the assumption of correct beliefs is unrealistic, but the large
majority of these papers applied to experimental data are non-equilibrium models such as level :
(e.g. [20] and [21]; and reviewed in [39]) and its many successors (e.g. [22], [23], and [19]). These
models have proven extremely useful in explaining experimental data post-hoc, but their application
is sometimes criticized for lacking the discipline that equilibrium consistency brings.
There are many equilibrium models that involve biased or otherwise incorrect beliefs (e.g. [56]
and [15]), but these are typically ill-suited for (nor were they designed for) direct application to
experimental data. In terms of models that allow for “noise in beliefs”, there are very few. An early
example is the parametric sampling equilibrium ([13]) which has been applied to experimental data
([14]). Notably, [12] introduce the notion of a belief-map as part of their random belief equilibrium
(RBE). Their focus is on the limiting case in which belief-noise “goes to zero” to develop a theory
of equilibrium selection, so their conditions on belief distributions do not impose any testable
restrictions beyond ruling out weakly dominated actions. Noisy belief equilibrium (NBE) ([34]),
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on which our paper builds, was developed to study the case in which belief noise is bounded away
from zero, so it maintains the structure of the belief-map but imposes behavioral axioms to impose
testable restrictions.
We are novel in studying an equilibrium model that allows for both noise in actions and noise in
beliefs. Because it is a non-parametric, axiomatic model that makes set-predictions and we study
the restrictions imposed by the axioms, there is a clear relationship to the literature on the empirical
content of QRE (e.g. [3], [2], [28], [57], and [58]).40
We also make several contributions to the literatures on belief elicitation and strategic sophis-
tication. By having multiple belief elicitations per subject-game without feedback, we are able
to study noise in beliefs. By eliciting beliefs for a family of closely related games, we are able
to track how beliefs vary within-subject across games and compare these belief patterns across
individual subjects. This distinguishes us from experiments that elicit beliefs once for each game
in a set of seemingly unrelated games (e.g. [36] and [37]) as well as studies that elicit beliefs
for the same game repeatedly with feedback (e.g. [32] and [41]). In terms of analysis, we focus
not just on rates of best response, but also on how these rates of best response vary across every
neighborhood of stated beliefs.41 In addition to establishing that subjects’ beliefs are noisy, we
show that within-subject variations in beliefs predict actions.
Studies on strategic sophistication, primarily using the level : framework, typically use domi-
nance solvable games to get around the non-identifiability issues discussed in Section 2.6.2 (e.g.
[60] and [61]). Hence, little is known about how sophistication manifests itself in the important class
of fully mixed games. By combining our rich subject-level beliefs data with a direct measure of
sophistication, we provide some of the first evidence. In finding a correlation between sophistication
measures from fully mixed and dominance solvable games, our analysis also suggests a “persistence
of strategic sophistication” across these two domains, adding positive evidence to a literature that
40This literature was jumpstarted with the negative results of [3] who showed that structural QRE can rationalize the
data from any one game without strong restrictions on the error distributions. Work since has focused on studying the
restrictions imposed by other variants of QRE.
41[59] provides some evidence in 3 × 3 games that beliefs toward the corners of the simplex are best responded to
more often.
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has found largely negative results (e.g. [62]).
2.10 Conclusion
Motivated to contribute to a more realistic game theory, we study the beliefs people form over
opponents’ behavior and the actions they take conditional on these beliefs.
We begin by characterizing an equilibrium model with “noise in actions” and “noise in beliefs”–a
benchmark model that avoids unrealistic deterministic assumptions that would be trivially rejected.
By injecting noise into both actions and beliefs, the model runs the risk of becoming vacuous, so
we restrict both types of noise to satisfy axioms that are stochastic generalizations of “best response”
and “correct beliefs”.
Using a laboratory experiment, we collect actions data and elicit beliefs for a canonical family
of games with systematically varied payoffs. By having multiple elicitations per subject-game
without feedback, our design allows us to (i) observe noise in both actions and beliefs and (ii) test
the axioms of the benchmark model.
We find that both sources of noise are important for explaining features of the data, which
suggests that deterministic assumptions may be an important source of misspecification. In particular,
this calls into question the common practice of applying models with deterministic beliefs to
experimental data.
Interestingly, despite the axioms being relatively weak, we find rejections. The most striking
violation comes in the form of belief biases that depend on player role. Using a structural model
applied to our subject-level beliefs data, we argue that the player role itself induces a higher degree
of strategic sophistication in the player who faces more asymmetric payoffs and that this can explain







This is an experiment in decision making, and you will be paid for your participation in cash. Different subjects may earn
different amounts of money. What you earn depends partly on your decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on luck.
In addition to these earnings, each of you will receive $10 just for participating in and completing the experiment.
It is the policy of this lab that we are strictly forbidden from deceiving you, so you can trust the experiment will proceed
exactly as we describe, including the procedures for payment.
The entire experiment will take place through your computers. It is important that you do not talk or in any way try to
communicate with other subjects during the experiment.
Please turn off your cellphones now.
On the screen in front of you, you should see text asking you to wait for instructions, followed by a text box with a button that
says “ID”. Your computer ID is the number at the top of your desk, which is between 1 and 24. In order to begin the experiment,
you must enter your computer ID into the box and press ‘ID’. Please do that now.
You should all now see a screen that says “please wait for instructions before continuing”. Is there anyone that does not see
this screen? This screen will appear at various points throughout the experiment. It is important that whenever you see this screen,
you do not click ‘continue’ until told to do so.
The experiment has two sections. We will start with a brief instruction period for Section 1, in which you will be familiarized
with the types of rounds you will encounter. Additional instructions will be given for Section 2 after Section 1 is complete.
If you have any questions during the instruction period, raise your hand and your question will be answered so everyone can
hear. If any difficulties arise after the experiment has begun, raise your hand, and an experimenter will come and assist you.
At the beginning of the experiment, each subject will be assigned the color RED or the color BLUE. There will be an equal
number of RED and BLUE subjects. If you are assigned RED, you will be RED for the entire experiment. If you are assigned
BLUE, you will be BLUE for the entire experiment.
Section 1 consists of several rounds. I will now describe what occurs in each round. First, you will be randomly paired with a
subject of the opposite color. Thus, if you are a BLUE subject, you will be paired with a RED subject. If you are a RED subject,
you will be paired with a BLUE subject. You will not not know who you are paired with, nor will the other subject know who you
are. Each pairing lasts only one round. At the start of the next round, you will be randomly re-paired.
[SLIDE 1]
In each round, you will see a matrix similar to the one currently shown on the overhead, though the numbers will change every
round. In every round, you and the subject you are paired with will both see the same matrix, but remember that one of you is
BLUE and one of you is RED.
Both subjects in the pair will simultaneously be asked to make a choice. BLUE will choose one of the two rows in the matrix,
either ‘Up’ or ‘Down’, which we write as ‘U’ or ‘D’. RED will choose one of the two columns, either ‘Left’ or ‘Right’, which we
write as ‘L’ or ‘R’. We refer to these choices as “actions”. Notice that each pair of actions corresponds to one of the 4 cells of the
matrix. For instance, if BLUE chooses ‘U’ and RED chooses ‘L’, this corresponds to the top-left cell, and similarly for the others.
Thus, depending on both players’ actions, there are 4 possible outcomes:
• If BLUE chooses ‘U’ and RED chooses ‘L’, BLUE receives a payoff of 10, since that is the blue number in the UP–LEFT
cell, and RED receives 20, since that is the RED number.
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• If BLUE chooses ‘D’ and RED chooses ‘R’, BLUE receives a payoff of 11 and RED receives 75.
• And the other two cells UP–RIGHT and DOWN–LEFT are similar.
We reiterate: each number in the matrix is a payoff that might be received by one of the players, depending on both players’ actions.
Are there any questions?
In this section, you will play for 20 rounds and 1 of your rounds will be chosen for your payment. This 1 round will be selected
randomly for each subject, and the payment will depend on the actions taken in that round by you and the subject you were paired
with. In the selected round, your payoff in the chosen cell denotes the probability with which you will receive $10. For example, if
you receive a payoff of 60, then for that round you would receive $10 with 60% probability and $0 otherwise.
Since every round has an equal chance of being selected for payment, and you do not know which will be selected, it is in your
best interest that you think carefully about all of your choices.
During the experiment, no feedback will be provided about the other player’s chosen action. Only at the end of the experiment
will you get to see the round that was chosen for your payment and the actions taken by you and the player you were paired with in
that round.
Before we begin the first section, you will answer 4 training questions to ensure you understand this payoff structure. In each
of these 4 questions, you will be shown a matrix and told the actions chosen by both players. You will then be asked with what
probability a particular player earns $10 if this round were to be selected for payment. That is, you are being asked for their payoff
in the appropriate cell. To answer, simply type the probability as a whole number into the box provided and click ‘continue’. The
page will only allow you to ‘continue’ when your answer is correct, at which point you may proceed to the next question. Please
click ‘continue’ and answer the 4 training questions now.
[SLIDE 2]
Now that you’ve completed the training questions and understand the payoff matrices, we will proceed to Section 1. In each
round of this section you will be randomly paired with another subject. If you are BLUE, you will be paired with a RED subject,
and if you are RED, you will be paired with a BLUE subject. Recall that, at the start of each round, you will be randomly re-paired.
In each round, for each pair, the RED player’s task will be to select a column of the matrix, and the BLUE player’s task will
be to select a row of the matrix, and these actions determine both players’ payoffs for the round.
[SLIDE 3]
You should now see an example round on the overhead. This shows the screen for a BLUE player, who is asked to choose
between ‘U’ and ‘D’. Notice however that the text instructing you to make a choice is faded. This is because you must wait for
10 seconds before you are allowed to make a decision. Once 10 seconds has passed, the text will darken, indicating that you can
now make a selection. The number of seconds remaining until you are able to choose is shown in the bottom right corner. Now the
overhead shows what the screen will look like after the 10 seconds have passed.
[SLIDE 4]
The 10 seconds is a minimum time limit. There is no maximum time limit on your choices, and you should feel free to take as
much time as you need, even after the 10 seconds has passed. In order to make your selection, simply click on the row or column




You may change your answer as many times as you like before submitting. If you would like to undo your choice, simply click
again on the highlighted row or column. Once you are satisfied with your choice, click ‘submit’ to move on to the next round.
Before beginning the paid rounds of Section 1, we will play 4 practice rounds to familiarize you with the interface. These
rounds will not be selected for payment. Are there any questions about the game, the rules, or the interface before we begin the
practice rounds?
Please click ‘continue’ and begin the practice rounds now. You will notice that you have been assigned either RED or BLUE.
This will be your color throughout the experiment. Please continue until you have completed the 4 practice rounds.
You have now completed the practice rounds, and we will proceed to the paid rounds of Section 1. Section 1 consists of 20
rounds, exactly like those you have just played. Recall that, in each round, you will be randomly paired with another subject and
that one round will be randomly selected for payment. Are there any questions about the game, the rules, or the interface before we
begin?
[SLIDE 6]
Please click ‘continue’ and play Section 1 now. The rules we discussed for Section 1 will be shown on the overhead as a
reminder throughout.
[SLIDE 7]
We will now have a brief instruction period for Section 2, in which you will be familiarized with the types of rounds you will
encounter.
If you have any questions during the instruction period, raise your hand and your question will be answered so everyone can
hear. If any difficulties arise once play has begun, raise your hand, and an experimenter will come and assist you.
In this section, each round will be similar to those from Section 1. You will see some of the same matrices and your assignment
of RED or BLUE will be the same as before.
Now, however, after being shown a matrix, your task will be to give your belief or best guess about the probability that a
randomly selected subject chose a particular action when playing the same matrix in Section 1. That is, you will be shown a matrix,
and the computer will randomly select a round from Section 1 in which the same matrix was played. Then,
• If you are RED, you will be asked for the probability that a randomly selected BLUE player chose ‘U’ in that round in
Section 1.
• If you are BLUE, you will be asked for the probability that a randomly selected RED player chose ‘L’ in that round in
Section 1.
As before, you will be paid for your responses. We will now describe this payment mechanism.
[SLIDE 8]
Consider first the matrix that is shown on the overhead. Please imagine that the computer has randomly selected a round from
Section 1 in which this matrix was played. We wish to know your belief about the probability that a randomly selected RED player
chose ’L’ in that round. Please, take some time now to think carefully about what you believe this probability to be.
[SLIDE 9]
Consider the question that is now shown on the overhead, which asks which of the following you would prefer:
• Under Option A, you receive $5 if a randomly selected RED player chose ’L’ in that round, and $0 otherwise.
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• Under Option B, you receive $5 with probability 75%, and $0 otherwise.
Please think carefully about which of these two options you would prefer.
Presumably, if you believe the probability that a randomly selected RED player chose ’L’ is greater than 75%, then you would
prefer Option A, which you believe gives you the highest probability of a $5 prize. For example, if you believe this probability is
89%, you would choose Option A since 89 is greater than 75.
If, on the other hand, you believe the probability that a randomly selected RED player chose ’L’ is less than 75%, then you
would prefer Option B, which you believe gives you the highest probability of a $5 prize. For example, if you believe this probability
is 22%, you would choose Option B since 22 is less than 75.
In this way, your answer to this question will tell us whether you believe this probability is greater than or less than 75%.
[SLIDE 10]
Now imagine we asked you 101 of these questions, with the probability in Option B ranging from 0% to 100%. Presumably
you would answer each of these questions as described previously. That is, for questions for which the probability in Option B is
below your belief, you would choose Option A, and for questions for which the probability in Option B is above your belief, you
would choose Option B. Imagine, for example, you believe that there is a 64% probability that a randomly selected RED player
chose ’L’ in the selected round. Then, you would select Option A for all questions before #64, and Option B for all questions after
#64. For Question #64, you could make either selection.
[SLIDE 11]
In this case, your selections would be as shown on the overhead, with the chosen options in black and the unchosen options in
gray. From these answers, we could determine that you believe the probability that a randomly selected RED player chose ’L’ is
64%.
In each round of this section, you will be faced with a table of 101 questions as shown on the overhead. To save time, instead of
having you answer each question individually, we will simply ask you to type in your belief, and the answers to these 101 questions
will be automatically filled out as above. That is, for rows of the table in which the probability in Option B is below your stated
belief you will automatically select Option A, and for rows of the table in which the probability in Option B is at or above your
stated belief you will automatically select Option B.
If this round is chosen for payment, one of the 101 rows of the table will be randomly selected and you will be paid according
to your chosen option in that row. If you chose Option A in that row, a subject of the relevant color will be randomly chosen, and
you will receive $5 if they played the relevant action in the selected round of Section 1. If you chose Option B in that row, you will
receive $5 with the probability given in that option.
It is thus in your best interest, given your belief, to state your belief accurately. Otherwise, if you type something other than
your belief, there will be rows of the table for which you will not be selecting the option that you believe gives you the highest
probability of receiving a $5 prize.
In this section you will play 40 rounds, giving 40 such beliefs. At the end of the section, 2 rounds will be randomly chosen for
payment. For each of these rounds, one of the 101 rows of the table will be randomly selected and you will be paid according to
your chosen option in that row.
Are there any questions about this?
In addition to stating a belief, in each round you will also be asked to choose an action, as you did in Section 1. Now, however,
the other action will not be determined by another subject acting simultaneously. Instead, recall that the computer has randomly
selected a round from Section 1 featuring the matrix shown on your screen. The computer will also randomly select a player of the
other color and record the action they took in that round. This is the action that you will be paired with. That is:
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• If you are RED, the BLUE action will be that which a randomly selected BLUE player chose in the selected round of
Section 1.
• If you are BLUE, the RED action will be that which a randomly selected RED player chose in the selected round of Section
1.
Again, the randomly selected round from Section 1 will feature the same matrix shown on your screen, so your payoff is determined
as if you were paired with a randomly selected player from Section 1, rather than being paired with a player who chooses an action
simultaneously.
As in Section 1, your payoff from taking an action gives the probability of earning $10 if the round is chosen for payment.
At the end of the section, 2 rounds will be randomly chosen for payments based on your actions. This is in addition to the 2
rounds randomly chosen for payments based on your beliefs. Moreover, the randomization algorithm that selects these rounds will
ensure that all 4 rounds feature different matrices and that these matrices will be different from that selected for payment in Section
1. In particular, this means that if a round is selected for an action-payment, it cannot also be selected for a belief-payment and vice
versa.
As before, since you do not know which round will be selected for payment, nor which type of payment it will be selected for,
these payment procedures ensure that, in each round, it is in your best interest to both state your belief accurately and choose the
action that you think is best.
[SLIDE 12]
You should now see an example round on the overhead. This shows the screen for a BLUE player. As in Section 1, you will
see the matrix in the middle of the screen. At the top of the screen, you are told that the computer has randomly selected a round of
Section 1 in which this matrix was played.
Below this, the instructions are shown, and are again faded for 10 seconds. Once 10 seconds has passed, the text asking you
for your belief will darken as now shown on the overhead.
[SLIDE 13]
You will not be able to select an action until after you have entered your belief.
Once you have entered your belief, the resulting probabilities will appear below or beside the matrix and the text asking you
to select your action will darken, as now shown on the overhead.
[SLIDE 14]
Your belief must be a whole number between 0 and 100 inclusive. Once you enter your belief, we will automatically ’fill out’
the questions in the 101 rows based on your belief as previously described. If you wish, at any time you may scroll down to observe
the 101 rows.
As in Section 1, once you have selected an action, it will be highlighted on the matrix, as now shown on the overhead.
[SLIDE 15]
At this point, you may freely modify both your belief and action as many times as you wish before pressing ‘submit’. Remem-
ber that there is no upper time limit on your choices, and you should feel free to take as much time as you need, even after the
minimum 10 seconds has passed.
Before beginning the paid rounds of Section 2, we will play 3 practice rounds to familiarize you with the interface. These
rounds feature the same matrices as the practice rounds from Section 1, and will not be selected for payment. Are there any
questions about the game, the rules, or the interface before we begin the practice rounds?
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Please click ‘continue’ to be taken to the first practice round now. Recall that your belief must be a whole number between 0
and 100 inclusive, and at any time you may scroll down to see the table of 101 questions. Please continue until you have completed
the 3 practice rounds.
You’ve now completed the practice rounds, and we will proceed to the paid rounds of Section 2.
[SLIDE 16]
Recall that Section 2 consists of 40 rounds, exactly like those you have just played. 4 rounds will be randomly selected for
payment–2 rounds for beliefs and 2 rounds for your actions. Again, these 4 rounds will feature different matrices to each other
and to the matrix selected for payment in Section 1. The payment procedures ensure that it is always in your best interest to both
state your belief accurately and choose the action that you think is best. Unlike Section 1, Section 2 will be played at your own
pace without waiting for other subjects between rounds. Once you have completed Section 2, please remain seated quietly until all
subjects have finished.
Are there any questions about the game, the rules, or the interface? If you have any questions during the remainder of the
experiment, raise your hand, and an experimenter will come and assist you. You may click ’continue’ and play Section 2 now. The
rules we discussed for Section 2 will be shown on the overhead as a reminder throughout.
You have now completed the experiment. All that remains is to organize payments. To do this, you will be shown a page with
all of your randomly selected rounds and your earnings in each. This page will also show you how to fill out the payment receipt at
your desks. Before reaching this page, you will see an explanation page describing how the results are determined and how to read
them. You may click ‘continue’ now and read through the explanation page. Then continue to the payments page, where you will
see your results and fill out your receipt.
2.11.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Existence follows from Brouwer’s fixed point theorem after showing Ψ8 : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is continuous.
To this end, let `8 (·|f9 )f 9 ∈[0,1] be the family of Borel measures derived from 8 (·|f9 )f 9 ∈[0,1] that define the belief distributions.
From (B1) and (B2), `8 (·|f9 )f 9 ∈[0,1] has the property that `8 (|f9 ) is continuous in f9 ∈ (0, 1) for any Borel subset  ∈
B([0, 1]). From this and the fact that &8 ◦ D̄8 (f9 ) is continuous in f9 ∈ [0, 1], it is immediate that Ψ8 (f9 ) is continuous in
f9 ∈ (0, 1). So we need only consider f9 → 0+ (the case of f9 → 1− is similar). From (B4) (and (B1) and (B2)), there are
discontinuities at the endpoints: `8 ({0}|f9 ) = 0 for f9 > 0 but `8 ({0}|0) = 1. However, from (B1) and (B2), `8 ( |f9 ) is
continuous as f9 → 0+ if  = [0, n) or  = (n, n2) (i.e. if  or its complement is well-separated from 0), which implies that
`8 ( [0, n) |f9 ) → 1 as f9 → 0+ for any n > 0. Hence, Ψ8 (f9 ) is continuous since Ψ8 (0) = &8 ◦ D̄8 (0) and as f9 → 0+, beliefs
become arbitrarily concentrated within a neighborhood of 0 and &8 ◦ D̄8 (f9 ) is continuous in f9 ∈ [0, 1].
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similar arguments, it must be that Ψ* (f!) must satisfy (2.1) for all f! . Conversely, let f! < f#! and 2 ∈ (0,
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restrictions are that &* ◦ (D̄1 (0)) ∈ (0, 12 ) and &* ◦ (D̄1 (1)) ∈ (
1
2 , 1), so this is feasible. This construction violates (B1) and
(B2), but can be modified to satisfy these axioms by smoothing out the distribution of f∗
!






, this construction can be extended so that Ψ* (f
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) = 2′ for any 2′ ∈ (2, 34 ) in such a way that none of the axioms
are violated. Proceeding in this fashion, any Ψ* : [0, 1] → [0, 1] that is continuous, strictly increasing, and satisfying (2.1) can be
induced for some {&* , f∗!}. Part (ii) is similar, and part (iii) follows since the QNBE is the intersection of the constructed Ψ* and
Ψ! .
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decreases (see Figure 2.1).

Proof of Proposition 5. The only if direction follows immediately from Propositions 3 and 4. We omit the if direction because it
is very similar to that in the proof of Proposition 6 below as it basically combines the results for QRE and NBE.

Proof of Proposition 6. The only if direction can be found for very similar games for QRE in [2] and for NBE in [34] in terms of
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Proof of Proposition 7. (i): Let F and E with F = 5 (E) for some concave 5 . Let - > 20. Without loss, normalize so that
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. Similarly, if - < 20, normalize without loss so that F(0) = E(0) = 0 and
F(20) = E(20) = 1. This implies that f̃D,-
!







Part (ii) is the same, except with E(I) = I, which implies f̃E,-
!















for - ∈ {- ′ , - ′′} with - ′ > 20 and - ′′ < 20. The purple CDF is 1 (·|f̂-
′
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2.11.3 Details of statistical tests
For what follows, let #(
8
denote the set of subjects in role 8 ∈ {1, 2} in session ( ∈ {[A,BA], [A,A]}.
Bowman et al. (1998) test. The null hypothesis is that a regression function, which in our case is the expected action conditional on
beliefs, is weakly monotone.
Let 18G
B;
be the ;th of 5 belief statements for subject B in role 8 for game G ∈ G where G is a set of games that is either the
entire set of six games {-80, -40, ..., -1} or any one of these games. Let 08G
B;
∈ {0, 1} be the action corresponding to belief 18G
B;
.




, and we denote such estimators by <̂(1) and F̂(1). We




• Step 1: Find the critical local linear (lowess) regression bandwidth ℎ2 , which is the smallest such that <̂(1; ℎ2) is weakly
monotone (increasing if 8 = 1, decreasing if 8 = 2).






; ℎ0) where F̂ is some estimator with bandwidth ℎ0 chosen to minimize
the mean integrated squared error
∑







) + n 8G
B;
is the true model.42
• Step 3: Resample the subjects in I with replacement |I | times. Conditional on drawing each subject B, resample 5
times with replacement from {n̂ 8G
B1 , n̂
8G
B2 , ..., n̂
8G
B5 } for each G ∈ |G| for a total bootstrap sample of 5 · |G| · |I| observations
{n̂∗8C }C ∈{1,2,...,30· |I | } and thus {0∗8C = <̂(18C ; ℎ2) + n̂∗8C }C ∈{1,2,...,30· |I | } where 18C is the belief associated with n̂∗8C .
• Step 4: Apply <̂ using ℎ2 to {(18C , 0∗8C )}C ∈{1,...,5· |G | · |I | } and observe whether or not the result is monotone.
• Step 5: Repeat Steps 3 and 4 B = 5, 000 times, constructing the ?-value by determining the proportion of estimates at Step
4 which are not monotonic (not everywhere increasing if 8 = 1, not everywhere decreasing if 8 = 2).
Abadie (2002) test. The null hypothesis is that 8 (I |fG9 ) ≤ 8 (I |f
H
9
) for I ∈ [0, 1].
• Step 1: Compute Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic )̂ =
(
5
# [A,BA]8 ·5# [A,BA]8 
5












̂8 (I |fG9 ) and ̂8 (I |f
H
9
) are the empirical CDFs of beliefs.
• Step 2: Resample the subjects in #[A,BA]
8
with replacement. Conditional on drawing each subject, resample with replace-
ment from her 10 belief statements, i.e. pooled together from G and H, and assign the first 5 to group G and the second 5
to group H. Do this
#[A,BA]8  times to form two bootstrapped CDFs ∗8 (I |fG9 )1 and ∗8 (I |fH9 )1 where 1 is the bootstrap
index. Use these to calculate )∗
1
.
• Step 3: Repeat previous step B = 5, 000 times.






42[49] suggest to use lowess regression with bandwidth selected by the method of [63]. We opt instead for local
linear kernel regression with cross-validation based bandwidth selection for its wider availability in statistical packages
(Stata 15.0 command npregress kernel, which uses optimal bandwidth selection by default).
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2.11.4 The effects of belief elicitation: a closer look
In the top panels of Appendix Figure 2.21, we plot the action frequencies from [A,BA] and [A,BA]. That is, we are comparing
first-stage actions (without belief elicitation) to second-stage actions, each of which was preceded by belief elicitation.43 For both
players, we observe systematic and significant differences between the two stages. This is confirmed in the first 2 columns of
Appendix Table 2.13 in which we regress actions on indicators for each of the six --games (omitted from the table) and indicators
for each of the six games interacted with an indicator for the the second-stage. -tests reject that the action frequencies are the
same across stages.
Our hypothesis is that these differences are caused by belief elicitation. However, the two stages differ in which came first, the
fact that the games in the second stage are played against previously recorded actions, the number of rounds, and very slightly in
their composition of games. To pin down the cause, we ran the additional [A,A] treatment. This is identical to the [A,BA] treatment
except beliefs are not elicited (and instructions never mention belief elicitation).
The bottom panels of Appendix Figure 2.21 plot the action frequencies from [A,A] and [A,A], and Columns 3-4 of Appendix
Table 2.13 replicate columns 1-2 for the [A,A] treatment. We find that the actions data is statistically indistinguishable between
the two stages of the [A,A] treatment. In particular, the difference between player 1’s first- and second-stage action frequencies
completely disappears. We conclude that belief elicitation does have an effect on actions.
Our goal in this paper is to study the relationships between beliefs and the associated actions without our own interference as
experimenters. How does the fact that belief elicitation affects second-stage actions influence our conclusions? This depends on
what is driving the effect.
There are two channels through which belief elicitation may have an effect on the actions subjects take. It could be that (i)
elicitation affects beliefs or (ii) elicitation affects actions conditional on beliefs. If only the former “beliefs channel” is active,
only testing axioms on the belief-map would be affected since we condition on second-stage beliefs when testing axioms on the
action-map. If only the latter “actions channel” is active, only testing axioms on the action-map would be affected since we are
comparing second-stage beliefs to first-stage actions when testing axioms on the belief-map. Since we do not observe the beliefs
subjects had in the first stage, there is no way of knowing definitively the degree to which either channel is active, but our previous
analysis gives insight.
From the top panels of Appendix Figure 2.21, the direction of the change in actions due to belief elicitation is systematic. For
player 1, subjects are more likely to choose  for - > 20 and* for - < 20. For player 2, subjects are more likely to choose ' for
- > 20 and ! for - < 20. While the effect is systematic for both players, the effect for player 2 is rather small.
Suppose the elicitation effect is through the beliefs channel. In the context of our structural model, this is consistent with
increased sophistication for player 1, with f̂ [,]
*
resembling the first-stage actions of the high sophistication group in Figure
2.14. For player 2, the effect is consistent with decreased sophistication. We find this plausible for player 1 only as it is intuitive
that eliciting beliefs may induce subjects to think more deeply about opponents’ behavior.
Suppose the elicitation effect is through the actions channel. Player 2’s actions become more extreme, so it could be that belief
elicitation simply reduces the probability that player 2-subjects make mistakes or “trembles” for any given belief, which we find
very plausible. For player 1, this would have an effect in the opposite direction from that which we observe, so it may be at play,
but is overwhelmed by an effect in the opposite direction.
For player 1, we believe the beliefs channel dominates. If this is the case, prior to elicitation, player 1-subjects had beliefs closer
to the uniform distribution and thus beliefs with a more conservative bias. For player 2, we believe the actions channel dominates,
so prior to elicitation, player 2-subjects’ actions would have been noisier for any given belief. Under these interpretations, all of
our main conclusions would be unchanged.
43The results are similar if, instead, we compare the data from [A,◦] and [A,BA], but this would be somewhat
confounded by composition effects.
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If belief elicitation affects actions largely through beliefs by making subjects more sophisticated, a natural hypothesis is that
more sophisticated subjects will be less affected by belief elicitation. Since we have a measure of sophistication from the dominance
solvable games, this is easy to test. In Appendix Figure 2.22, we plot the first- and second-stage action frequencies from [A,BA] by
the sophistication groupings from Section 2.6.2. This seems to indicate that the effect of elicitation is primarily driven by subjects
with low sophistication, and this is confirmed in Appendix Table 2.14.













Notes: The top panels plot first-stage and second-stage actions from [A,BA], and shows a systematic difference
between the two stages. The bottom panels plot first-stage and second-stage actions from [A,A], and shows no
difference between the stages.
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Table 2.13: Effects of belief elicitation
[A,BA] [A,A]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
f̂* f̂! f̂* f̂!
2nd stage × X80 -0.119∗∗ -0.057 0.048 -0.022
(0.030) (0.156) (0.500) (0.754)
2nd stage × X40 -0.019 -0.059 0.007 0.048
(0.748) (0.111) (0.884) (0.362)
2nd stage × X10 0.130∗∗ 0.105∗∗ -0.056 -0.081
(0.013) (0.031) (0.438) (0.266)
2nd stage × X5 0.194∗∗∗ 0.007 0.019 0.130∗
(0.000) (0.850) (0.746) (0.070)
2nd stage × X2 0.070 0.091∗∗ 0.011 0.000
(0.202) (0.040) (0.867) (1.000)
2nd stage × X1 0.124∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.015 0.000
(0.037) (0.016) (0.803) (1.000)
-test 5.12∗∗∗ 3.24∗∗∗ 0.21 0.92
(0.000) (0.004) (0.972) (0.485)
[d1,d2] [6,323] [6,335] [6,161] [6,161]
Observations 2592 2676 1134 1134
p-values in parentheses
∗ ? < .1, ∗∗ ? < .05, ∗∗∗ ? < .01
Notes: We regress actions on indicators for all six --games (omitted) and indicators for each of the six games
interacted with an indicator for the second stage. Columns 1-2 are for [A,BA], and columns 3-4 are for [A,A]. We also
report the results of -tests of the hypothesis that all six coefficients are zero. Standard errors are clustered at the
subject-game level.
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Table 2.14: Effects of belief elicitation by sophistication group
Low Sophistication High Sophistication
(1) (2) (3) (4)
f̂* f̂! f̂* f̂!
2nd stage × X80 -0.136 -0.089∗ -0.100 -0.025
(0.121) (0.092) (0.120) (0.679)
2nd stage × X40 -0.011 -0.064 -0.027 -0.054
(0.907) (0.301) (0.696) (0.188)
2nd stage × X10 0.207∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.046 0.046
(0.003) (0.009) (0.543) (0.531)
2nd stage × X5 0.211∗∗∗ 0.068 0.177∗∗ -0.054
(0.005) (0.289) (0.020) (0.152)
2nd stage × X2 0.129∗ 0.096∗ 0.008 0.086
(0.069) (0.097) (0.928) (0.204)
2nd stage × X1 0.157∗∗ 0.061 0.088 0.143∗∗
(0.045) (0.280) (0.325) (0.022)
-test 4.50∗∗∗ 2.69∗∗ 1.58 1.89∗
(0.000) (0.016) (0.157) (0.086)
[d1,d2] [6,323] [6,167] [6,155] [6,167]
Observations 1176 1176 1092 1176
p-values in parentheses
∗ ? < .1, ∗∗ ? < .05, ∗∗∗ ? < .01
Notes: For high and low sophistication groups and for each player, we regress actions from both stages of [A,BA] on
indicators for all six --games (omitted) and indicators for each of the six games interacted with an indicator for the
second stage. Columns 1-2 are for the high sophistication group, and columns 3-4 are for the low sophistication group.




Figure 2.23: Screenshots from first stage
Notes: This figure shows an example round from the perspective of a player 1-subject (blue). At the start of the round,
the subject sees the payoff matrix (left screen), and a 10 second timer counting down to 0 (not shown here) is seen at
the bottom right corner of the screen. After 10 seconds pass, the text “Please click to select between U and D:” darkens
(middle screen) indicating that the subject may take an action. To select an action, the subject clicks on a row of the
matrix. The row becomes highlighted and a ’Submit’ button appears (right screen). At this point, the subject may freely
modify his answer before submitting. The subject may undo his action choice by clicking again on the highlighted row.
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Figure 2.24: Screenshots from second stage of [A,BA]
Notes: This figure shows an example round from the perspective of a player 1-subject (blue). At the start of the round,
the subject sees the payoff matrix (top-left screen) and is told “The computer has randomly selected a round of Section
1 in which the below matrix was played.” After 10 seconds pass, the text “What do you believe is the probability that a
randomly selected red player chose L in that round?” darkens (top-right screen) indicating that the subject may state a
belief. The subject enters a belief as a whole number between 0 and 100. Once the belief is entered, the corresponding
probabilities appear below the matrix and the text “The computer has randomly selected a red player and recorded their
action from that round. Please click to select between U and D:” darkens (bottom-left screen) indicating that the subject
may take an action. Only after stating a belief may the subject select an action, but after the belief is stated, the subject
may freely modify both his belief and action before submitting. After a belief is entered and an action is selected, the
‘Submit’ button appears (bottom-right screen).
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Figure 2.25: Screenshots from second stage of [A,A]
Notes: The first stage [A,A] is identical to that of the [A,BA]. The second stage of the [A,A] is the same as that of
[A,BA], except beliefs are not elicited.
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2.11.6 Additional Figures
Figure 2.26: QNBE and the data
Notes: The green dot gives the empirical action frequencies from [A, ◦ ], the red square gives the median belief, and the
black diamond is the Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 2.27: Subjects’ rates of best response
Notes: This figure gives histograms of subjects’ rates of best response across all --games. The solid lines are averages,
and the dashed lines in the bottom panel mark the average rate of best response from [32].
153








Notes: We plot the predicted values (with 90% error bands) from restricted cubic spline regressions of actions on
beliefs (4 knots at belief quintiles, std. errors clustered by subject) superimposed over belief histograms. The vertical
dashed line is the indifferent belief, and the horizontal line is set to one-half.
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Notes: For player 1 and each of the --games, we plot the predicted values (with 90% error bands) from restricted cubic
spline regressions of actions on beliefs (4 knots at belief quintiles, standard errors clustered by subject). Belief





, and the horizontal
line is set to one-half. The solid vertical line is the indifferent belief with concave utility that is estimated from fitting a
single curvature parameter to all player 1-subjects’ data.
Figure 2.30: Average time to form beliefs by game and player
Notes: We plot the average time until stated beliefs are finalized by game and player role.
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Notes: The left panel is for player 2’s beliefs about*, and the right panel is for player 1’s beliefs about !. The colored
histogram is for the high sophistication group, and the white histogram is for the low sophistication group. Mean
beliefs are given as colored and black lines, for high and low sophistication, respectively.
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2.11.7 Additional Tables
Table 2.15: Rates of best response
Player 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
X80 X40 X10 X5 X2 X1 all
best response rate 0.741∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗ 0.544 0.544 0.639∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.356) (0.414) (0.000)
Observations 270 270 270 270 270 270 1620
p-values in parentheses
∗ ? < .1, ∗∗ ? < .05, ∗∗∗ ? < .01
Player 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
X80 X40 X10 X5 X2 X1 all
best response rate 0.836∗∗∗ 0.857∗∗∗ 0.854∗∗∗ 0.836∗∗∗ 0.854∗∗∗ 0.857∗∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 280 280 280 280 280 280 1680
p-values in parentheses
∗ ? < .1, ∗∗ ? < .05, ∗∗∗ ? < .01
Notes: This table reports the average rates of best response by player and game. Significance is based on a two-sided
C-test of the null hypothesis that the rate of best response is one-half. Standard errors are clustered by subject.
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Table 2.16: Additional games
X80s X80s
D1 L R D2 L R
U 0 20 U 0 20
6 0 20 4
D 20 4 D 6 8








R1 L R R2 L R
U 0 20 U 0 20
5 0 5 0
D 10 0 D 40 0
0 20 0 20
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Table 2.17: Fixed effect regressions of actions on beliefs–player 2, pooled across games
(1) (2)
quintile equally spaced
very low beliefs -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.004)
low beliefs -0.005∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010)
medium beliefs -0.006∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002)
high beliefs -0.009∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000)




∗ ? < .1, ∗∗ ? < .05, ∗∗∗ ? < .01
Notes: For player 2, we pool together the data from all six games. In column 1, we divide the individual belief
statements into quintiles–very low, low, medium, high, and very high beliefs. For each belief quintile, we run a separate
linear regression of actions on beliefs that are both first demeaned by subtracting subject-specific averages. In column 2,
we do the same thing, except the five belief groups are based on evenly spaced bins of 20 belief points. Standard errors
are clustered by subject.
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Table 2.18: Bias in beliefs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
X80 X40 X10 X5 X2 X1
med(f̂∗
*
) - f̂* 30.000∗∗∗ 27.025∗∗∗ -18.235∗∗∗ -19.506∗∗∗ -30.124∗∗∗ -21.482∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 442 442 442 442 442 442
med(f̂∗
!
) - f̂! -6.506∗ 7.199∗ -0.663 -4.086 -4.096 -0.096
(0.079) (0.050) (0.418) (0.345) (0.172) (0.433)
Observations 436 436 436 436 436 436
p-values in parentheses
∗ ? < .1, ∗∗ ? < .05, ∗∗∗ ? < .01
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
X80 X40 X10 X5 X2 X1
mean(f̂∗
*
) - f̂* 25.511∗∗∗ 26.021∗∗∗ -16.938∗∗∗ -16.531∗∗∗ -22.027∗∗∗ -16.253∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 442 442 442 442 442 442
mean(f̂∗
!
) - f̂! 2.146 10.321∗∗ -7.303 -12.615∗∗∗ -10.441∗∗ -9.670∗∗
(0.675) (0.027) (0.148) (0.010) (0.035) (0.049)
Observations 436 436 436 436 436 436
p-values in parentheses
∗ ? < .1, ∗∗ ? < .05, ∗∗∗ ? < .01
Notes: This table reports, for each player and game, the empirical bias in beliefs as measured by the difference between
the median or mean belief statement and the empirical action frequency (expressed as percentages). In both cases, we
report the ?-values from two-sided tests of the null hypothesis that beliefs are unbiased. When using the median,
?-values are bootstrapped in a way so as to preserve the within-subject correlation observed in the data. When using the
mean, we use standard C-tests, clustering by subject.
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Table 2.19: The sophistication gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
V̂(k≥2) V̂(k≥2) V̂(k≥2) V̂(k≥2) V̂(k≥2) V̂(k≥2)
Player 1 22.465∗∗∗ 20.054∗∗∗ 20.626∗∗∗ 24.797∗∗∗ 22.461∗∗∗ 21.743∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Response time 0.729∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 0.828∗∗∗ 0.857∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
V̂(k≥1) 0.286∗∗ 0.345∗∗
(0.048) (0.038)
Constant 33.887∗∗∗ 17.841∗∗∗ -6.973 33.150∗∗∗ 15.275∗∗ -14.987
(0.000) (0.004) (0.614) (0.000) (0.023) (0.343)
Observations 110 110 110 93 93 93
p-values in parentheses
∗ ? < .1, ∗∗ ? < .05, ∗∗∗ ? < .01
Notes: In column 1, we regress V̂(: ≥ 2) on an indicator for player 1. Column 2 controls for subject-average response
time on the three rounds of 8 (since sophistication is measured entirely with beliefs data, we use the time until stated
beliefs are finalized). Column 3 additionally controls for V̂(: ≥ 1). Columns 4-6 are the same, except we first drop
subjects who ever took a dominated action in 8 throughout the experiment.
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Table 2.20: Sophistication and behavior
Player 1 Player 2







High soph. × X80 -20.172∗∗∗ -0.297∗∗∗ -12.607∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (1.000)
High soph. × X40 -14.359∗∗∗ -0.304∗∗∗ -11.636∗∗∗ 0.125
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.199)
High soph. × X10 10.107∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 7.321∗∗ -0.018
(0.032) (0.001) (0.041) (0.871)
High soph. × X5 15.687∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 5.836 0.107
(0.001) (0.005) (0.124) (0.254)
High soph. × X2 18.808∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 4.607 0.018
(0.000) (0.003) (0.239) (0.857)
High soph. × X1 17.975∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗ 2.371 -0.018
(0.001) (0.025) (0.529) (0.856)
-test 11.91∗∗∗ 8.53∗∗∗ 5.85∗∗∗ 0.51
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.801)
[d1,d2] [6,323] [6,323] [6,335] [6,335]
Observations 3240 648 3360 672
p-values in parentheses
∗ ? < .1, ∗∗ ? < .05, ∗∗∗ ? < .01
Notes: We regress beliefs or actions on indicators for all six --games (omitted) and indicators for each of the six games
interacted with an indicator for the high sophistication group. Columns 1-2 use player 1-subjects and columns 3-4 use
player 2-subjects. We also report the results of -tests of the hypothesis that all six coefficients are zero. Standard
errors are clustered at the subject-game level.
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Chapter 3: Endogenous Quantal Response Equilibrium
3.1 Introduction
In games played in the laboratory, the empirical frequencies of actions deviate systematically
from the predictions of Nash equilibrium. Quantal response equilibrium (QRE) ([1]), which extends
Nash equilibrium by allowing players to make probabilistic mistakes in choosing optimal strategies,
has had considerable success in explaining these deviations ([11]).
QRE is defined for any finite normal form game Γ = {#, , D} where # = {1, ..., =} is the set
of players,  is the action space, and D is the payoff function. Player 8’s pure actions are denoted
8 = {081, ..., 08 (8)} with  = 1 × ... × =. Let Δ8 be the set of probability measures on 8 and
let Δ = Δ1 × ... ×Δ= be the set of probability measures on  with ? = (?1, ..., ?=) an arbitrary
element. For simplicity, let ?8 9 = ?8 (08 9 ). Payoffs are given by D8 (08, 0−8) : 8 × 9≠8  9 → R. In
the usual way, extend payoffs to the probability domain via D8 (?) =
∑
0∈ ?(0)D8 (0). In addition
to these standard objects, we follow the QRE literature in defining D̄8 9 (?−8) = D8 (08 9 , ?−8) and
D̄8 (?−8) = (D̄81(?−8), ..., D̄8 (8) (?−8)) ∈ R (8) for every ?−8 ∈ × 9≠8Δ 9 . These are the expected
payoffs to each action given opponents’ behavior.





−8), player 8 makes probabilistic mistakes in best responding. In applications, it is common
to assume logit responses in which player 8 takes action 9 with probability





where the parameter _ ∈ [0,∞) is exogenous and controls the degree of mistakes. _ = 0 implies
uniformly mixing over all actions independently of payoffs, and, as _ → ∞, the probability of
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taking (one of) the highest payoff action(s) approaches one.
A logit QRE or LQRE is obtained when the distribution over all players’ actions is consistent
with logit responses.
8. Fix {Γ, _}. An LQRE is any ? ∈ Δ such that for all 8 ∈ 1, ..., = and all 9 ∈ 1, ...,  (8),
?8 9 = &8 9 (D̄8 (?−8);_).
The parameter _ is usually interpreted as a reduced-form summary of “rationality” or “skill”,
and each value of _ corresponds to different LQRE predictions. In common practice, the best-fit _
is estimated from data via likelihood methods, and the resulting prediction is compared to that of
other models.
Another interpretation is that _ is the precision with which players calculate or perceive the
expected utility to each action.1 Under this interpretation, it is natural to consider an alternative
model in which _ is an endogenous choice variable. The idea is that the process of evaluating
payoffs is inherently stochastic, and errors in evaluating payoffs lead to costly mistakes. The agent
may reduce the degree of mistakes by increasing precision, but doing so is psychologically costly.
She therefore chooses precision optimally to balance these tradeoffs.
Following this motivation, we introduce endogenous quantal response equilibrium (EQRE) in
which each player 8 chooses _∗
8
(E8; \) optimally subject to costs, where E8 is 8’s vector of expected
utilities (determined in equilibrium) and \ is a parameter of the cost function. EQRE applies
this process to games via two stages. In the first stage, each player 8 chooses _∗
8
. In the second
stage, players’ behavior is given by logit responses. In equilibrium, the first-stage choice of _∗
8
is a
best response to others’ (second-stage) behavior, and the distribution of second-stage actions is a
heterogeneous LQRE given the endogenous precision profile (_∗1, ..., _
∗
=).
1Suppose {Y8: }:=1,..., (8) are independent type I extreme value-distributed “error terms” with parameter _ ∈ (0,∞).
The variance of Y8: is given by c
2
6_2 , a strictly decreasing function of _, and so we interpret _ ∈ (0,∞) as the precision





[64]) and so (3.1) results from choosing the action that maximizes the sum of expected payoff and random error.





 (8) . Hence, we allow for _ = 0 to
represent “zero precision”.
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EQRE is defined for a given cost function 2, which is further scaled by \ ∈ (0,∞), a positive
parameter analogous to LQRE-_. We think of the scaled cost function as reflecting the cognitive
processes in the brain that are involved in evaluating payoffs, and so it is specified exogenously
and assumed to be the same for all players. However, since the benefit to precision depends on
the payoffs one faces, each player 8 will generically choose a different _∗
8
in equilibrium. Hence,
EQRE provides a theory not only of how _ depends on the game, but also on the heterogeneity of
_∗
8
s within a game.2 Since LQRE assumes homogeneity, the models’ predictions are generically
distinct.
We prove existence of equilibria, provide conditions for the equilibrium to be unique, and show
other basic properties such as that the limit points (as cost parameter \ → 0) are Nash equilibria.
We also construct a sequence of cost functions {2: } for which the :th EQRE set (with 2: fixed and
elements indexed by \ ∈ (0,∞)) approaches the LQRE set (with elements indexed by _ ∈ [0,∞)).
Hence, EQRE nests LQRE as a limiting case, a result reminiscent of those obtained by [54].3
We establish that endogenous quantal response satisfies a modified version of the regularity
axioms ([2]). This suggests that EQRE might behave similarly to LQRE in individual games,
and yet we show that there are systematic deviations from the LQRE predictions related to the
endogenous heterogeneity of _∗
8
s.
In the case where each player has only two actions, we have a tight characterization of each
agent’s stochastic choice. This allows us to establish that, just like for LQRE, the EQRE graph4 has
a manifold structure that can be used to select a unique Nash equilibrium.
We apply our results to generalized matching pennies, in which we provide a nearly full
characterization of EQRE. We show that, for any given cost function 2, the EQRE set (i.e. indexed
by \) is a curve in the unit square that crosses the LQRE set (i.e. indexed by _) at finite points
2In an EQRE, the nature of heterogeneity is novel in that it is determined endogenously across players who are
endowed with the same cost function. [8] and [54] study QRE-type models in which players draw their _-type from a
distribution. In these models, heterogeneity is not across players, but across a population of subjects, and the distribution
of _s is exogenous. Similarly, one could extend EQRE to allow for distribution of \s in the population, but we do not
pursue that here.
3They introduce Truncated QRE (TQRE), in which players have “downward looking” beliefs about other players’
precision. TQRE nests cognitive hierarchy ([22]) and LQRE as limiting cases.
4The EQRE graph is the graph of the correspondence which associates equilibria to every \ ∈ (0,∞).
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that we give explicitly as the solution to a system of linear equations. Importantly, these points of
crossing, and hence the qualitative shape of the EQRE set, does not depend on the cost function.
Furthermore, we provide bounds on the set of all possible EQRE (i.e. for any cost function), and
these typically exclude a large measure of possible datasets, including a large measure of regular
QRE outcomes.
There are several difficulties in the analysis of EQRE. First, there is no closed form for optimal
precision _∗
8
. Second, the optimal precision may not be unique, and hence equilibria may require
that players mix over different levels of precision. We overcome these obstacles by establishing
sufficient conditions for optimal precision to be unique and using implicit methods to analyze it.
This paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of this section, we discuss related literature.
Section 3.2 gives the EQRE model. Section 3.3 shows how EQRE nests LQRE as a limiting case.
Section 3.4 specializes EQRE to the case of binary actions, compares endogenous to exogenous
quantal response, and gives the equilibrium selection result. Section 3.5 applies our results to
generalized matching pennies, and Section 3.6 concludes. All proofs are found in Appendix 3.7.2.
Related literature
Endogenizing _. Several papers suggest to endogenize _, either along the lines pursued here or
through a theory of how _ evolves as players gain experience. These include the original 1995 paper
as well as other early contributions (e.g. [65] and [8]). [17] were the first to propose a formal theory
of endogenous _, and the concept of EQRE is identical to their “endogenous rationality equilibrium.”
However, [17] do not study implications of the model other than through numerical approximation.
Our contribution is to study the model’s predictions theoretically, which we compare to those of
LQRE. To obtain these results, we develop an approach based on implicit methods.
Control costs and inattention. In EQRE, we think of the equilibrium expected payoffs as being
objective and deterministic. An agent’s process of evaluating these payoffs is inherently stochastic,
but she may incur psychological costs to make more precise judgements. Optimal precision will
depend on the payoffs to each action and the precision technology (cost function). Such an idea is
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most related to the literature on control costs, which models mistakes as resulting from trembles
that can be reduced through costly effort. Both [29] and [30] derive the multinomial logit from such
an optimization, and [66] provides some results for the stochastic choice of an agent who chooses
logit precision optimally. This approach can be contrasted with the literature on rational inattention
in games, such as [67], [68], and [69], in which stochastic choice is driven by learning about some
unknown, random state.
Tractability. A common critique of QRE models is that the defining fixed-point equations
can typically only be solved numerically. This applies to both EQRE and LQRE which involve
non-polynomial (“transcendental”) equations. Nevertheless, for simple cases of empirical relevance,
we are able to characterize EQRE rather well by putting tight bounds on the set of EQRE that can
be attained for any cost function. This approach is reminiscent of recent work by [57] and [58] that
introduce set-valued solution concepts that “envelope” the set of regular QRE and circumvent the
need to solve for fixed points at all. Finally, even without closed form solutions, since EQRE and
LQRE share a similar structure, we are able to make precise statements about their relationship.
3.2 Endogenous quantal response equilibrium
In an endogenous quantal response equilibrium (EQRE), _ is no longer exogenous. Each player
8 chooses precision _∗
8
(or a distribution over different _∗
8
s) optimally subject to costs in a first stage,
taking as given the opponents’ second-stage behavior. In equilibrium, the distribution of second-
stage actions is a heterogeneous LQRE given the endogenously determined vector _∗ = (_∗1, ..., _
∗
=).
We begin by analyzing the first-stage optimal precision choice problem of such an agent, holding
fixed opponents’ behavior, which only enters the problem via the expected utilities they induce.
Hence, given E8 ∈ R (8) and cost parameter \ ∈ (0,∞), player 8 solves:








where we defined 1 as the benefit function, and 2 is an exogenously specified cost function which is
scaled by \. The agent’s problem is thus to choose precision optimally by weighing the benefits and
costs.
The cost function 2 : [0,∞) → [0,∞) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing,
and strictly convex. Specifically, we require 2(0) = 0, ;8<
_→∞
2(_) = ∞, 2′+(0) = 0,5 and 2
′′ (_) > 0
for _ > 0. In other words, we require that zero precision is costless, infinite precision is infinitely
costly, and that the marginal cost of precision starts at zero and is strictly increasing. For example,
2 could be a power function: 2(_) = _: for : > 1.6 For most of the paper, we think of the cost
function as held fixed, though for some later results we consider the predictions obtained in the
limit by a sequence of cost functions or the set of predictions obtainable for some cost function.
We also defined 1(E8; ·) : [0,∞) → [0,∞) as the benefit function for convenience. This is
merely player 8’s overall expected utility given the expected utility to each of her actions and her
second-stage quantal response, both of which depend on E8.
There is a complication in the interpretation of the first-stage problem. The premise is that the
agent will perceive E8 with error in the second stage and yet it seems that the first-stage objective
depends on a noiseless perception of E8. However, the first-stage agent does not actually need to
know E8 perfectly in order to write down the objective function. It is enough to know the values of
the components of E8 = (E81, ..., E8 (8)) without their labels (i.e. without knowing the corresponding
actions).7 Hence, we think of the first-stage agent as only understanding the “stakes” involved in
the game (perhaps from past experience facing similar problems) and the second-stage agent as
evaluating specific payoffs given the pre-selected precision.
When E8 9 = E8: ≡ a for all 9 , : , then 1(E8;_) = a, the constant function that assigns utility a for




+ (0) = 0 is a technical assumption which implies that the agent chooses positive precision if the marginal benefit
to precision is positive at 0, and this is always the case unless all actions have the same payoff.
6Note that we allow for 2
′′
+ (0) = 0 or 2
′′
+ (_) = ∞ so that 2(_) = _: for any : > 1 is admissible.
7Since &8 is exchangeable in the sense that &8 9 (E8;_) = &8: (E
′
8
;_) if E8 9 = E
′
8:
and E8; = E
′
8 ] (;) where ] :
{1, ...,  (8)} → {1, ...,  (8)} is a permutation, the first-stage objective would be the same if the labels of the components
of E8 were changed.
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1. 1(E8; 0) = 1 (8)
∑





2. For all _ ∈ [0,∞), m1(E8 ;_)
m_
∈ (0, I1) and m
21(E8 ;_)
m_2









= 0, and m
21(E8 ;_)
m_2
< 0 for sufficiently high _.
These are intuitive. Property 1: when _ = 0, the agent uniformly randomizes, so expects to
receive the unweighted average utility. As _→∞, the agent takes (one of) the best action(s) with
probability approaching one, which implies a natural bound on the benefit of precision. Property
2: increasing _ will always lead to better decisions, even on the margin when _ = 0, so the first
derivative is positive. Unsurprisingly, it is also bounded. The second derivative is bounded, but it
cannot be signed in general, which we will return to as it complicates the analysis. Property 3: We
establish some limiting behaviors for the first two derivatives, which are unsurprising given that 1 is
strictly increasing and bounded.
A solution to the first-stage problem exists. If E8 9 = E8: ≡ a for all 9 , : , then the solution is
trivial: _∗
8
= 0, which results in uniformly random behavior. Otherwise, any solution is strictly
greater than 0 and satisfies a first-order condition. This is summarized in Theorem 6, along with
basic properties of _∗
8
that follow from properties of 1 and assumptions on 2.
6.
(i) A solution to the optimal precision choice problem (3.2) exists (_∗
8
(E8; \) ≠ ∅), and if _ ∈ _∗8 (E8; \)















− \2′ (_) = 0. (3.3)
(ii) If E8 9 ≠ E8: for some 9 , : , any optimal precision is greater than 0 and is strictly decreasing in \:
1. 8= 5 {_∗
8
(E8; \)} > 0.
2. 8= 5 {_∗
8









(E8; \)}) = 0.
As mentioned, the benefit function 1(E8; ·) fails to be concave for some E8, which is to say that
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the marginal benefit to _ may actually increase over portions of the domain. An example of this
can be found in Section 5.1 of [66]. For this reason, _∗
8
(E8; \) is not a singleton in general (hence
the use of inf and sup). Fortunately, _∗
8
(E8; \) is still well-behaved in the following sense, which
follows from standard arguments.
2. Correspondence _∗
8
: R (8) × (0,∞) ⇒ [0,∞) is upper hemi-continuous.
_∗
8
is upper hemi-continuous, and not simply continuous, because _∗
8
(E8; \) may not be a
singleton. The next lemma establishes that _∗
8
(E8; \) is a singleton, however, for both sufficiently
low and sufficiently high \. The result is proved by establishing that, for extreme \, the solution to
the first-stage problem is in a region where the objective is locally concave.
3. For all E8 ∈ R (8) , _∗8 (E8; \) is a singleton for sufficiently low and high \.
In general, equilibria may involve mixing over _ ∈ _∗
8
(·; \). Hence, we define optimal mixed
precision by f∗
8
(E8; \) ≡ {f8 ∈ Δ [0,∞) : BD??(f8) ⊂ _∗8 (E8; \)} to be any distribution over optimal
selections, which is also clearly optimal. Finally, the endogenous quantal response correspondence
&∗
8
(·; \) : R (8) ⇒ Δ8 is defined by
&∗8 (E8; \) ≡ {
∫ ∞
0
&8 (E8;_)3f8 (_) |f8 ∈ f∗8 (E8; \)} (3.4)
= >=E{)8 (E8; \)}
where )8 (E8; \) = {&8 (E8;_) |_ ∈ _∗8 (E8; \)} is the set of action frequencies from any optimal pure





(E8; \) represents an
action frequency induced by some optimal (possibly mixed) precision and satisfies ?
′
8 9





Defining &∗ = (&∗1, ..., &
∗
=) (suppressing \ in the notation), equilibrium is defined analogously
to Definition 8 as a fixed point of the composite correspondence &∗ ◦ D̄ : Δ⇒ Δ.
9. Fix {Γ, \}. An EQRE is any ? ∈ Δ such that for all 8 ∈ 1, ..., = and all 9 ∈ 1, ...,  (8),
?8 ∈ &∗8 (D̄8 (?−8); \).
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(·; \) ∈ Δ8 is non-empty.
2. &∗
8
(·; \) is convex-valued and upper hemi-continuous on R (8) .
3. For all 8 and 9 , : = 1, ...,  (8)
E8 9 > E8: =⇒ ?
′
8 9 > ?
′
8: for any ?
′
8 ∈ &∗8 (E8; \).





> 0 if E8 9 = <0G: {E8: }.
Properties 1-3 are immediate from properties of &8 and _∗8 , and Property 4 is established in
Appendix 3.7.4. Properties 3 and 4 are modified versions of the regularity axioms ([2]). Property
3 is an extension of monotonicity that allows for multi-valued quantal response: for any selection
from &∗
8
, higher payoff actions are played more often. Property 4 is a weak form of responsiveness.
Whereas responsiveness requires that an all-else-equal increase in the payoff to any one action
increases the probability it is played, we have only been able to show Property 4, which is weaker
in two ways. First, it only holds for extreme \, which is required to ensure that &∗
8
is single-valued






> 0 if E8 9 = <0G: {E8: }.8 The first two properties of &∗8 imply existence (by
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem).
7. Fix {Γ, \}. There exists an EQRE.
3.3 Limiting relationships to Nash equilibrium and LQRE
EQRE is distinct from Nash equilibrium and LQRE. However, by taking suitable limits of the
cost function, there are limiting relationships to these concepts.
Analogous to the LQRE correspondence ?∗
!
: (0,∞) ⇒ Δ defined by ?∗
!
(_) =
8An increase in some E8 9 may increase or decrease _∗8 . Our result relies on showing that, when E8 9 = <0G: {E8: }, an
increase in E8 9 increases the product _∗8 E8 9 which implies an increase in&
∗
8 9
if E8 9 = <0G: {E8: }. When E8 9 ≠ <0G: {E8: },
an increase in _∗
8
E8 9 does not imply an increase in &∗8 9 .
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{? ∈ Δ : ?8 = &8 (D̄8 (?−8);_) ∀8} ([1]), we define the EQRE correspondences ?∗ : (0,∞) ⇒ Δ
and Λ∗ : (0,∞) ⇒ [0,∞)= by
?∗ (\) =
{





_∗1(D̄1(?−1); \), ..., _
∗
= (D̄= (?−=); \) ⊂ [0,∞)= : ? ∈ ?∗ (\)
}
.
8. Let {\1, \2, ...} be a sequence such that ;8<
C→∞
\C = 0. Let {?1, ?2, ...} and






C), ..., _∗= (D̄= (?C−=); \C)) ∈ Λ∗(\C) for all C such that ;8<
C→∞
?C = ?∗∗. Without loss,
assume that _C
8
is a singleton for all 8 and C.9 Then (i) ?∗∗ is a Nash equilibrium, and (ii) for all
players 8 such that ?∗∗
8 9
≠ 1




Part (i) of Theorem 8 is analogous to a classic result for LQRE, which states that any limit
point as costs go to zero are Nash equilibria. In Section 3.4.2, we extend the result to a theory of
equilibrium selection for the case that each player has exactly two actions.
Part (ii) is interesting because it gives a non-obvious relationship between a Nash equilibrium of a
game and the limiting behavior of the optimal precision required to approach it. It is unsurprising that
_C
8
→∞ as \ → 0 when the limiting Nash equilibrium ?∗∗ is such that<0G 9 : {D̄8 9 (?∗∗−8)−D̄8: (?∗∗−8)} >
0 since the marginal benefit to precision is positive as the marginal costs go to 0. Interestingly, the
result also holds when <0G 9 : {D̄8 9 (?∗∗−8) − D̄8: (?∗∗−8)} = 0 as long as ?∗∗8 9 ≠
1
 (8) for all 9 , i.e. that 8 is
not uniformly mixing over all of her pure actions. The result is non-obvious because in this case
both the marginal cost to precision and the marginal benefit go to 0, so it seems there may be an
indeterminacy, but the condition that resolves it is related to the Nash strategy of player 8.
To obtain limiting relationships between EQRE and LQRE, we formally define sets of equilibria.
The LQRE set L(Γ) = {?∗
!
(_) ∈ Δ : _ ∈ [0,∞)} is the set of LQRE that are attainable for some
9Since this result is only concerned with the limit as \ → 0, take a strictly decreasing sequence {\C } with \1




(D̄8 (?C−8); \C ) is a singleton by Lemma 3.
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_. An EQRE set
E(Γ; 2) = {?∗ (\) ∈ Δ : \ ∈ (0,∞)} (3.5)
is defined for a given cost function 2 and gives the set of EQRE attainable for some \. An EQRE
set typically depends on the choice of cost function, which we emphasize in the notation.
Our next result shows that there exists a sequence of cost functions for which the EQRE set
approaches the LQRE set (in the sense that every LQRE is nearby some EQRE), and hence EQRE
nests LQRE as a limiting case. Specifically, we use the family of power cost functions 2(_) = _:
for : > 1 and consider the limiting EQRE sets as : →∞.
9. Fix game Γ. As : →∞, the EQRE set E(Γ;_: ) approaches the LQRE set L(Γ) in the sense that,
for any n > 0, there exists  such that for all : >  : for all ?! ∈ L(Γ), there exists ? ∈ E(Γ;_: )
such that ‖?! − ? ‖ < n .
The intuition is simple. Any _̃ is associated with a particular LQRE. As : →∞, we construct a
:-sequence of cost parameters {\: (_̃)} such that the marginal cost function \: (_̃):_:−1 approaches
a step function that is vertical at _̃ and thus crosses all players’ marginal benefit functions 1
′ (E8;_)
at approximately _̃ (independent of E8). By construction, for sufficiently large : , _∗8 ≈ _̃ for all
players 8, and so the endogenous heterogeneity of _∗
8
s which differentiates EQRE from LQRE
effectively disappears as : →∞.
Beyond the use of power cost functions in Theorem 9, there is another reason to consider power
costs in applied work. It is well-known that the logit quantal response function (3.1) satisfies
&8 (E8;_) = &8 (VE8; 1V_) for any scale factor V > 0. Hence, scaling a game’s utility payoffs by
some arbitrary V > 0 will leave the LQRE set unchanged. Given some data, this V-scaling will




_̂, but will not affect the resulting prediction. That
the predictions do not depend on such arbitrariness has normative appeal and is obviously important
for applications.
In Appendix 3.7.3, we show that, under power costs 2(:) = _: , endogenous quantal response
(3.4) satisfies a similar property: &∗
8
(E8; \) = &∗8 (VE8; V:+1\). Hence, scaling a game’s utility
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payoffs by some V > 0 will not affect the EQRE set. The best-fit parameter would go from \̂ to
\̂
′
= V:+1\̂, but the resulting prediction would be unaffected. For general cost functions, the EQRE
set may be affected by V-scalings, so we favor power costs for applications.
3.4 Binary actions
In this section, we specialize to the class of binary-action games in which each player has two
actions. Games in this class are widely used in experiments, covering 2 × 2 games, various voting
type games, and more. The theory could also be extended to an endogenous agent QRE (AQRE)
([9]) and used to analyze extensive form games in which there are two actions at every node, such as
the centipede game. Importantly for our purposes, with binary actions it is much easier to analyze
the solution to the first-stage problem (3.2), from which we derive a much tighter characterization
of stochastic choice.







, where ΔE8 9 : = E8 9 − E8: is the signed payoff
difference. Using this expression, the benefit function becomes
∑2
:=1&8: (E8;_)E8: = ΔE8 4
_ΔE8
1+4_ΔE8 +
<8={E81, E82}, where ΔE8 ≡ |ΔE8 9 : | ∈ [0,∞) is the absolute payoff difference. We can now rewrite
(3.2) as




1 + 4_ΔE8︸          ︷︷          ︸
≡1(ΔE8 ;_)
−\2(_), (3.6)
in which we defined the net benefit function 1(ΔE8; ·) for this case. Inspection reveals that it is
simply the probability of taking the better action times the net benefit of doing so. When ΔE8 = 0,
1(ΔE8;_) = 0 for all _. When ΔE8 > 0, 1(ΔE8; ·) satisfies:










3. For all _ ∈ [0,∞), m1(ΔE8 ;_)
m_
∈ (0, I1) and m
21(ΔE8 ;_)
m_2
∈ (−I2, 0) for some I1, I2 ∈ R++.
For the most part, these properties are intuitive specializations of the more general properties
from the previous section. Unlike in the general case, however, property 3 states that 1(ΔE8; ·), and
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thus the first-stage objective (3.6), is strictly concave.10 Due to this fact, _∗
8




(0; \) = 0 and _∗
8
(ΔE8; \) > 0 for ΔE8 > 0.
2. _∗
8









(ΔE8; \) = 0 if ΔE8 > 0.
Since single-valued upper hemi-continuous correspondences are continuous functions, we have
the following lemma as a direct corollary of Lemma 2.
4. _∗
8
: [0,∞) × (0,∞) → [0,∞) is continuous.
From Lemma 4, it follows that the binary-action analogue of the endogenous quantal response
correspondence (3.4) is a continuous function &∗
8 9
(·; \) : R2 → (0, 1) defined by





1 + 4_∗8 (ΔE8 ;\)ΔE8 9:
For reference, we give the equilibrium definition for the binary-action case. Note that single-
valuedness of _∗
8
implies that all equilibria are pure in the sense that it is never optimal to mix over
different _∗
8
s. Existence follows from Theorem 7 (or directly by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem).









(·; \) ∈ Δ is non-empty.
2. &∗
8
(·; \) is continuous and differentiable on R2.
3. For all 8 and 9 , : ∈ {1, 2}





















Properties 1-3 are immediate given the properties of general &∗
8
from the previous section and
Lemma 4. Referring to the regularity axioms ([2]), property 3 is monotonicity verbatim. Property 4





= 0 if ΔE8 = 0, whereas responsiveness requires that
this derivative be strictly positive for all ΔE8. Property 4 follows from properties of _∗8 presented in
the next subsection.
3.4.1 Exogenous versus endogenous quantal response
For the binary-action case, we compare exogenous and endogenous quantal response. For this,










1 + 4_∗8 (ΔE8 ;\)ΔE8
.
(3.7)
Note that 08 only depends on, and is strictly increasing in, the product _ΔE8. In particular, 08
is strictly increasing in ΔE8 for any _ > 0 and strictly increasing in _ for any ΔE8 > 0. Thus, to
understand quantal response, we analyze properties of _∗
8
. While there is no closed form for _∗
8
,
much can be learned via implicit methods.
10. Fix cost parameter \. Optimal precision _∗
8








(ΔE8; \) = 0.
(ii) _∗
8

























|ΔE8>Δ Ē(\) < 0.
(iv) The product _∗
8









(ΔE8; \)ΔE8 = ∞.
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(v) The product _̄(\)Δ Ē(\) equals constant ^ ≈ 2.4 for all \.11
(vi) Δ Ē(\) is strictly increasing in \, ;8<
\→0
Δ Ē(\) = 0, and ;8<
\→∞
Δ Ē(\) = ∞.
Figure 3.1: Endogenous precision for low and high costs
Notes: The left panel plots _∗
8
(·; \) as a function of ΔE8 for low costs \ and high costs \
′
> \. The peak precision _̄(\),
which obtains at Δ Ē(\), is labelled. By parts (v) and (vi) of Theorem 10, the area of rectangle [0,Δ Ē(\)] × [0, _̄(\)]
equals the area of rectangle [0,Δ Ē(\′)] × [0, _̄(\′)], but the latter rectangle is “wider”. The right panel plots the
accuracy implied by endogenous precision choice. Note how, for both values of \, peak precision implies the same
level of accuracy.
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We illustrate the theorem in the left panel of Figure 3.1, which plots _∗
8
(·; \) as a function of ΔE8.
Parts (i)-(iii) of the theorem state that _∗
8
(·; \) is hump-shaped: starting at 0 when ΔE8 = 0, strictly
increasing to its peak, and then strictly decreasing to 0 as ΔE8 → ∞. This is intuitive. The good
action is worth ΔE8 more than the bad action, so ΔE8 represents the cost of making a mistake or
equivalently the benefit of being accurate. But for any given _, the agent is better able to distinguish
the good action from the bad, and is thus more accurate, when ΔE8 is high. So when ΔE8 is very low,
the benefit of accuracy is low and the agent optimally chooses low precision and thus low accuracy;
and when ΔE8 is very high, it is so easy to distinguish the good action from the bad that the decision
maker does not need high precision for high accuracy. Part (iv) confirms this intuition, implying
that accuracy increases in ΔE8 even though _∗8 is non-monotonic in ΔE8.
Parts (v) and (vi) of Theorem 10 have no obvious implication for decision problems, though
we will use them extensively in the analysis of games. Part (v) states that _̄(\)Δ Ē(\) = ^ ≈ 2.4 for
11^ is defined as the solution to 4G (G − 2) − 2 − G = 0, an equation derived from implicit analysis of first-order
conditions.
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any scaled cost function \2. This implies that the accuracy associated with peak precision _̄(\),
which obtains at Δ Ē(\), is always 0∗
8
(Δ Ē(\); \) = 4_̄(\)Δ Ē (\)
1+4_̄(\)Δ Ē (\) =
4^
1+4^ ≈ 0.92. This invariant feature
of _∗
8
is key to proving results that hold for any cost function, and is remarkable because the overall
shape of _∗
8
is sensitive to the cost function. In particular, part (vi) states that the location of the
peak Δ Ē(\) increases in \. Geometrically, these results imply that rectangle [0,Δ Ē(\)] × [0, _̄(\)]
maintains the same area but becomes “wider” as \ increases.
In Corollary 1, we compare accuracy under exogenous and endogenous quantal response. This










(ΔE8; \) = ;8<
ΔE8→∞















(iii) If _ ∈ (0, _̄(\)), 0∗
8
(ΔE8; \) > 08 (ΔE8;_) for intermediate ΔE8 and
0∗
8
(ΔE8; \) < 08 (ΔE8;_) for extreme ΔE8.
(iv) If _ > _̄(\), 0∗
8
(ΔE8; \) < 08 (ΔE8;_) for all ΔE8.
Part (i) of the corollary states that exogenous and endogenous accuracy agree when ΔE8 = 0
and in the limit as ΔE8 →∞. Part (ii) states that both forms of accuracy are increasing in ΔE8. In
the case of endogenous accuracy, this is despite the fact that _∗
8
is non-monotonic and limits to 0.
Interestingly, while m08 (ΔE8 ;_)
mΔE8





|ΔE8=0 = 0. This is intuitive from a
comparison of _ and _∗
8
. When precision is fixed at _ > 0, an infinitesimal increase in ΔE8 from 0
to n must increase accuracy. However, when precision is endogenous, an infinitesimal increase in






Parts (iii) and (iv) simply state that, since _∗
8
is hump-shaped, exogenous accuracy for any _ > 0 is
greater than endogenous accuracy for sufficiently low or sufficiently high ΔE8 > 0. If _ and \ are
set such that _ is greater than peak precision _̄(\), than exogenous accuracy is greater for all values
of ΔE8 > 0.
12Using the quotient rule, take the derivative of (3.7) with respect to ΔE8 and evaluate the expression at ΔE8 = 0 using
that _∗
8









(E8; \) = 1{E 9≥E: }0∗8 (ΔE8; \) + 1{E 9<E: } (1 − 0∗8 (ΔE8; \)), part (ii) of Corollary 1
implies property 4 of &∗
8
from the previous subsection. Hence, &∗
8
satisfies monotonicity and a (very
slightly) modified version of responsiveness ([2]). It is well-known that these regularity axioms
impose testable restrictions on QRE. Since both EQRE and LQRE are regular, this implies that their
performance in explaining data from individual games may be very similar a priori, depending on
the game. Nevertheless, as we will show in Section 3.5, the EQRE and LQRE sets may be very
different.
3.4.2 Equilibrium selection
The next theorem establishes several properties of the equilibrium correspondence in the binary-
action case, and is analogous to the well-known equilibrium selection result for LQRE. Like the
classic theorem, it is proved using results from differential topology, though the proof differs at
several steps.
11. For almost all games with  (8) = 2 for all 8:
(i) ?∗

(\) is upper hemi-continuous.13
(ii) ?∗

(\) is odd for almost all \.
(iii) The graph of ?∗

contains a unique branch which starts at the centroid (in which
?8 9 =
1
 (8) for all 8 and 9) for \ = ∞, and converges to a unique Nash equilibrium as
\ → 0.
Part (iii) states that for sufficiently high values of \, the EQRE is unique and involves uniform
mixing at \ = ∞. As \ decreases, this main branch can be “traced” (similar to the procedure of [70])
until it converges as \ → 0, and the unique limit point is necessarily a Nash equilibrium (Theorem
8).
Some steps of the proof go through for all normal form games, such as Lemma 7 of Appendix
3.7.2, which states that the equilibrium is unique (and pure) for sufficiently high \. There are
two issues in generalizing the result fully. First, since the first-stage objective is not generally
13This is always true, not just generically.
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concave (see Section 3.2), Λ∗(\) and ?∗

(\) may be discontinuous in \. Second, without a better
understanding of properties of &∗ such as we have in the binary-action case, we are unable to show
that the equilibrium graph is a manifold. Nevertheless, we conjecture that the result does hold for
almost all normal form games in which _∗
8
is guaranteed to be single-valued for all 8 and \ (part (i)
is true in that case).
To illustrate the theorem, we use the example of the asymmetric chicken game ([65]) whose
payoffs are given in Table 3.1. Letting ? and @ denote the probabilities that player 1 plays* and
player 2 plays ! respectively, Figure 3.2 gives the EQRE correspondences when costs are quadratic
2(_) = _2. Asymmetric chicken has three Nash Equilibria {?, @} ∈ {{0, 1}, { 1213 ,
4
5 }, {1, 0}}, all of
which are limit points of {?∗

(\)} as \ → 0, and {?∗∗, @∗∗} = {0, 1} is the unique Nash equilibrium
selected by EQRE, the same equilibrium selected by LQRE as _→∞. What is not clear from the
figure (but follows from Theorem 8) is that, along any branch, _∗
8
→∞ for all 8 as \ → 0.




U [?] 0, 0 6, 1
D 1, 14 2, 2
Figure 3.2: EQRE of asymmetric chicken
Notes: This figure plots EQRE as a function of parameter \ ∈ (0,∞). The dashed lines gives the main branch that can
be “traced” from very high to very low values of \ and limits to a unique Nash equilibrium. The solid lines correspond
to EQRE on branches that only occur for sufficiently small \.
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3.5 Generalized matching pennies
In this section, we study 2 × 2 games with the generalized “matching pennies” structure. These
are the simplest games with unique, fully mixed Nash equilibria, and hence have been played
extensively in the lab.
We show that (1) the EQRE and LQRE sets (3.5) are curves in the unit square that cross at
finite points that we give explicitly as a function of the game’s payoff parameters; (2) the EQRE set
deviates systematically from the LQRE set at all other points; and (3) these deviations are closely
related to the endogenous heterogeneity of _∗
8
s. Importantly, these results do not depend at all on
the EQRE cost function, which is arbitrary but assumed to be fixed as we vary \. In addition, we (4)
provide bounds that the LQRE set and EQRE set (for any cost function) must satisfy.
Figure 3.3: Structure of generalized matching pennies
L [@] R
U [?]
0! + 2! 0' U: up D: down
L: left R: right
player 1’s payoff in upper-left corner
1* 1* + 3* player 2’s payoff in lower-right corner
D
0! 0' + 2'
0! , 0', 1* , 1 ∈ R
2! , 2', 3* , 3 > 0
1 + 3 1
Notes: The restrictions imposed ensure that the Nash equilibrium is unique and fully mixed.
Generalized matching pennies is defined by the payoff matrix in Figure 3.3. The parameters
0! , 0', 1* , and 1 give the base payoffs. The parameters 2! , 2', 3* , and 3 are the payoff
differences, which we assume are strictly positive to maintain the relevant features.14 As is well-




14Games in which the payoff differences are all strictly negative are equivalent up to the labelling of actions.
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Since LQRE and EQRE are translation invariant,15 the base payoffs–0! , 0', 1* , and 1–can
be ignored for equilibrium analysis. For what follows, and for reasons that will be clear, we
reparameterize the game by specifying four parameters: ?∗∗ = 3
3*+3 , @
∗∗ = 2'
2!+2' , A =
2!+2'
3*+3 , and
B = 2! + 2'. These are the Nash equilibrium, the ratio of payoff differences, and a scale factor given
here as the sum of player 1’s payoff differences. From ?∗∗, @∗∗, and A , all the payoff differences can
be recovered up to a positive scaling, which is pinned down by B. In this section, no results depend
on the scale of the game, so B can be ignored for now.
3.5.1 Example
There are several cases to consider, so we preview the result using an example game before
stating the result for all games.
Figure 3.4: Example: reaction functions and equilibrium sets
Notes: The game used in this example is such that ?∗∗ > 12 and @
∗∗ < 12 . The left panel plots LQRE and EQRE reaction
functions (solid and dashed curves, resp.) associated with fixed _ and \, respectively. The right panel plots the LQRE








































15&8 (E8 + W4 (8) ;_) = &8 (E8;_) and &∗8 (E8 + W4 (8) ; \) = &∗8 (E8; \) for any E8 ∈ R (8) and W ∈ R, where 4 (8) =
(1, ..., 1).
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The fixed points that define the equilibria of these games can be plotted in the unit-square of
?-@ space, as in the example of Figure 3.4. In the left panel, the Nash equilibrium is given as the
intersection of the best response correspondences. Similarly, LQRE and EQRE are given as the
intersections of their respective reaction functions which map the opponent’s mixed action into
quantal response. That is, for any fixed _ and \, the curves are drawn, and their intersections give
the corresponding equilibria. The right panel plots the LQRE and EQRE sets, which result from
varying _ and \, respectively, from 0 to∞ and collecting the equilibria.
Player 1’s LQRE and EQRE reactions are strictly increasing in @ and pass through the point
{ 12 , @
∗∗}: when player 2 is mixing according to her Nash strategy, player 1 is indifferent and must
uniformly randomize. Similarly, player 2’s reactions are strictly decreasing in ? and pass through
{?∗∗, 12 }. These restrictions are true of all reaction functions induced by quantal response satisfying
the regularity axioms. When ?∗∗ ≥ 12 and @
∗∗ < 12 , as in this example, the set of regular QRE ([2]),
which we call the regular set, is given by '1 ∪ '2 ⊂ [0, 1]2 where '1 = [?∗∗, 1] × [@∗∗, 12 ] and
'2 = [ 12 , ?
∗∗] × [ 12 , 1] are two rectangular components.
16 We draw the components of the regular
set as gray rectangles.
Since LQRE and EQRE are regular, their equilibrium sets are contained within the regular set.
In this example, the equilibrium sets agree at five specific points. That the models agree at { 12 ,
1
2 }
and {?∗∗, @∗∗} follows from Theorem 11 (and the analogue for LQRE), which states that these
are the EQRE limits as \ goes from ∞ to 0 (and the LQRE limits as _ goes from 0 to ∞). That
the models agree at {?∗∗, 12 } then follows from path connectedness.
17 Furthermore, the EQRE set
“crosses” the LQRE set at two special points, here labelled {?1, @1} and {?2, @2}, whose identity we
will soon explore. Thus, as is clear from Figure 3.4, the EQRE set weaves in and out of the LQRE
set at designated crossings.
In general, the number of crossings (the existence of {?1, @1} and {?2, @2}) and their location
depends on the payoff parameters. As it turns out, the crossing points can be found in closed form
16If ?∗∗ = 12 , the second component is degenerate: '2 = ∅.
17That the EQRE and LQRE sets are path connected follows from the fact that the equilibria are unique for fixed
parameters and that the equilibrium graphs are manifolds.
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as they are the solution to a system of linear equations that does not depend on the EQRE cost
function. Before stating the result formally in the next subsection, we introduce the key objects that
define these points of crossing and illustrate them for the example game of Figure 3.4.
What differentiates EQRE from LQRE is the endogenous heterogeneity of _∗
8
s. Since the _∗
8
s
depend on the absolute expected utility differences Δ D̄1(@) = | (2! + 2')@ − 2' | and Δ D̄2(?) =
| (3* + 3)? − 3 | that obtain in EQRE {?, @}, we first characterize the regions of the unit square
such that Δ D̄1 < Δ D̄2 and Δ D̄1 > Δ D̄2. To this end, we define the iso-utility curves in terms of our
transformed parameters, which give the action frequencies {?, @} such that Δ D̄1(@) = Δ D̄2(?):
D+(@) ≡ A@ + (?∗∗ − A@∗∗)
D−(@) ≡ −A@ + (?∗∗ + A@∗∗).
We abuse notation by writing D+ ≡ {{?, @}|? = D+(@)} and D− ≡ {{?, @}|? = D−(@)}; by
construction, {?, @} ∈ D+ ∪ D− if and only if Δ D̄1(@) = Δ D̄2(?). The iso-utility curves have slopes
±A, and since Δ D̄1(@∗∗) = Δ D̄2(?∗∗) = 0, they have a unique intersection at the Nash equilibrium:
{?∗∗, @∗∗} = D+ ∩ D−. Necessarily, since {?∗∗, @∗∗} is interior and A > 0, D+ and D− partition the
square into four regions: two in which Δ D̄1 < Δ D̄2 (top and bottom) and two in which Δ D̄1 > Δ D̄2
(left and right). We illustrate this in the top left panel of Figure 3.5 for our example game.
Next, we characterize regions of the unit square defined by the relative accuracies of both
players. Recall that we defined accuracy (3.7) as the probability of taking the better action. In
any LQRE or EQRE {?, @}, the accuracies of players 1 and 2 are given by <0G{?, 1 − ?} and
<0G{@, 1 − @} respectively, both of which are greater than 12 . The top right panel of Figure 3.5
plots the iso-accuracy curves which we label 0+ and 0−. These are defined by {?, @} such that
both players are equally accurate (<0G{?, 1 − ?} = <0G{@, 1 − @}) and are simply the diagonals
of the square. Note that, unlike the iso-utility curves, the iso-accuracy curves do not depend
on the game. Off the diagonals, in the top and bottom quadrants, player 1 is more accurate:
<0G{?, 1 − ?} > <0G{@, 1 − @}. In the left and right quadrants, player 2 is more accurate:
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<0G{@, 1 − @} > <0G{?, 1 − ?}.
Figure 3.5: Example: iso-utility, iso-accuracy, and equilibrium sets
Notes: The game used in this example is such that ?∗∗ > 12 , @
∗∗ < 12 , and A > 0 is sufficiently low that D
− (whose slope



















max{p, 1− p} >
max{q, 1− q}
max{p, 1− p} >
max{q, 1− q}
max{q, 1− q} >
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The bottom left panel of Figure 3.5 reproduces both the iso-utility and iso-accuracy curves for
our example game, superimposed by the regular set (gray rectangles) and the LQRE set (solid black
curve). It is well-known that the LQRE set connects the centroid { 12 ,
1
2 } to the Nash equilibrium
{?∗∗, @∗∗} as _ varies from 0 to ∞, and since LQRE is regular, the entire LQRE set is contained
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within the regular set. We add to this a novel observation: the LQRE set crosses all intersections of
the iso-utility and iso-accuracy curves within the regular set and cannot cross the curves at any other
point. This must be the case since players’ accuracies (3.7) are one-to-one with the products _Δ D̄1
and _Δ D̄2. Hence, in any LQRE,Δ D̄1 = Δ D̄2 if and only if<0G{?, 1−?} = <0G{@, 1−@}. The shape
of the LQRE set thus depends predictably, not only on the Nash equilibrium {?∗∗, @∗∗} = D+ ∩ D−,
but also on the parameter A which controls the slopes of D+ and D− and thus where they cross 0+ and
0−. In this example, there are two such crossings in the regular set, which are precisely the points
{?1, @1} and {?2, @2}. These are defined as {?1, @1} ≡ D+ ∩ 0− ∩ '1 and {?2, @2} ≡ D− ∩ 0+ ∩ '2
(solutions to linear systems), and in general, one or both of these points may not exist depending on
the game’s payoff parameters.
As it turns out, what we observe for the example game in the bottom right panel of Figure 3.5
generalizes to all games satisfying a technical condition (both players are “not too accurate” in
any LQRE). Specifically, the EQRE set can only cross the LQRE set (as well as the iso-utility and
iso-accuracy curves) at {?1, @1} or {?2, @2} (or the trivial point {?∗∗, 12 }) and must so if these points
exist. Furthermore, the existence of these points also determines precisely where the EQRE set
is “below”, “above”, “to the left of”, or “to the right of” the LQRE set. Hence, characterizing the
behavior of EQRE is largely reduced to a simple geometric analysis.
3.5.2 General analysis
Games with completely symmetric Nash equilibria {?∗∗, @∗∗} = { 12 ,
1
2 } are uninteresting (all
regular QRE coincide with Nash), and for all other games, it is without loss to consider ?∗∗ ≥ 12 and
@∗∗ < 12 .
As previously mentioned, the qualitative shape of the EQRE set depends on how many times the
iso-utility and iso-accuracy curves cross within the regular set, or in other words, on the existence of
{?1, @1} and/or {?2, @2}. Thus, there are four cases, which we illustrate in Figure 3.6. Cases 1 and
2 (3 and 4) involve Nash equilibria in which player 1 is less (more) accurate than player 2, as shown
by {?∗∗, @∗∗} to the left (right) of 0−. Cases 1 and 3 (2 and 4) involve, for fixed Nash equilibrium,
186
sufficiently low (high) ratio A such that D− passes through (below) the second component of the
regular set.
The main result of this section establishes that the EQRE set always falls into one of the four
cases from Figure 3.6 for all games satisfying a technical condition (both players are “not too
accurate” in any LQRE). In other words, the models agree at finite points that we give explicitly,
and the EQRE set deviates systematically at all other points. Importantly, which of the four cases
applies depends on the game’s payoffs only, not on the cost function.
The result relies on several lemmas. In what follows, we use the notation {?, @;_} to refer to an
LQRE {?, @} that obtains for precision parameter _. Similarly, {?, @; \} is an EQRE that obtains
for cost parameter \. When a particular EQRE {?, @; \} is clear from the context, _∗1 and _
∗
2 are
shorthand for _∗1 ≡ _
∗





The first lemma establishes that the position of the EQRE set relative to the LQRE set (“below”,
“above”, “to the left of”, or “to the right of”) is pinned down by the endogenous heterogeneity of
_∗
8
s–which player has a larger precision in equilibrium. It follows from simple geometric arguments.
5. (i) Take any @ ∈ (@∗∗, 12 ) with associated EQRE {?, @; \} and LQRE {?
′
, @;_} (which exist
and are unique). ? Q ?
′
if and only if _∗1 Q _
∗
2. (ii) Take any ? ∈ (
1
2 , ?
∗∗) with associated EQRE
{?, @; \} and LQRE {?, @ ′;_} (which exist and are unique). @ Q @ ′ if and only if _∗1 R _
∗
2.
The main result makes use of Lemma 5 by establishing subsets of the EQRE set such that _∗1 > _
∗
2
and _∗1 < _
∗
2. Intuitively, this may be difficult because _
∗
8
(Δ D̄8; \) is non-monotonic in Δ D̄8 by
Theorem 10 for fixed \, and each point of the EQRE set corresponds to a different \. However,
Theorem 10 also establishes that, for any given \, (1) _∗
8
(Δ D̄8; \)Δ D̄8, and thus accuracy (3.7), is
strictly increasing in Δ D̄8; and (2) peak precision _̄(\) is associated with a specific (very high) level
of accuracy 4
_̄(\)Δ Ē (\)
1+4_̄(\)Δ Ē (\) =
4^
1+4^ ≈ 0.92. Therefore, if both players’ accuracies are less than the magic
number 4
^
1+4^ , their relative accuracies imply orderings of the _
∗
8
s and Δ D̄8B. That is, if both players
are not too accurate (<0G{?, 1 − ?} and <0G{@, 1 − @} less than 4^1+4^ ), the more accurate player
chooses higher precision and faces higher stakes.
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Figure 3.6: The four cases of equilibrium sets
Notes: Case 1: both {?1, @1} and {?2, @2} exist. Case 2: only {?1, @1} exists. Case 3: only {?2, @2} exists. Case 4:









































































































6. Fix EQRE {?, @; \} in which <0G{?, 1 − ?}, <0G{@, 1 − @} < 4^1+4^ . If <0G{?, 1 − ?} ≷
<0G{@, 1 − @}, then _∗1 ≷ _
∗
2 and Δ D̄1(@) ≷ Δ D̄2(?).
Combining Lemma 5 with Lemma 6 gives a sufficient “no crossing” condition.
7. The EQRE set cannot cross the LQRE set at any point {?, @} ≠ {?∗∗, 12 } such that <0G{?, 1 −
?} ≠ <0G{@, 1 − @} < 4^1+4^ ; and thus if both players are “not too accurate” in any LQRE (all
LQRE {?, @} satisfy <0G{?, 1 − ?}, <0G{@, 1 − @} < 4^1+4^ ), the only possible points of crossing
are {?∗∗, 12 }, {?
1, @1}, or {?2, @2}.
And finally, our result, which establishes the shape of the EQRE set and its relationship to the LQRE
set. It is proven by establishing the ordering of _∗
8
s within neighborhoods of special points {?∗∗, @∗∗},




2 }, which determines whether the EQRE set is locally “below”, “above”, “to the
right of”, or “to the left of” the LQRE set by Lemma 5. The result then follows by invoking Lemma
7 (“no crossing”), which implies that the EQRE set can only cross the LQRE set at {?∗∗, 12 } (trivially
by path connectedness) or at special points {?1, @1} or {?2, @2}; and by path connectedness, the
EQRE set must cross at these points if they exist. The EQRE set also cannot cross the iso-utility or
iso-accuracy curves at points other than {?1, @1} or {?2, @2} by now-familiar arguments.
12. Suppose that both players are “not too accurate” in any LQRE (all LQRE {?, @} satisfy
<0G{?, 1 − ?}, <0G{@, 1 − @} < 4^1+4^ ).
18 Then the EQRE and LQRE sets overlap at finite points:
(I) the EQRE set crosses the LQRE set at {?∗∗, 12 };
19 (II) the EQRE set cannot cross the LQRE set,
D+ ∪ D−, or 0+ ∪ 0− at any other points except {?1, @1} or {?2, @2}, and must so if these points exist;
and (III):
(i) If {?1, @1} exists (Cases 1 and 2):
(a) EQRE is “below” for all @ ∈ (@∗∗, @1): ? < ? ′ for EQRE {?, @} and LQRE {? ′, @}.
(b) EQRE is “above” for all @ ∈ (@1, 12 ): ? > ?
′
for EQRE {?, @} and LQRE {? ′, @}.
18This is a restriction on LQRE, but one can derive sufficient conditions based on payoff parameters ?∗∗, @∗∗, and A
since the LQRE set is restricted in its crossings of the iso-utility and iso-accuracy curves.
19If ?∗∗ = 12 , then '2 = ∅ and {?




2 } is the common limit of EQRE and LQRE as \ → ∞ and _ → 0,
respectively, but no “crossing” actually takes place.
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(ii) If {?1, @1} does not exist (Cases 3 and 4):
(a) EQRE is “above” for all @ ∈ (@∗∗, 12 ): ? > ?
′
for EQRE {?, @} and LQRE {? ′, @}.
(iii) If {?2, @2} exists (Cases 1 and 3):
(a) EQRE is “to the left” for all ? ∈ (?2, ?∗∗): @ < @ ′ for EQRE {?, @} and LQRE {?, @ ′}.
(b) EQRE is “to the right” for all ? ∈ ( 12 , ?
2): @ > @ ′ for EQRE {?, @} and LQRE {?, @ ′}.
(iv) If {?2, @2} does not exist (Cases 2 and 4):
(a) EQRE is “to the left” for all ? ∈ ( 12 , ?
∗∗): @ < @ ′ for EQRE {?, @} and LQRE {?, @ ′}.
The result establishes that EQRE and LQRE are generically distinct–with predictions that
overlap at finite points that we give explicitly. Also, by establishing that the EQRE set cannot
cross the LQRE set, iso-utility curves, or iso-accuracy curves except at specific points, we have
bounded the EQRE predictions. Since these bounds do not depend on the cost function, we have
shown that the flexibility of choosing the cost function still excludes a large measure of outcomes
(including regular QRE). Since the LQRE set serves as a bound on “one side” of the EQRE set,
depending on where the data falls, it may be that EQRE outperforms (or underperforms) LQRE for
any cost function. This observation makes it possible to determine which model is qualitatively more
consistent with data without relying heavily on the usual measures of fit or an assumed functional
form for the cost function.
3.6 Conclusion
Logit QRE or LQRE, with its free parameter _, is perhaps the best-known parametric model
applied to experimental data. _ is usually interpreted as a reduced-form summary of “rationality” or
“skill”, which leads to the natural question: where does _ come from?
This question leads us to endogenize _. The resulting model, which we call endogenous quantal
response equilibrium (EQRE), takes as given the logit structure, but endogenizes _–now interpreted
as “precision”. In the first-stage of an EQRE, each player 8 chooses _∗
8
optimally subject to costs
taking as given the opponents’ second-stage behavior, which forms a heterogenous LQRE given the




Because incentives to acquire precision depend on the equilibrium behavior of opponents, which
in turn depends on the payoffs of the underlying game, each player generically chooses a different
_∗
8
. Because of this, EQRE and LQRE generically give different predictions. We show that EQRE
satisfies a modified form of the regularity axioms ([2]) and provide analogues to classic results for
LQRE, such as those for equilibrium selection. In the binary-action case, we are able to characterize
behavior well. For generalized matching pennies games, we have a nearly complete characterization
of the EQRE set which deviates systematically from the LQRE set. In future work, it would be
interesting to test these predictions and the empirical performance of EQRE more generally.
3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Properties of 1
For this part, we drop the 8 subscript. In particular, we use  instead of  (8) and & 9 instead of &8 9 .
E ∈ R is a vector with components E1, ..., E indexed by 9 , : , or ;. Recall the maintained assumption that
E 9 ≠ E: for some 9 , : . Unless stated otherwise, all sums go from 1 to . Finally, we define a ≡ <0G 9{E 9}
and ∗ ≡ ∑: 1{E:=a } as the highest utility alternative and the number of such alternatives, respectively.
1. 1(E; 0) = 1

∑
9 E 9 and ;8<
_→∞
1(E;_) = a.






=⇒ 1(E; 0) = ∑ 9 & 9 (E; 0)E 9 = ∑ 9 ( 1 )E 9 = 1 ∑ 9 E 9 . As is well-known,
;8<
_→∞
& 9 (E;_) = 0 if E 9 < E: for some : and ;8<
_→∞
& 9 (E;_) = 1 ∗ . Hence, ;8<_→∞1(_; E) = ;8<_→∞
∑
9 & 9 (E;_)E 9 =∑











2. For all _ ∈ [0,∞), m1 (E;_)
m_
∈ (0, I1) and m
21 (E;_)
m_2




















































{(E29 − E 9E:) + (E2: − E:E 9)}4
_(E9+E: ) > 0
The last equivalence follows from the fact that (E2
9
− E 9E:) = 0 if E 9 = E: and hence it is without loss to
only consider summing over E 9 ≠ E: . Furthermore, whenever 9 and : are such that G = E 9 > E: = H, we
can group this with the sum in which H = E 9 < E: = G. The last inequality holds due to supermodularity of
5 (G, H) = GH, which implies that (E2
9
− E 9E:) + (E2: − E:E 9) > 0 whenever E 9 > E: .
Hence, m1 (E;_)
m_
> 0 for all _ ∈ [0,∞). Inspection reveals that m1 (E;_̃)
m_
< ∞ for any _̃ ∈ [0,∞), so that
m1 (E;_)
m_
∈ (0, I1) for some I1 ∈ R++ follows from the fact that m1 (E;_)m_ → 0 as _ → ∞ (property 3 below).
Similarly, inspecting the expression for the second derivative (3.8) reveals that −∞ < m
21 (E;_̃)
m_2
< ∞ for any
_̃ ∈ [0,∞). That m
21 (E;_)
m_2













= 0, and m
21 (E;_)
m_2



































:,; (E29 − E2: + 2E:E; − 2E 9E;)4
_(E9+E:+E;)
(∑: 4_E: )3 . (3.8)
As before, as _ → ∞, the terms with the largest exponents dominate. In the denominator, the term with




+ 2E:E; − 2E 9E;) = 0 if
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E 9 = E: , and hence the term in the numerator with the largest exponent is proportional to 4_(2a+`) for some




The denominator of m
21 (E;_)
m_2







+ 2E:E; − 2E 9E;)4_(E9+E:+E;) . We show that the terms with the largest exponent are negative, and hence
m21 (E;_)
m_2




+2E:E; −2E 9E;) = 0 if E 9 = E: . Hence, letting ` < a
be the second largest component of E, the largest exponents are achieved exactly when (1) E 9 = E; = a and
E: = ` and (2) when E; = E: = a and E 9 = `. In these cases, the terms are a(a2 − `2 + 2`a − 2a2)4_(2a+`)
and `(`2 − a2 + 2a2 − 2`a)4_(2a+`) , respectively. Summing the two gives (`3 − a3 + 2`a2 − 2`2a)4_(2a+`) ,
and this is negative for any ` < a.
3.7.2 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 6. (i): The objective is continuous and defined over [0,∞). Since 1 is bounded, but 2
is unboundedly increasing, a solution exists and all solutions are finite. Since the objective is continuously
differentiable, any solution strictly greater than zero must satisfy the first-order condition (3.3). If E8 9 = E8:
for all 9 , : , the unique solution is _∗
8
(E8; \) = 0, which satisfies (3.3) trivially. If E8 9 ≠ E8: for some 9 , : ,
then m1
m_
> 0 for all _ ∈ [0,∞). Since 2′+(0) = 0, all solutions are strictly greater than zero and thus satisfy
(3.3). (ii): Assume E8 9 ≠ E8: for some 9 , : , implying all solutions are strictly greater than zero. Since
m1
m_
> 0 and 2′ > 0 for all _ ∈ [0,∞), any solution _ ∈ _∗
8




= (_ − n)
obtains a strictly higher net payoff than _ under \
′









(E8; \)}) = ∞ because, as \ → 0,
\2




(E8; \)}) = 0 because, as \ → ∞, \2
′ → ∞ pointwise (except
at the point _ = 0). 
Proof of Lemma 2. To show _∗
8
(E8; \) is upper hemi-continuous in (E8 , \), use Berge’s theorem of the maxi-
mum. The objective is jointly continuous in (E8 , \). To invoke the theorem, all that is required in addition is
a compact constraint set, but this requires some preparation as the constraint set _ ∈ [0,∞) is not compact.




′) and any n > 0 there
exists a _̄(n) such that restricting the constraint set to _ ∈ [0, _̄(n)] does not change the solution _∗
8
(E8; \) for











by Berge’s theorem. But since (E′
8
, \
′) and n were chosen arbitrarily, _∗
8
(E8; \) is upper hemi-continuous for
all (E8 , \). 
Proof of Lemma 3. This is trivial if E8 9 = E8: for all 9 , : , so assume E8 9 ≠ E8: for some 9 , : . As \ → 0,
8= 5 {_∗
8
(E8; \)} → ∞, or in other words that _∗8 (E8; \) ⊂ (_(\),∞) for _(\) such that _(\) → ∞ as \ → 0.
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By properties of 1 and 2, the objective is strictly concave for sufficiently high _, so the objective is strictly
concave over the region where the solution obtains for sufficiently low \, making _∗
8
(E8; \) is a singleton.
As \ → ∞, BD?{_∗
8
(E8; \)} → 0 or in other words that _∗8 (E8; \) ⊂ (0, _̄(\)) for _̄(\) such that _̄(\) → 0
as \ →∞. By properties of 1 and 2, the objective is strictly concave for sufficiently low _, so the objective




Proof of Theorem 7. An EQRE is a fixed point of &∗ ◦ D̄. Since &∗
8
(·; \) is convex-valued and upper hemi-
continuous on R (8) and D̄ is continuous on Δ, &∗ ◦ D̄ : Δ ⇒ Δ is convex-valued and upper hemi-
continuous. Because Δ is a compact subset of R , &∗ ◦ D̄ is also closed graph. Summarizing, &∗ ◦ D̄ :
Δ ⇒ Δ is a non-empty and convex-valued correspondence with a closed graph mapping from a non-
empty, compact, convex set to itself. By Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, &∗ ◦ D̄ has a fixed point. 
Proof of Theorem 8. (i): Suppose ?∗∗ is not a Nash equilibrium. Then there is some player 8 and a pair
of actions 08 9 and 08: such that ?∗∗(08:) > 0 and D8 (08 9 , ?∗∗−8) > D8 (08: , ?∗∗−8) or equivalently D̄8 9 (?∗∗−8) >
D̄8: (?∗∗−8). Since D is continuous, it follows that for sufficiently small n > 0 there is a ) such that D̄8 9 (?C−8) >
D̄8: (?C−8) + n for all C ≥ ) . But then since \C → 0, _C8 → ∞ by Theorem 6 which implies that ?C (08:) →
0, contradicting that ?∗∗(08:) > 0. (ii): It is the case that either <0G 9: {D̄8 9 (?∗∗−8) − D̄8: (?∗∗−8)} > 0 or
that <0G 9: {D̄8 9 (?∗∗−8) − D̄8: (?∗∗−8)} = 0. In the former case, _C8 → ∞ based on an argument similar to




< ∞. But then, since
<0G 9: {D̄8 9 (?C−8) − D̄8: (?C−8)} → 0, this would imply that ;8<C→∞?C8 9 =
1
 (8) for all 9 , a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 9. Let 2(_) = _: . Taking derivatives: 2′ (_) = :_:−1 and 2′′ (_) = : (:−1)_:−2. Let _̃ > 0
be arbitrary and noting that \2
′ (_̃) = 1 ⇐⇒ \ = 1
:_̃:−1
, define \: (_̃) ≡ 1:_̃:−1 as the cost parameter such
that the marginal cost \: (_̃)2
′ (_) at _̃ is 1. As : →∞, the marginal cost function \:2
′
gets arbitrarily steep
at _̃. In particular, it approaches a step function that is vertical at _̃: (1) \: (_̃)2
′ (_) → 1{_=_̃} + ∞1{_>_̃}
(pointwise) and (2) \: (_̃)2
′′ (_̃) → ∞.
We show that any LQRE with associated _̃ is approached by a :-sequence of EQRE with cost function
2(_) = _: scaled by \: (_̃) as defined above. Specifically, given any finite game, the set of attainable
expected utility vectors + = (+1, ..., +=) ≡ {D̄(?) ∈ R : ? ∈ Δ} is a compact subset of R . We show
that, for each player 8, &∗
8
(·; \: (_̃)) → &8 (·; _̃) uniformly over all +8. This is sufficient for the result as
any fixed point of &(·; _̃) = (&1(·; _̃), ..., &= (·; _̃)) represents an LQRE and uniform convergence implies
there must be a nearby fixed point of&∗(·; \: (_̃)) = (&∗1(·; \: (_̃)), ...., &
∗
= (·; \: (_̃))) representing an EQRE.
When _̃ = 0, the result is trivial so assume _̃ > 0 in what follows.
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For player 8, partition +8 into three subsets +8 = +08 ∪ + n8 ∪ +1−n8 where n > 0 is small. +08 = {E8 ∈
+8 : E8< = E8; for all <, ;} gives precisely the payoff vectors such that player 8 is indifferent between
all alternatives, + n
8
= {E8 ∈ +8 : E8< ≠ E8; for some <, ; and ‖E8 − E
′
8





the set of nearby payoff vectors for which player 8 is almost indifferent, and +1−n
8
= {E8 ∈ +8 : E8< ≠
E8; for some <, ; and ‖E8 − E
′
8




} is the compact set of far away payoff vectors for
which player 8 is not indifferent. The proof proceeds by showing that &∗
8
(·; \: (_̃)) → &8 (·; _̃) uniformly
for all E8 within each of these three sets, from which the result follows.
That &∗
8
(·; \: (_̃)) → &8 (·; _̃) uniformly for all E8 ∈ +08 is trivial. For any _ ∈ [0,∞) and E8 ∈ +08 ,
&8 9 (E8;_) = 1 (8) for all 9 . Hence &
∗
8
(E8; \: (_̃)) = &8 (E8; _̃) for all E8 ∈ +08 and any : .
Fix any n > 0. For any E8 ∈ +1−n8 , the marginal benefit function 1
′
8
(E8;_) > 0 for all _ ∈ [0,∞). As
: →∞, the marginal cost function \: (_̃)2
′ (_) gets arbitrarily steep at _̃. Since +1−n
8
is compact, as : →∞,
\: (_̃)2
′ (_) crosses 1′
8
(E8;_) arbitrarily close to _̃ for all E8 ∈ +1−n8 . Hence, as : → ∞, _∗8 (E8; \: (_̃)) ≈ _̃
for all E8 ∈ +1−n8 , and so &∗8 (·; \: (_̃)) → &8 (·; _̃) uniformly for all E8 ∈ +1−n8 .
Since \: (_̃)2
′ (_) becomes arbitrarily steep at _̃ as : → ∞, for any n ′ > 0 and sufficiently high : , the
point where \: (_̃)2
′ (_) crosses 1′
8
(E8;_) for any E8 ∈ +8 is between 0 and _̃ + n
′
. Hence, for sufficiently
large : , _∗
8
(E8; \: (_̃)) is bounded for all E8 ∈ +8 and for all E8 ∈ + n8 in particular. For any _ ∈ [0, _̃ + n
′]
and E8 ∈ + n8 , &8 9 (E8;_) →
1
 (8) as n → 0 since the precision is bounded and E8< → E8; for all <, ;
as n → 0. Hence, it is also the case that, as n → 0, &∗
8 9






(·; \: (_̃)) → &8 (·; _̃) uniformly for all E8 ∈ + n8 .
We have shown that (1) for any given n > 0, &∗
8
(·; \: (_̃)) → &8 (·; _̃) uniformly over E8 ∈ +08 ∪ +1−n8
as : → ∞ and (2) for sufficiently high : , &∗
8
(·; \: (_̃)) → &8 (·; _̃) uniformly for all E8 ∈ + n8 as n → 0. But
since n is arbitrary, we may take a C-sequence {nC } going to 0 as in (2), and for each nC invoke (1). Hence,
as : → ∞, &∗
8
(·; \: (_̃)) → &8 (·; _̃) uniformly over all E8 ∈ +8 = +08 ∪ + n8 ∪ +1−n8 , which completes the
proof. 
Proof of Theorem 10.
(i): We have already established that _∗
8
(0; \) = 0. For ΔE8 > 0, the objective is strictly concave so
_∗
8






− \2′ (_) = 0.





(4_ΔE8+1)2 = 0, which implies that ;8<ΔE8→∞
_∗
8
(ΔE8; \) = 0 from properties of 2.
(ii): Since _∗
8
(0; \) = 0 and _∗
8
(ΔE8; \) > 0 for ΔE8 > 0, (i) implies _∗8 (·; \) obtains a strictly positive peak,
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= −ΔE8 · 4







4_ΔE8 (4_ΔE8 − 1)
(4_ΔE8 + 1)3
− \2′′ (_).







′′ (_) < 0 for all ΔE8 > 0, and hence _∗8 (ΔE8; \)
is differentiable in ΔE8 by the implicit function theorem. Thus, the peak is characterized by _ = _̄(\) and
any ΔE8 that satisfy m_mΔE8 = 0. Defining 6(_,ΔE8) ≡ 4
_ΔE8 (_ΔE8 − 2) − 2−_ΔE8 = 0, inspection reveals that
m_
mΔE8
= 0 ⇐⇒ 6(ΔE8 , _) = 0. Inspection also reveals that for any given _, ΔE8 such that 6(ΔE8 , _) = 0 is
unique. Thus, the peak, denoted by _̄(\), is obtained at the single point Δ Ē(\).
(iii): Note that _ and ΔE8 only enter the 6(·) function above as the product G = _ΔE8. We have already
shown that m_
mΔE8
= 0 ⇐⇒ 6(·) = 0 ⇐⇒ G = _̄(\)Δ Ē(\), and similarly, it is the case that m_
mΔE8
>
0 ⇐⇒ 6(·) < 0 ⇐⇒ G < _̄(\)Δ Ē(\) and m_
mΔE8
< 0 ⇐⇒ 6(·) > 0 ⇐⇒ G > _̄(\)Δ Ē(\).
Suppose ΔE8 = ΔE
′
8























− \2′ ( G
ΔE8
) = 0.






















4G (4G + 1) (1 − 4G)
(4G + 1)4





Since ΔE8 > 0, G > 0, 4G > 1, and 2
′′ (·) > 0, we have that mk
mΔE8
> 0 and mk
mG
< 0 which implies that
mG
mΔE8




(4G+1)2 → ∞ and \2
′ ( G
ΔE8
) → 0 as ΔE8 → ∞. Therefore, if G were
bounded as ΔE8 →∞, it could not satisfy k = 0, so it must be that G →∞ as ΔE8 →∞.
(v): As shown in parts (ii) and (iii), _̄(\) and Δ Ē(\) satisfy 6(_̄(\),Δ Ē(\)) = 4_̄(\)Δ Ē (\) (_̄(\)Δ Ē(\) −
2) − 2 − _̄(\)Δ Ē(\) = 0. _̄(\) and Δ Ē(\) only enter 6(·) as the product G = _̄(\)Δ Ē(\), and 6(G) ≡
4G (G − 2) − 2 − G = 0 ⇐⇒ G = ^ ≈ 2.4.
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(ΔE8; \) = ∞. Since this holds for every ΔE8 ∈ (0,∞), we also have
that _̄(\) is strictly decreasing in \, ;8<
\→∞
_̄(\) = 0, and ;8<
\→0
_̄(\) = ∞. The result follows from part (v) as
Δ Ē(\) = ^/_̄(\). 
Proof of Lemma 5. We illustrate the proof in Figure 3.7. The left panel plots, for some game, the EQRE and
LQRE sets in the first component of the regular set, with a particular EQRE as the intersection of reaction
functions. The right panel “zooms in” on this component of the regular set.
(i): Take any EQRE {?, @; \} such as the point  in the right panel of Figure 3.7. Suppose _∗1 > _
∗
2.
First, draw LQRE reaction functions for player 1 using _ = _∗1 and similarly for player 2 using _ = _
∗
2. By
construction, these curves pass through point , but this is not an LQRE since each player has a different
_. Next, redraw player 1’s reaction function by decreasing _ to _∗2. Player 1’s reaction function “pivots”
clockwise as _ decreases until it crosses player 2’s reaction function at point . This is an LQRE with
_ = _∗2, and note that, since the reaction functions are strictly monotonic, point  is necessarily to the
south-east of point . Finally, by continuity, one can increase _ to some value _
′ ∈ (_∗2, _
∗
1) such that
both LQRE reaction functions pivot counter-clockwise and intersect at the LQRE  directly below point
. Hence, _∗1 > _
∗
2 is implies that the EQRE is “above” an LQRE. Conversely, find EQRE {?, @; \} and
LQRE {?′, @;_} such that ?′ < ?, such as points  and . Since the LQRE reactions are strictly monotonic,
the only way to go from  to  is to increase player 1’s _ (pivoting her reaction counter-clockwise) and
decrease player 2’s _ (pivoting her reaction clockwise) to exactly _∗1 and _
∗
2, respectively, which satisfy
_∗1 > _ > _
∗









symmetric (and trivial for _∗1 = _
∗
2). (ii): Part (ii) is essentially the same as part (i). 
Proof of Lemma 6. If <0G{?, 1 − ?} ≷ <0G{@, 1 − @} < 4^1+4^ , then _
∗
1Δ D̄1 ≷ _
∗
2Δ D̄2 < _̄(\)Δ Ē(\) ≡ ^
which implies Δ D̄1 ≷ Δ D̄2 < Δ Ē(\) by part (iv) of Theorem 10. That _∗1 ≷ _
∗
2 follows from part (iii) of
Theorem 10. 
Proof of Lemma 7. Suppose {?, @; \} is an EQRE in which <0G{?, 1 − ?} ≠ <0G{@, 1 − @}. If {?, @} is
an LQRE, it must be that (1) Δ D̄1(@) ≠ Δ D̄2(?) (since some player is more accurate despite each having
the same _) and (2) that _∗1 = _
∗
2 by Lemma 5. But by Lemma 6, (1) and (2) cannot occur simultaneously if
<0G{?, 1 − ?} ≠ <0G{@, 1 − @} < 4^1+4^ . 
Proof of Theorem 12. In what follows, let {?\ , @\ } refer to some \-indexed EQRE sequence.
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Figure 3.7: Relationship between LQRE, EQRE, and the heterogeneity of _∗
8
s
Notes: The left panel plots the LQRE set (solid black curve), the EQRE set (dotted curve), and the regular set (gray
rectangles) for some game. Point  is a particular EQRE associated with the reaction functions that pass through it.
The right panel “zooms in” on the first component of the regular set, and additionally draws LQRE reaction functions















Suppose {?1, @1} exists. This implies that <0G{?∗∗, 1 − ?∗∗} < <0G{@∗∗, 1 − @∗∗} < 4^1+4^ . As \ → 0,
{?\ , @\ } → {?∗∗, @∗∗} and thus for EQRE {?, @; \} for sufficiently low @ ∈ (@∗∗, @1), _∗1 < _
∗
2 (Lemma 6).
Thus, for all sufficiently low @ ∈ (@∗∗, @1), ? < ?′ for EQRE {?, @} and LQRE {?′, @} (Lemma 5).
Suppose ?∗∗ > 12 ({?
1, @1} may or may not exist). For sufficiently high @ ∈ (@∗∗, 12 ), EQRE {?, @} must
satisfy <0G{@, 1 − @} < <0G{?, 1 − ?} < 4^1+4^ since {?\ , @\ } passes through {?
∗∗, 12 } for some \ < ∞,




2 (Lemma 6). Thus, for all
sufficiently high @ ∈ (@∗∗, 12 ), ? > ?
′
for EQRE {?, @} and LQRE {?′, @} (Lemma 5).
Suppose ?∗∗ = 12 (which implies {?
1, @1} exists, but we do not use this fact here). In this case,




2 } and Δ D̄1(
1
2 ) > Δ D̄2(
1




2 } and thus Δ D̄2(?\ ) → Δ D̄2(
1
2 )
and Δ D̄1(@\ ) → Δ D̄1( 12 ). By part (vi) of Theorem 10, as \ → ∞, Δ Ē(\) → ∞, and thus, for sufficiently




2 (part (iii) of
Theorem 10). Thus, it is still the case that for all sufficiently high @ ∈ (@∗∗, 12 ), ? > ?
′
for EQRE {?, @} and
LQRE {?′, @} (Lemma 5).
If ?∗∗ = 12 , '2 = ∅, so suppose ?
∗∗ > 12 ({?
2, @2} may or may not exist). For sufficiently high
? ∈ ( 12 , ?
∗∗), EQRE {?, @} must satisfy <0G{@, 1 − @} < <0G{?, 1 − ?} < 4^1+4^ since {?\ , @\ } passes






2 (Lemma 6). Thus, for all sufficiently high ? ∈ (
1
2 , ?
∗∗), @ < @′ for EQRE {?, @} and LQRE {?, @′}
(Lemma 5).
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Suppose ?∗∗ > 12 and that {?
2, @2} exists. In this case, Δ D̄1( 12 ) < Δ D̄2(
1
2 ). As \ → ∞, {?\ , @\ } →
{ 12 ,
1
2 } and thus Δ D̄2(?\ ) → Δ D̄2(
1
2 ) and Δ D̄1(@\ ) → Δ D̄1(
1
2 ). By part (vi) of Theorem 10, as \ → ∞,
Δ Ē(\) → ∞, and thus, for sufficiently small ? ∈ ( 12 , ?
2), all EQRE {?, @; \} are such that Δ D̄1(?) <
Δ D̄2(@) < Δ Ē(\) and _∗2 > _
∗
1 (part (iii) of Theorem 10). Thus, for all sufficiently small ? ∈ (
1
2 , ?
2), @ > @′
for EQRE {?, @} and LQRE {?, @′} (Lemma 5).
We have established the local behavior of the EQRE set in neighborhoods of {?∗∗, @∗∗}, {?∗∗, 12 }, and
{ 12 ,
1
2 }. We now use the path connectedness of the EQRE and LQRE sets and invoke Lemma 7 to show that
the EQRE set can only cross the LQRE set at specific points:
If ?∗∗ > 12 , then by path connectedness, the EQRE set must cross the LQRE set at exactly {?
∗∗, 12 }. This
shows ().
If {?1, @1} exists, by path connectedness, the EQRE set must cross the LQRE set at some {?′, @′} with
@
′ ∈ (@∗∗, 12 ). By But by Lemma 7, the sets can only cross at {?
1, @1}. If {?1, @1} does not exist, by
the same lemma, the EQRE set cannot cross the LQRE set at any @
′ ∈ (@∗∗, 12 ). This shows (III)-(i) and
(III)-(ii).
If {?2, @2} exists, by path connectedness, the EQRE set must cross the LQRE set at some {?′, @′} with
?
′ ∈ ( 12 , ?
∗∗). But by Lemma 7, the sets can only cross at {?2, @2}. If {?2, @2} does not exist, by the same
lemma, the EQRE set cannot cross the LQRE set at any ?
′ ∈ ( 12 , ?
∗∗). This shows (III)-(iii) and (III)-(iv).
All that remains is to show that the EQRE set cannot cross D+ ∪ D− or 0+ ∪ 0− at any points other than
{?1, @1} and {?2, @2}. At any EQRE {?′, @′; \} ∈ D+ ∪ D−, Δ D̄1(@
′) = Δ D̄2(?






′;_∗1} an LQRE, but {?
1, @1} and {?2, @2} are the only LQRE in D+ ∪ D−. Thus, the
EQRE set cannot cross D+ ∪ D− except at {?1, @1} or {?2, @2}. The EQRE set cannot cross 0+ ∪ 0− at any
point other than {?1, @1} or {?2, @2} because the EQRE set is otherwise bounded away from 0+ ∪ 0− by the
LQRE set, D+ ∪ D−, or boundary of the regular set. This shows (II). 
Proof of Theorem 11
To facilitate comparison between this proof and the analogous one for standard LQRE (Theorem 3 in
[1]), we freely borrow from [1]. We highlight only the most interesting differences. While parts of the proof
only go through for games in which  (8) = 2 for all 8, we use general notation to emphasize what can be
said for normal form games and where the proof breaks down. The proof uses the following lemma, which
holds for normal form games.
7. For sufficiently large \, ?∗

(\) is a singleton.
Proof. For any E8 ∈ R (8) , _∗8 (E8; \) is a singleton for sufficiently large \ by Lemma 3. Since, for any
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finite game Γ, the set of all possible expected payoffs {D̄(?) ∈ R : ? ∈ Δ} is compact, this can be
extended to games: for sufficiently high \, _∗
8
(D̄8 (?−8); \) is a singleton for all 8 and ?−8 ∈ Δ−8. Thus, for
sufficiently large \, the mapping q : Δ → Δ with components q8: (?; \) = 4
_∗
8




(D̄8 (?−8 ) ;\ ) D̄8; (?−8 )
is a
continuous function. For this proof, we always take \ sufficiently large for this to be the case. Then, for any
\, (?, \) ∈ (?∗

(\), \) if and only if ? is a fixed point of q.
We will show that for \ sufficiently large, q is a contraction mapping, and hence has a unique fixed
point. To prove the result, we use three basic facts from [1]. We also use a fourth fact which is unique to our
problem. For convenience, we define utility differences (i.e. across actions, given the opponents’ behavior)
by D8:; (0−8) = D8 (08: , 0−8) − D8 (08;, 0−8) and D8:; (?−8) =
∑
0−8 ∈−8 D8:; (0−8)?−8 (0−8).
Fact 1. For any ?, @ ∈ Δ0 (the interior of Δ), <0G8: |?8: − @8: | ≤ <0G8:; |?8:/?8; − @8:/@8; |.
Fact 2. Since the derivative of 4G at G = 0 is 1, then for all  > 1, there is a X such that whenever
|G1 |, |G2 | < X, |4G1 − 4G2 | ≤  · |G1 − G2 |.
Fact 3. There is an " > 0 such that <0G8:; |D8:; (?−8) − D8:; (@−8) | ≤ " · <0G8: |?8: − @8: |.
Fact 4. For any ?, @ ∈ Δ and \:
<0G8:; |_∗8 (D̄8 (?−8); \)D8:; (?−8) − _∗8 (D̄8 (@−8); \)D8:; (@−8) |
≤<0G 9
(
<0G{_∗9 (D̄ 9 (?− 9); \), _∗9 (D̄ 9 (@− 9); \)}
)
· <0G8:; |D8:; (?−8) − D8:; (@−8) |
Since _∗
8
≥ 0, Fact 4 is obvious whenever D8:; (?−8) ≠ D8:; (@−8) for some 8:;. And when D8:; (?−8) =
D8:; (@−8) for all 8:;, _∗8 (D̄8 (?−8); \) = _∗8 (D̄8 (@−8); \) = 0 for all 8, in which case both sides of the inequality
equal 0 and it is satisfied trivially.
Pick any  > 1, and let X be defined as in Fact 2, and " defined as in Fact 3. Pick \̄ sufficiently large
such that _ ≡ <0G8 ?_∗8 (D̄8 (?−8); \̄) satisfies
1. _D8:; (?−8) < X for all 8, :, ;, and any ?, and
2. _ < 1/( · ").
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Letting ‖ · ‖ represent the sup norm and writing d ≡ _ ·  · " , we have that for any ?, @ ∈ Δ
‖q(?) − q(@)‖ = <0G8: |q8: (?) − q8: (@) |




(D̄8 (?−8); \̄)D8:; (?−8) − 4_∗8 (D̄8 (@−8); \̄)D8:; (@−8) |
≤  · <0G8:; |_∗8 (D̄8 (?−8); \̄)D8:; (?−8) − _∗8 (D̄8 (@−8); \̄)D8:; (@−8) |
≤ <0G 9
(
<0G{_∗9 (D̄ 9 (?− 9); \̄), _∗9 (D̄ 9 (@− 9); \̄)}
)
·  · <0G8:; |D8:; (?−8) − D8:; (@−8) |
≤ _ ·  · " · <0G8: |?8: − @8: |
= d · ‖? − @‖
where d < 1. The steps follow, respectively, by the definition of ‖ · ‖, Fact 1, the definition of q, Fact 2, Fact
4, Fact 3 and the definition of _, and the definitions of d and ‖ · ‖. Finally, since _∗
8
(E8; \) is decreasing in \
for any fixed E8, ‖q(?) − q(@)‖ ≤ d · ‖? − @‖ for any \ > \̄. Hence, q is a contraction mapping and has a
unique fixed point for sufficiently large \.

Fix game form Γ, and let U represent the set of all possible payoff functions for Γ. For each 8 ∈ # ,
define <8 =  (8) − 1 and "8 = {1, ..., <8}. Write #−8 = # − {8} and < =
∑
8∈# <8. Define ?80 = ?8 (8)
and 8 = {?8 ∈ R<8 : ?8: ≥ 0 for all : ∈ "8 and
∑
:∈"8 ?8: ≤ 1}. Write 08 for the interior of 8.
Using the identity ?80 = ?8 (8) = 1 −
∑
:∈"8 ?8: , a mixed strategy ?8 ∈ Δ8 can be identified by the first
<8 components, i.e. by a vector in 8. Write  =
∏
8∈# 8, and 0 for the interior of . A vector
? = (?1, ..., ?=) ∈  is referred to as a mixed profile.
For any D ∈ U, as in the proof of Lemma 7, define utility differences D8:; (0−8) = D8 (08: , 0−8) −
D8 (08;, 0−8), D8:0(0−8) = D8: (8) (0−8), and D8:; (?) = D8:; (?−8) =
∑
0−8 ∈−8 D8:; (0−8)?−8 (0−8). Define - =
0 × (0,∞) and correspondence  : - ×U ⇒ R< with components given by, for any 8 ∈ # and : ∈ "8,






Note that we have redefined _∗
8
as a function of payoff differences relative to the utility of action 08 (8) ,
which is without loss. The use of correspondence (3.9) is unique to our problem.
For any D ∈ U, write 5D (?, \) =  (?, \, D). For any given D ∈ U, ?∗ (\) = {? : 5D (?, \) = 0} and the
EQRE graph G = {(?∗

(\), \) : 0 < \ < ∞} is given by G = 5 −1D (0), where 0 is the <-dimensional vector
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of zeros. If _∗
8
: R (8)−1 × (0,∞) ⇒ [0,∞) is single-valued, then 5D is a continuous function. Then, 5 −1D (0)
would be a closed set (preimage of a closed set), and hence G would be upper hemi-continuous. Hence, if
the game is such that _∗
8
is single-valued, then part (i) of Theorem 11 is satisfied. This is true in the case
where  (8) = 2 for all 8, but it is not true in general (see discussion in Section 3.2).
When  (8) = 2 for all 8, replace (3.9) with  : - ×U → R= (< = = in this case) defined by





for all 8. Again, for any given D ∈ U, the EQRE correspondence is given by G = 5 −1D (0). We will show
that, for any (?, \) ∈ - ,  is surjective. Note that for any n ∈ [0,∞),










where ñ ∈ (−∞,∞) depends on ?. Hence,  is surjective for fixed (?, \) ∈ - if _∗
8
( |D810(?) |; \)D810(?) :
U → (−∞,∞) is surjective. This follows from part (iv) of Theorem 10 after noting that D810(?) : U →
(−∞,∞) is surjective for fixed ?. Hence,  (?, \, D) is transversal to any submanifold of R=. By the
transversality theorem (Guillemin and Pollack, 1974: 68), for almost all D ∈ U, 5D (?, \) =  (?, \, D) is
transversal to 0. It follows (Guillemin and Pollack, 1974: 28) that 5 −1D (0) is a manifold of codimension
= = <, or dimension 1, for almost all D ∈ U. These particular theorems from differential topology were
invoked previously in [9], but not in [1].
The rest of the proof, which differs from the analogue in [1] in only very minor ways, goes through for
any normal form game in which G is a manifold. We have shown this only for the binary action case, but
we conjecture that it is considerably more general.
Note that the previous argument can be extended to the case when the domain of 5D is bounded: for any
2 = (2, 2̄) with 0 < 2 < 2̄, define -2 ⊂ - by -2 = 0 × [2, 2̄]. Then -2 is a (< + 1)-dimensional manifold
with boundary, and G2 = 5 −1D (0) ∩ -2 is a 1-dimensional manifold with boundary.
Now pick " > 0 so that for all ? ∈ Δ, BD?8:; |D8:; (?) | ≤ " . Define _(\) ≡ <0G8 ?_∗8 (D̄8 (?−8); \),
0\ = 4
−_(\)" , and 1\ = 4_(\)" . Then it follows that for any (?, \) ∈ G, that





≤ _(\) · " =⇒ 0\ ?80 ≤ ?8: ≤ 1\ ?80.
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But




=⇒ ?80 ≥ 1/(1\<8 + 1)
and
?8: ≥ 0\ ?80 =⇒ ?8: ≥ 0\/(1\<8 + 1) = 2\ .
Since 0\ ≤ 1, it follows that for all 0 ≤ : ≤ <8 (i.e. including : = 0) the above inequality holds. Define
, = {(?, \) ∈ - : ?8: ≥ 2\ for all 8 ∈ #, 0 ≤ : ≤ <8}.
Thus, we have shown that G ⊂ , ∩ - . Similarly, G2 ⊂ , ∩ -2. In other words, the EQRE graph can only
“exit” - (i.e. have ? on the boundary ) at the minimum and maximum values of \.
We wish to show that in generic games, the EQRE graph can be used to make a unique selection of
a Nash equilibrium. To do this, we use two facts. First, as we have already shown in Lemma 7, there is
a unique solution for sufficiently large \. Second, we will show that this branch of the correspondence
converges to a unique Nash equilibrium as \ goes to 0.
We have now shown enough to prove part (ii) of Theorem 11, that for almost all \, there are an odd num-
ber of EQREs. From the argument, setting 2 = (2, 2̄), we have shown that G2 is a compact, 1-dimensional
manifold with boundary, which for large enough 2̄, has a unique intersection with \ = 2̄. Any such mani-
fold has a finite number of connected, compact components, each of which must have an even number of
boundary points. We have also shown that any boundary point must be at \ = 2̄ or \ = 2. Since there is
exactly one solution at \ = 2̄, there must be an odd number of solutions at 2.
We now show part (iii) of Theorem 11, that as \ → 0, the branch B of the manifold that passes through
2̄ (for sufficiently high 2̄) converges to a unique Nash equilibrium.
8. Let \̄ be chosen so that ?∗

(\̄) is a singleton. Then for almost all games, as \ → 0, the branch B of the
manifold that passes through \̄ converges to a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof. It follows from the arguments above that for almost all games there exists a decreasing sequence
{\8} with \8 < \̄ for all 8, such that if we define 28 = (\8 , \̄), -8 = -28 , and G8 = G28 ⊂ G,
1. G is a 1-dimensional manifold with a unique point, say ( ?̄, \̄), for which \ = \̄, and a unique
connected branch B that passes through ( ?̄, \̄).
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2. G8 is a compact 1-dimensional manifold with boundary, which has a finite number of connected
components
3. Letting B8 be the connected branch of G8 which begins at ( ?̄, \̄), it follows that B8 is a compact
connected 1-dimensional manifold with boundary for all 8, which has a unique intersection, say (?8 , \8),
with \ = \8.
Now for any 8, define A8 = {(?, \) ∈ B : \ < \8} and 8 to be the closure of the projection of A8 onto
. Then {8} is a decreasing sequence of sets. We show that for almost all games, ∩88 must be a unique
point. First of all, since  is compact and each 8 is closed and nonempty, ∩88 cannot be empty. Suppose
by way of contradiction that ∩88 contains two distinct points. Since generic games contain a finite number
of Nash equilibria, we may assume that the game defined by D has a finite number of Nash equilibria. By
Theorem 8, any point in ∩88 must be a Nash equilibrium. But if ?∗∗ and @∗∗ are both in ∩88, then we can
construct a sequence {(?8 , \8)} ⊂ B with ?28−1 → ?∗∗, ?28 → @∗∗, \8 → 0 (i.e. “odds” approach ?∗∗ and
“evens” approach @∗∗), and a homeomorphism q : R→ B satisfying several properties. In particular, since
B is connected, it is also path connected (Guillemin and Pollack, p. 38 exercise 3), so q can be constructed
to satisfy q(0) = ( ?̄, \̄), q(8) = (?8 , \8), and q[8 − 1, 8] ∩ q[8, 8 + 1] = q(8) with q[8, 8 + 1] a compact
1-dimensional manifold with boundary.
We have constructed an infinite sequence of compact manifolds with boundary, each of whose projec-
tion on  connects a point near ?∗∗ with a point near @∗∗. Further, for any \8, at most a finite number
of these manifolds intersect with -8 (since B ∩ -8 is a compact 1-dimensional manifold with boundary,
which can consist of at most a finite number of components.) It follows that any separating hyperplane
C = {? ∈  : ? · (?∗∗ − @∗∗) = C} between @∗∗ and ?∗∗ must have a nonempty intersection with ∩88
(by compactness of C ). However, since there are an infinity of such hyperplanes, there are infinitely many
points in ∩88 and hence an infinite number of Nash equilibria, which is a contradiction. 
3.7.3 Under power costs, the EQRE set is invariant to scaling





(VE8; V:+1\) for any V > 0, and (ii) the EQRE set is unaffected by V-scalings: E(VΓ, _:) = E(Γ, _:)
where VΓ is the same as Γ up to a V-scaling of all players’ payoffs.
Proof. (i): Let 2(_) = _: for : > 1. To show that &∗
8
(E8; \) = &∗8 (VE8; V:+1\), it is enough to show that
_̃ ∈ _∗
8
(E8; \) if and only if 1V _̃ ∈ _
∗
8
(VE8; V:+1\) since &8 (E8; _̃) = &8 (VE8; 1V _̃). To this end, re-write the
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first-order condition (3.3) for 2(_) = _: :




















6(VE8;_) − (\V:+1):_:−1 = 0, (3.11)
which completes the proof. First, notice from inspecting 6(E8;_) that 6(VE8;_) = V26(E8;_V). Using this




_̃)V) − (\V:+1): ( 1
V
_̃):−1 = 0 ⇐⇒
V26(E8; _̃) − \V2:_̃:−1 = 0 ⇐⇒
6(E8; _̃) − \:_̃:−1 = 0.
(ii): It follows from part (i) that any EQRE of Γ associated with \ is an EQRE of VΓ associated with
\
′
= V:+1\. Thus, every EQRE of Γ is in one-to-one correspondence with an EQRE of VΓ, so the two sets
must be the same. 
3.7.4 Property 4 of &∗
For this part, we drop the 8 subscript. Hence, we use & 9 , &∗9 , and _
∗ instead of &8 9 , &∗8 9 , and _
∗
8
. E ∈ R
is a vector with components E1, ..., E indexed by 9 , : , ;, or <. Unless stated otherwise, all sums go from 1
to . Finally, define a ≡ <0G 9{E 9} as the highest utility alternative.
In what follows, assume that E 9 > 0 for all 9 without loss (translation invariance of & 9 and &∗9). The
case in which E 9 = E; = a for all ; is trivial, so assume that E 9 = a > E; for some ;. Under this condition,




if product G ≡ _E 9 increases, i.e. even
if _ decreases by a small amount with the increase in E 9 . Since we only consider \ sufficiently low and
sufficiently high, we can take &∗
9




as E 9 increases, we analyze the behavior of _∗E 9 via the system:















− \2′ (_) = 0
k(G, _; E 9) = G − _E 9 = 0.
These are merely the first-order condition (3.3) and the definition of G. Using the implicit function theorem,





m(G,_) > 0 for sufficiently low and high \, where
m (q, k)






















From previous results, m
21 (E;_)
m_2








 = − [ m21 (E;_)m_2 − \2′′ (_)] > 0 for sufficiently low and high \ as well. It remains
to show that m(q,k)
m(E9 ,_) < 0 for sufficiently low and high \.
m (q, k)




































:,; (E2; − E;E: )4









:≠ 9 (2E 9 − 2E:)/2 = 2
(
( − 1)a −∑:≠ 9 E: ) /2 > 0. By continuity,
mq
mE9
> 0 for sufficiently low _, which is implied by sufficiently high \. Since m
21 (E;_)
m_2
− \2′′ (_) < 0 for
sufficiently high \ also, m(q,k)
m(E9 ,_) < 0 and the result follows.











, and hence it is



























(a(a2 − `2 + 2`a − 2a`) + `(`2 − a2 + 2a` − 2`a))
} ª®®¬ · 4_(`−a)
=
(
−2a2 + 2a` + _(`3 − `2a)
)
· 4_(`−a) ,
where ` < a is the second largest component of E. This approaches 0, but is negative for _ < ∞. Hence, for
sufficiently large _, which is implied by low \, m(q,k)
m(E9 ,_) < 0 and the result follows.
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